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ABSTRACT
This study examines the role of increasing import competition in
the dramatic decline in the economic position of less-educated
U.S. workers between 1979 and 1989. It documents the trend of
stagnant or declining earnings for high school dropouts and high
school graduates. It also finds that, in contrast to the
previous decade of the 1970s, most age cohorts of less-educated
workers did not see their earnings improve over the 1980s as
their level of work experience increased.
As a first step in ascertaining whether the large growth in
imports over the 1980s played a role in these earnings trends for
less-educated workers, the study finds that less-educated workers
lost employment in import-competing industries at a
disproporationate rate when compared with workers in other
industry categories. However, when less-educated workers are
divided into high school dropouts and high school graduates, it
finds that the distinction based on industry import-sensitivity
is valid only for high school graduates because high school
dropouts experienced devastating employment losses across all
industries.
Two regression models were run to further examine the role of
imports. The first estimates the effects of living in a
metropolitan area with an import-sensitive industry structure on
workers' earnings, probability of employment, and annual hours of
work. This model finds strong local labor market effects on
earnings, particularly for less-educated, women, Black, and
Hispanic workers, but not on the probability of employment or
annual hours of work. The second regression model estimates the
effects of import-sensitivity on a metropolitan area's mean level
of annual earnings and its labor force participation rate and
finds that metropolitan import-sensitivity has significant
effects. The results were strongest for women's earnings and
labor force participation rates, with negligible real effects for
men. The study's conclusion places these findings in the broader
context of current global economic restructuring.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
Over the 1980s, earnings inequality among U.S. workers
increased at an alarming rate. This pervasive increase in
earnings inequality reflected widening wage differentials based
on education, age, race, industry, and occupation. Moreover, the
growth in earnings divergence resulted not only from an increase
in earnings at the top of the earnings distribution, but from a
decline in real earnings for those at the bottom, particularly
among less-educated men. Because the rise in inequality occurred
over the same period that the U.S. economy grew increasingly
subject to intense global competition, international trade --
particularly import competition -- has been considered a prime
suspect among those searching for an explanation.
In this study, I examine the role of impor.t competition in
the dramatic decline in the economic position of U.S. workers
between 1979 and 1989. Following a review of the literature
which both documents and seeks to explain the growth in earnings
inequality, I pursue three lines of inquiry. I begin in chapter
two by documenting the trend in real mean earnings for different
demographic groups of U.S. workers between 1969 and 1989. I also
compare the earnings of ten-year age cohorts of workers between
1979 and 1989 with those of the age cohort in the previous decade
in order to ascertain whether the current generation of workers
has fared as well as the previous one.
As a first step in analyzing whether the large growth in
imports played a role in the trend of declining earnings for
less-educated workers, in chapter three I examine whether less-
educated workers lost employment in import-competing industries
at a disproportionate rate when compared with workers in other
industry categories, as we would expect they would if imports
were the driving force behind wage declines. In addition to
analyzing the data for all less-educated workers, I also examine
the experience of high school dropouts and high school graduates
separately.
In my final piece of data analysis, in chapter four I
examine the role of import-competition in the earnings and
employment of workers across a broad array of metropolitan labor
markets by running two regression models. The first model
estimates the effects of living in a metropolitan area with an
import-sensitive industry structure on workers' earnings,
probability of employment, and annual hours of work. The second
model estimates the effects of import-sensitivity on a
metropolitan area's mean level of annual earnings and its labor
force participation rate. In chapter five, I offer a summary of
my research results and a critique of my methodology. I then
close by considering my findings in the broader context of the
current wave of global economic restructuring and the new forms
of labor market segmentation which have resulted from it.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In this review of the literature, I begin with an overview
of research which provides evidence of the growth in wage
divergence in the United States and discuss what this research
tells us about the underlying causes of the increase in
inequality. A review of cross-country comparisons of earnings
inequality follows. Section three then reviews and evaluates six
of the most plausible explanations for the growth in inequality,
giving special attention to the role of international trade.
These six explanations, which are divided into demand, supply,
and institutional factors, are technological change,
international trade, the relative growth in the supply of better-
educated workers, immigration, deunionization, and the declining
value of the minimum wage. Section four then discusses new
evidence of growing earnings instability and its role in earnings
divergence, which is followed by an overview of the literature
exploring the geographic dimensions of wage inequality within the
United States in section five. The review closes with a brief
summary of the evidence on factors which explain the growth in
U.S. wage inequality.
I. Evidence of Rising U.S. Wage Inequality
A. Early Studies
As early as 1972, Peter Henle of the U.S. Department of
Labor first reported evidence of increasing earnings inequality.
Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Henle found
that the earned income distribution for men during the period
1958 to 1970 showed a slow but persistent trend toward greater
inequality both for all male earners and for male earners working
full-time and year-round. In a later article in 1980, Henle and
Ryscavage found a continuation of the basic trend toward
inequality in male earnings, though the trend seemed to have
slowed some from 1970 to 1977. The results for women were more
ambiguous.
Both the earlier and later studies discuss four developments
which the authors felt may account for the greater inequality in
earnings for men:
* the growing importance of voluntary part-time work;
* the increasing flow of young people into the labor
force;
* the changing occupational structure, most importantly
the growth of high-paid professionals and managers; and
* the pattern of increases in earnings which, in many
cases, meant higher increases in rates of pay for
higher-earning occupations.
The authors argued that slower movement toward inequality over
the period 1970 to 1978 could be explained by the fact that these
four trends also decreased over the same period.
Because real earnings for men continued to grow into the
early 1970s, these first reports of increasing earnings
inequality did not seem to raise alarms. Perhaps a second reason
for the low-key response was that there appeared to be an easy
explanation with the evidence of increased returns to experience
(Welch, 1979) that accompanied the entrance of large cohorts of
baby boomers into the labor market. If the source of the trend
lay in demographics, it was clear that the situation would
eventually correct itself. At the same time, Freeman (1976) had
found evidence of decreasing returns to education which appeared
to be a robust trend working in the opposite direction.
In an article which built on the work of Henle and
Ryscavage, Dooley and Gottschalk (1982) showed that the growing
inequality of male earnings couldn't be explained by either the
growing number of youth in the labor force (the baby boom
hypothesis) or by education effects. The authors considered two
explanations for the growth of inequality. Their first
explanation was that increased transfer programs may have created
"disequalizing labor supply responses." to transfer income.1
However, since the trend was found for higher earner groups who
would not have been affected by transfers, the authors felt this
explanation was inadequate. Their second proposed explanation
was that workers of the baby boom generation may have a greater
variance of skill and education investment. However, accounting
for this effect eliminated some of the inequality but some
remained. The authors concluded by saying that an explanation
for the greater inequality in earnings, both within demographic
groups and within occupations, remained an important topic for
further research.
Writing with Danziger, Gottschalk also examined the
role that increased earnings inequality played in the
dramatic rise in poverty between 1979 and 1982 (Danziger and
Gottschalk, 1983). The authors examined trends in poverty
for selected years from 1967 to 1982, as well as projected
how economic growth, the level of income transfers, and the
shape of the income distribution would affect poverty rates
in 1983 and 1984. Danziger and Gottschalk noted that
inequality of earnings, which strongly affects the shape of
I Dooley and Gottschalk, 1982, p. 45.
the income distribution, increased during recessions and
grew over time during this period. Because of layoffs and
reduced working time, an increase in earnings inequality
during recessions is not unexpected. However, the increase
in the trend level of earnings inequality over time eluded
simple explanation. From 1979 to 1982, poverty increased by
3.3 percentage points. The authors noted that,
"...even with sustained three percent real growth in
market incomes for all households it would still take
about eleven years to reduce poverty from the 1982 rate
to its 1979 level, if all other factors, including
transfers, remained constant." 2
Danziger and Gottschalk felt that the key factor in the
limited effectiveness of economic growth in reducing poverty
was the limited extent to which female-headed households
benefit from increases in market income and were pessimistic
about this situation changing in the near future.
A report on earnings inequality by Bluestone, Harrison,
and Tilly (1986) confirmed earlier findings of important
changes in the distribution of earnings. The authors
reported that wage and salary inequality, as measured by the
variance of the natural logarithm of annual earnings for all
workers, declined dramatically during the 1960s, continued a
slow decline until 1978, and then increased dramatically
from 1978 to 1983 (the final year calculated). Not only was
this trend in inequality apparent for all workers, but also
among year-round/full-time workers, men and women, youth,
and middle-aged workers.
A subsequent article based on the report's findings
(Harrison, Tilly, and Bluestone, 1986) included a discussion
of factors which were often credited with the increase in
inequality: the business cycle, the excess supply of younger
workers from the baby boom, and the strong dollar because of
its negative effect on employment in higher-wage export
2 Danziger and Gottschalk, 1983, p. 26.
industries. The authors reported that,
"According to our results, only about a third of the
year-to-year variation in wage inequality is explained
by these often-cited variables. While the three
predictors do have some impact on wage inequality, the
underlying U-shaped path of our indicator of wage
inequality still vividly stands out in the data."'
In a later study, Tilly, Harrison, and Bluestone (1986)
explored the reasons for the growth in earnings inequality
further. The authors found that :
* roughly two-thirds of the total increase in
inequality between 1978 and 1984 was attributable to growing
dispersion in hourly wage rates;
* virtually nothing of the increase in inequality could
be explained by changes in the demographic composition of
the labor force due to age, race, or sex;
* changes in the distribution of human capital, as
measured by education and labor force experience, did not
explain the increase in inequality;
* the growth in the share of total employment of part-
time workers and the fall of annual wages of part-time
workers relative to other workers factored significantly in
the increase in variance of annual wages and salaries; and
* a significant share of the increase in inequality was
attributable to both shifts in earnings within industries,
and to shifts in employment between industries.
Tilly, Harrison and Bluestone emphasized that the
importance of industry factors, changes in the distribution
of hourly earnings, and the growth of part-time work in
their results pointed to the significance of demand-side
factors in explaining the increase in earnings inequality.
They also stressed that a significant share of the increase
in inequality could not be accounted for by any of the above
factors. According to the authors,
3 Harrison, Tilly, and Bluestone, 1986, p.13.
"By default, this leaves open the possibility that
institutional mechanisms rather than simply supply or
demand shifts play an important role in the U-turn in
inequality. For example, some of the increase in
inequality may be explained by the growth of two-tiered
or pay-for-performance wage systems, whose
'flexibility' from a management perspective almost
certainly increases wage inequality among workers.
Further investigation is necessary to provide a fuller
explanation of the U-turn in inequality."4
While the reasons behind the growth in wage inequality
were not clear from these early studies, they did establish
several important facts about the trend which eliminated
certain simple explanations. First, it could not be
attributed to demographic shifts based on age, race, or sex.
Second, inequality grew both within and between different
industries, occupations, and demographic groups. The fact
that inequality appeared to be growing within fairly
narrowly-defined industries cast doubt on the possibility
that a simple shift from manufacturing to services was
wholly to blame. Third, it could not be explained by shifts
in working time, since most of it was caused by increased
variance in hourly wage rates. The picture that began to
emerge from these early analyses was that of a very broad-
based phenomena that appeared to affect every sector of the
economy and every group in the labor market. New concerns
were raised about whether the changing shape of the earnings
distribution was affecting the supply of employment which
could sustain a middle class standard of living. The
resulting debate over the quality of jobs, which was
instrumental in focussing the attention of the public as
well as the academic community on the increase in
inequality, is briefly discussed next.
B. The Debate Over Job Quality
Tilly, Harrison, and Bluestone, 1986, p. 4.
At the same time that researchers were publishing these
early reports of growing wage inequality which extended into
the mid-1980s, a second related debate was occurring over
the issue of job quality. The possibility that the share of
jobs paying a middle class wage was declining was first
introduced in the popular press by Kuttner as early as 1983,
partly in response to the widespread loss of manufacturing
employment in the recent back-to-back recessions which had
given rise to the supposition that the country was
deindustrializing (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).
Lawrence (1984) and Bluestone and Harrison (1986) soon
confirmed that the idea that the economy was losing middle
class jobs had some basis in fact. Lawrence's study
emphasized that the earnings distribution for full-time men
had shifted so that the proportion of those defined as
having middle-level earnings had shrunk from 56 to 47
percent of all earners. Though defining the middle somewhat
differently, Bluestone and Harrison came to a similar
conclusion but the emphasis of their findings was on the
growth of jobs at the low end of the earnings distribution.
Their study confirmed that not only had the share of low-
wage employment increased from 1979 to 1985, but also that
low-wage jobs constituted a dramatically larger share of new
job growth over the same period than they had in the two
preceding periods 1963-73 and 1973-79.
Following publication of the Bluestone/Harrison study,
several analysts voiced criticism that the study reflected
only the effects of the business cycle on wages (Kosters and
Ross, 1987, 1988; Norwood, 1987). Because the 1979 to 1985
period contained a major recession, the critics contended
that both part-year and part-time employment had risen
dramatically and that this accounted for the large growth in
low-wage employemnt. In response to this criticism,
Bluestone and Harrison (1987) "decycled" their results and
applied the same analysis to only year-round, full-time
workers. Contrary to the expectation that the results would
wash out once part-time and part-year workers were
eliminated, they proved to be equally, if not more, robust.
This was an indication that structural, rather than only
cyclical, factors were responsible for the growth of low-
wage employment.
Because of the combination of the continuing evidence
of growing earnings inequality and a growth of jobs at the
low end of the earnings distribution, support for the notion
that these labor market trends were of no concern quickly
diminished. The debate over job quality also fueled anxiety
over the mounting evidence that inequality of family incomes
was growing. Studies of the reasons for this increasing
divergence in family incomes pointed directly at earnings
inequality as the primary cause (Levy, 1989; Loveman and
Tilly, 1988; Joint Economic Committee, 1992). Researchers
now turned their attentions to two main areas of inquiry:
achieving a better understanding of the complexity of the
increase in earnings inequality, and sorting out the factors
responsible for its occurrence.
C. Research Exploring Additional Dimensions of the Growth in
Inequality
As the long economic recovery of the 1980s continued,
new research again confirmed that the growth in earnings
inequality was not a cyclical phenomenon and, by using data
on usual weekly or hourly earnings, further demonstrated
that the trend was not explained simply by growing variance
in weeks and hours of employment (Blackburn and Bloom, 1987;
Bluestone, 1989; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1989; Burtless,
1990). While the existence of a clear "U-turn" in earnings
inequality appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the choice
of indicators, when the labor market data was examined
separately for men and women two distinct trends emerged
(Karoly, 1993). Consistent with the earlier work of Henle
and Ryscavage (Henle, 1972; Henle and Ryscavage, 1980) the
trend for men showed a steady increase in inequality
beginning in the 1960s with an acceleration after 1979,
while that for women showed the increase in inequality
beginning in the 1980s (Blackburn and Bloom, 1987; Karoly,
1992; Burtless, 1990).
Not only did research reveal differences along gender
lines, but differences along other demographic dimensions as
well. Perhaps the most important findings of this research
detailed the persistent increase in inequality both within
and between education and age groups (Murphy and Welch,
1988, 1989a; Bound and Johnson, 1989; Levy, 1989; Mishel and
Bernstein, 1992). Mishel and Bernstein reported that
college-educated workers earned 37.7 percent more than high
school educated workers in 1979, but 55.7 percent more in
1989. Pierce and Welch (1994) pointed out that the earnings
of older workers had generally increased relative to younger
workers over the 1980s, but that the timing of the change in
the wage differential was different for college graduates
than for high school graduates. Among high school
graduates, Pierce and Welch found a steady increase in the
returns to experience over the 1970s and 1980s. For college
graduates, however, the returns to experience at the median
of the distribution declined until 1970, increased over the
1970s, then declined again over the 1980s.5 Freeman and
Katz (1994) also reported that the rising returns to
experience found among high school graduates in the 1980s
did not extend to workers with a college education.
The work of Murphy and Welch (1988, 1989a) concluded
that the widening earnings differential between more and
less-educated workers was due to a decline in the wages of
high school dropouts and high school graduates which
s Pierce and Welch, 1994, p. 164.
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resulted from an inward shift of the demand curve for less-
skilled labor. They also argued that the shift in the
demand curve had its roots in the expanding trade deficit,
particularly from increased import penetration over the
1980s.
A number of papers served to further reinforce the fact
that earnings inequality was increasing among workers who,
at least on the face of it, appeared to be very similar as
defined by industry, workforce experience, education, and
even occupation (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1989; Karoly,
1993; Katz and Murphy, 1991; Moffitt, 1989). This evidence
of growing within-group inequality clarified that
demographic, industry, and even occupational shifts could
not adequately explain the surge in inequality. Because
inequality was growing within age and education groups, it
also ruled out the possibility that a decline in the quality
of education among younger age cohorts was to blame.
In addition to differences in the timing of increasing
inequality between women and men mentioned above, other
important differences became apparent in the findings for
men and women. First, while earnings inequality increased
within each gender group over the 1980s, for women real
median earnings continued to increase while for men they
declined. Between 1979 and 1989, the real median hourly
wage for women rose by 5.3 percent while that for men
declined by 11.7 percent (Mishel and Bernstein, 1992).
Second, the overall result of these countervailing earnings
trends was that male and female earnings continued to
converge over the 1980s among all workers and among both
Whites and Blacks (Sorenson, 1991) -- a rare exception to
the general rule of earnings divergence along almost any
other demographic dimension (for example race, age, and
education). In 1979, the median hourly wage for women was
62.8 percent of that for men and by 1989 this figure had
risen to 74.9 percent; however, over 70 percent of this
convergence was due to the decline of male earnings (Mishel
and Bernstein, 1992).
Other research documented important differences in wage
inequality along racial as well as along gender lines.
Unlike the earnings convergence between men and women which
continued into the 1980s, the convergence of Black and White
earnings which had been apparent in the 1970s ceased in the
1980s (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1989; Sorenson, 1992;
Mishel and Bernstein, 1992). The divergence in Black/White
earnings is found among all workers as well as among men and
women workers examined separately (Sorenson, 1992). After
controlling for education, experience, and region, Mishel
and Bernstein (1992, p. 206) found that Blacks earned an
average of 16.4 percent less on an hourly basis than Whites
in 1989, an increase of over fifty percent from the 1979
level of 10.9 percent. They also found that the largest
increase in the Black/White pay gap occurred among college
graduates where the differential jumped from only 2.5
percent in 1979 to an impressive 15.5 percent in 1989.
In an examination of race and gender differences within
education groups, Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1991) found
that earnings differentials between college and high school
graduates and between high school graduates and those with
less than a high school education increased more for Whites
than for Blacks. Most surprisingly, the authors found that
the earnings differentials between Black high school
graduates and Black high school dropouts actually narrowed
over the 1980s. On the other hand, employment differentials
between education groups increased more for Blacks than
Whites, particularly for the high school/non-high school
comparison.
The work of Pierce and Welch (1994) clarified that the
differing trends in mean earnings for men and women
discussed earlier masked some significant underlying
differences by race and level of education. Among White
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men, for example, they found that real earnings declined for
the less-educated while they improved modestly for those
with four years of college or more. For White women, the
increase in the earnings of college graduates was much
larger than that for White men while the wage decline for
less-educated women was much smaller than that of White men.
Several studies have attempted to explain these
differing trends in wage inequality by gender and race.
Blau and Kahn (1994) find that a variety of supply and
demand factors are responsible for the divergent trends for
men and women. Women have increased their measured
characteristics such as education and experience and they
suggest that it is likely that they have increased their
unmeasured characteristics as well, especially since much of
the male/female wage differential remains unexplained after
controlling for education and experience. Blau and Kahn
also suggest that shifts in the composition of demand may
have favored women over men, as do Katz and Murphy (1991).
Katz and Murphy find that demand shifts favored less-
educated women at the same time that they favored more-
educated men. Consistent with this, Blau and Kahn find that
the male/female wage differential narrowed more at the
bottom of the skill distribution than at the top. They also
find that a major reason for the faster narrowing at the
bottom -- the greater loss of rent-paying jobs for low-skill
men -- is consistent with a demand-side explanation.
Sorenson (1992) tests four traditional explanations for
the widening of the race and narrowing of the gender pay
gaps. These explanations are: a shift away from
manufacturing and toward services; increased demand for
better-educated workers; an increase in women's productivity
characteristics relative to those of men; and a decline in
sex discrimination but an increase in race discrimination.
She finds that these traditional explanations can only
incompletely account for the changes in either the race or
gender pay gap. The improved productivity characteristics
of women cannot account for the narrowing of the gender pay
gap, nor she argues does economic restructuring. She
contends that women must have had increased access to better
employment opportunities over the 1980s but whether this is
due to unmeasured characteristics or a decline in gender
discrimination remains unclear.
Sorenson also argues that while the reasons for the
narrowing of the gender pay gap are similar for Blacks and
Whites, the reasons for the widening of the racial pay gap
are different for women and men. Among men, Blacks were
much more negatively affected by economic restructuring,
particularly the loss of unionized manufacturing jobs.
Because White men have more years of schooling on average
than Black men, the increased returns to education also
benefitted White men more. Among women, economic
restructuring and productivity differences explain little of
the growth in the racial pay gap. Sorenson adds that to the
extent that employer attitudes toward women have improved,
they appear to have benefitted Whites more than Blacks.
Lastly, before I conclude this discussion of race and
gender differences in earnings inequality trends, mention
must be made of the intriguing but somewhat controversial
findings of Lerman (1997a). On the basis of a study using
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP), Lerman argues that overall wage inequality remained
virtually unchanged between 1978 and 1995, even as
inequality among men and among women increased. He argues
that this result is an outgrowth of the fact that inequality
between men and women has decreased as women have found
better employment opportunities and those for less-skilled
men have narrowed.
Why Lerman reaches such different conclusions about the
overall trend in wage inequality is not clear, although one
contributing factor could be that he adjusts the SIPP
earnings data to reflect the number of hours worked at each
wage level in order to calculate his Gini index. SIPP data
also does not share the top-coding problems found in Current
Population Survey data (where all earners reporting above
$99,999 in annual earned income are all given an earnings
value of $99,999, regardless of the actual amount), which is
the source of most other researchers' results.6 Until we
can understand the source of the difference between Lerman's
results and those of others, it is impossible to fully
evaluate them.
Notwithstanding the findings of Lerman, the research
outlining differences in earnings inequality trends within
and between race, gender, work experience, and education
groups points to the impossibility of offering a simple
explanation for their origin. It also casts doubt on an
additional explanation for the growth in inequality -- the
argument that a deterioration in the quality of schooling is
to blame -- and reinforces earlier findings that more than
demographics and deindustrialization are at work. The
pervasiveness of the trend also raises questions about
whether the experience of the United States is somehow
unique or whether this is a fairly universal phenomenon, at
least among advanced industrialized countries. The next
section examines the evidence from cross-country comparisons
of earnings inequality.
II. Cross-Country Comparisons of Earnings Inequality
A growing number of studies document similarities and
differences in earnings inequality trends between the United
States and other advanced industrialized countries over the
1980s (Katz and Revenga, 1989; Blank, 1991; Gottschalk and
6 For a fuller discussion of the top-coding issue and other
CPS measurement issues, see Lerman (1997b).
Joyce, 1991; Card and Freeman, 1993; Freeman and Katz, 1994;
Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997). These examinations of
earnings inequality provide evidence which leads to three
important conclusions. First, the United States lies at the
extreme end of a continuum of wage inequality because of
both its high rate, and its high rate of growth, of earnings
inequality. Second, the United States is not alone in its
experience of widening wage differentials, either among men
or among women. Lastly, considerable diversity exists in
the experience of different countries primarily due to
differences in labor market supply and country-specific
labor market institutions.
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) present an in-depth
summary of the existing literature which provides
comparisons between a broad range of industrialized
countries and the United States. The authors group
countries into four categories, ranging from those with the
most similarity in earnings inequality trends to the United
States to those with the least. In the first group of
countries which had at least as large an increase in
inequality as the United States, only the United Kingdom
qualifies. Gottschalk and Smeeding's second group, which
consists of countries which had a sizeable increase in
earnings inequality but less than that in the U.S., includes
Canada, Australia, and Israel. Group three with quite small
increases in earnings inequality consists of France, Japan,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland. Italy and Germany
comprise a fourth group that exhibited no measurable
increase in earnings inequality over the 1980s.
Freeman and Katz (1994) point out that as a general
rule, those countries with the most decentralized labor
markets, such as the United States and United Kingdom, had
the greatest rise in wage inequality. Even in the case of
the United Kingdom, however, male workers at the bottom of
the distribution benefitted from an increase in real wages;
only in the United States did the real wages of low-wage
male workers decline. Freeman and Katz cite the fact that,
depending on the survey, between 1979 and 1989 real wages
for the bottom decile of U.S. male earners declined by 11 to
17 percent compared to a wage increase of 12 percent for the
bottom decile of British male workers and a 40 percent
increase for those in Japan.7
Freeman and Katz attribute the widespread increase in
wage inequality across countries to a shift in the relative
demand for better-educated workers caused by skill-biased
technological change and, to a lesser extent, by
international trade. However, they also point out that
since these two factors worked in the same direction in each
country over the 1980s, something else much account for the
large variation in outcomes. Their candidates for
explaining the variability in wage inequality trends (and
those of Gottschalk and Smeeding as well) are differences in
the growth of supply of better-educated workers relative to
less-educated workers and differences in wage-setting,
education, and training institutions within each country.
Thus, cross-country comparisons provide important
information which point to a combination of supply, demand,
and institutional factors which can explain not only the
growth of inequality in the United States, but also why the
United States lies at one extreme of an earnings divergence
continuum. At this point, it is appropriate to turn our
attention to the factors that can explain the growth of wage
' Citing different data, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, p.
32) report that Australia and Canada also experienced declines in
real earnings among men at the bottom of the earnings
distribution. It is unclear whether this is truly inconsistent
with Freeman and Katz, or whether they may be looking at
different points in the distribution or a different group of
workers. However, this finding is consistent with Freeman and
Katz's assertion that those countries with the most decentralized
labor market institutions also had the greatest increases in
earnings inequality.
inequality in the United States.
III. Explaining the Growth in U.S. Earnings Inequality
The literature documenting the growth in wage
inequality in the U.S. over the 1980s makes it clear that
earnings differentials widened along a variety of
dimensions, including those of race, age, experience,
industry, occupation, and especially education. In
attempting to sort out the complexity of this phenomenon,
this literature also served to eliminate several factors
which some once suspected of being the primary cause. The
persistence of the growth in inequality over time and the
finding that it existed within older as well as younger age
cohorts eliminated the possibility that demographic shifts
due to the entrance of the baby boom into the labor market
were the root cause, although certainly demographics have
played a small role. Similarly, the growth of inequality
among older age cohorts has cast doubt on the hypothesis
that declining school quality could account for the
declining fortunes of younger workers relative to older
workers. While a narrow view of deindustrialization,
(defined as a shift out of manufacturing and into services)
has certainly played an important role, particularly for
Black males, the large portion of the growth of inequality
which is due to changes within industries and occupations
also eliminates this sectoral shift as the sole or even the
primary explanation for wage divergence.
The story behind the growth in wage inequality over the
1980s is really the story of a number of different factors
all working in the same direction, with some factors more
important than others. Because several factors each caused
inequality to move in the same direction, separating out the
influence of one from another is almost impossible both due
to data limitations and because in some cases the factors
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are not completely independent of one another. For these
reasons, the debate over the causes and consequences of
increasing earnings inequality has continued to be lively.
Nevertheless, the beginnings of a consensus on the
growth of wage inequality seems to be emerging, at least in
terms of the broad outlines of what factors are responsible.
At the top of the list are a mix of demand, supply, and
institutional factors. Within the category of demand
factors, skill-biased technological change and international
trade are the most important. On the supply side, the two
most important influences have been immigration and the
relative growth in the supply of college graduates compared
with high school graduates. Institutional factors include
deunionization and the decline in the real value of the
minimum wage. Because the major focus of this thesis is on
the role of international trade, the section that follows
provides an in-depth review of both the theory and the
applied research on the role of trade in the growth in wage
inequality. This is followed by a broader review of the
remaining demand, supply, and institutional factors listed
earlier, as well as some intriguing new findings on earnings
instability.by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995). Lastly, I
review the literature on the geographic dimensions of wage
inequality since this work mirrors my own emphasis in
chapter four on examining local labor market effects.
A. Demand Factors Causing Earnings Inequality to Increase
1. International Trade
a. The Theory of the Relationship Between Trade and
Wages
The theory of how trade affects wages rests heavily on
the Hecksher-Ohlin model of international trade, as
developed in the work of both Eli Hecksher (1919) and Bertil
Ohlin (1933). The primary tenet of the Hecksher-Ohlin (H-0)
theory is that in a two country, two-factor model, each
country will export goods that use intensively the factors
of production with which they are relatively abundantly
endowed and will import goods which use intensively the
factors of production that are relatively scarce in the
domestic economy. Subsequent refinements and extensions of
the H-O model by Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Samuelson
(1948, 1949) increased the understanding of its implications
for the effects of trade on wages through the derivation of
two theorems: the factor price equalization theorem, and the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
More specifically, as developed by Samuelson, the
factor price equalization theorem posits that, under a
regime of free trade, prices of the factors of production
will converge across trading partners, given that the
factors are equivalent (for example, the wages of equally-
skilled labor). The Stolper-Samuelson theorem asserts that
an increase in the relative domestic price of a good, as a
result of an external shock such as the imposition of a
higher tariff, will increase the real wage of the factor
used intensively in producing that good, and will lower the
real wage of the other factor. Central to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem is the idea that international trade
affects wages through the mechanism of prices rather than
through the influence of trade volumes per se. For the
purpose of discussing these theories further, I am taking
the accepted approach of subsuming the independent
contributions of Stolper and Samuelson under the Hecksher-
Ohlin banner to avoid tedious and confusing references back
and forth.'
Before moving to a more detailed discussion of how
factor price equalization is theorized to operate, it is
useful to review briefly the assumptions needed to establish
it. As outlined by Freeman (1995) and Bluestone (1994b),
these assumptions include the following:
1. perfect competition, with no barriers to trade;
2. identical technology, i.e. identical production
functions with some factor substitution;
3. no scale effects;
4. identical consumer tastes in each country;
5. as many or more commodities than factors;
6. similar ranking of sectors by skilled to unskilled
and capital to labor intensity at all prices; and
7. each country must be incompletely specialized and
produce the full set of traded goods.
While many economists would agree that these
assumptions are extremely strict, no consensus appears to
exist on whether these restrictions place H-O theory outside
the realm of useful applicability.to "real-world"
conditions. Among economists considering H-O theory in
terms of their own applied labor market research, a spectrum
of opinion exists. At one end are those such as Edward
Leamer (1994) who use the theory as the underpinning of
their empirical research and view the theory as an essential
component of international trade theory, and at the other
end those such as Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) who find the
underlying assumptions too restrictive to make the theory of
much applied value. Occupying more of a middle ground are
those such as Bluestone (1994b) who argues that even though
the assumptions are strict, the world has moved enough of a
' For a useful discussion of the contributions of Stolper
and Samuelson to Hecksher-Ohlin theory, see Deardorff and Stearn,
1994.
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distance toward fulfilling these conditions over the past
thirty years that the theory should be taken seriously; and
Freeman (1995) who takes the view that the theory should be
seen as "a flag alerting us to the possibility that
increased linkages with less-developed countries may have
contributed to the immiseration of the less-skilled, and
pointing to some routes through which such linkages may have
worked."9  Despite the range of opinion, much of the
empirical work on the relationship between trade and the
recent rise in earnings inequality uses the Hecksher-Ohlin
theory as a framework, even if loosely. Therefore, it is
useful to understand the mechanisms by which H-O theory
links the two.
To understand the effect of trade on wages more
exactly, Wood (1995) asks us to consider a simple H-O model
with two countries, one a developed country with a relative
abundance of skilled labor and a relative scarcity of
unskilled labor, and the other a developing country with a
relative abundance of unskilled labor and a relative
scarcity of skilled labor. Each country produces both
machinery (a skilled labor-intensive good) and apparel (an
unskilled labor-intensive good). Because of their factor
endowments in skilled and unskilled labor, the developed
country has a comparative advantage in machinery, which it
will export while it imports apparel, while the developing
country has a comparative advantage in apparel which it will
export while it imports machinery.
Wood emphasizes that,
"In Hecksher-Ohlin theory, trade and wages are
linked solely though changes in product prices. For
example, an externally induced fall in the domestic
producer price of apparel, relative to the price of
machinery, reduces the wages of unskilled, relative to
9 See Freeman, 1995, p. 22.
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skilled, workers. "
Wood goes on to point out that two possibilities exist
for how domestic producer prices could be changed by
external forces, given the H-O assumptions of fixed
technology and consumer preferences. The first is a
reduction of barriers to trade. This link between trade
barriers and prices is also emphasized by Deardorff and
Hakura (1993) who point out that it is not trade volume that
is the critical link to wages under Stolper-Samuelson, but
rather the change in trade protection."
The second force outlined by Wood which constitutes an
external force which could change domestic producer prices
is a change in the relative international supplies of
skilled and unskilled labor. As an illustration, Wood cites
the example of a developing country which could expand its
supply of unskilled manufacturing workers through population
growth and the expansion of basic education, resulting in a
larger apparel sector with increased exports. The increased
exports, in turn, would lower the price of apparel on world
markets and hence in the developed country.
Faced with a lower price for apparel, the developing
country shifts more of its production into machinery and out
of apparel. As a consequence, some unskilled workers lose
employment in the apparel sector and the price (wage) of
unskilled labor is lowered across the economy. Under the
assumption of full employment, the lower price of unskilled
labor induces employers to hire more of them in both the
expanded machinery sector and the contracted apparel sector.
The ultimate result is that the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor will fall in both sectors and all labor will
Wood, 1995, p. 59.
" Deardorff and Hakura, 1993, p 4.
12 Wood, 1995, p.59.
be employed. A second result is that wage inequality will
rise in the developed country, since the wages of the
unskilled have declined and the wages of the skilled have
risen.
As even the rough sketch of Hecksher-Ohlin theory
presented above indicates, a number of ways exist by which
the theoretical link between trade and the recent increase
in wage inequality in the U.S. can be tested empirically.
The theory suggests at least five hypotheses which can be
tested with existing data, however imperfectly, that form
the basis of much of the research literature which will be
discussed below. More specifically, if the rise in wage
inequality has been induced by trade, we should expect to
find evidence that:
1. goods prices in sectors that extensively use
unskilled labor should have fallen;
2. the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor should
have risen within sectors;
3. an exogenous event has caused trade to increase:
either barriers to trade should have fallen, or the
population of skilled workers in developing countries should
have increased;
4. wage inequality should have risen not only in the
U.S., but in other developed countries which have been
affected by trade in the same way; and
5. an analysis of the factor content of import and
export industries should show that the resulting change in
the developed country's factor endowment has had a major
impact on the demand for unskilled labor.
I now turn to a review of what the existing empirical
literature has to contribute to our understanding of the
possible link between trade and the deterioration in wages
of the less-skilled and the subsequent rise in wage
inequality in the United States.
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b. A Review of the Empirical Literature
Much of the empirical literature attempting to
ascertain the role of international trade in the rise in
wage inequality over the 1980s falls into two categories:
those that study the effects of international prices on
wages (Revenga, 1992; Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Sachs
and Shatz, 1994) and those that use factor content analysis
to estimate the labor content of changes in demand (Katz and
Revenga, 1989; Murphy and Welch, 1991; Freeman and Katz,
1991, Bound and Johnson, 1991, 1992; Borjas Freeman, and
Katz, 1991; Katz and Murphy, 1991; Wood, 1994). Each of
these studies uses a methodology which relies on Hecksher-
Ohlin theory as an underlying framework, though with varying
degrees of strictness.
Studies Which Analyze the Effects of International
Prices on Wages
Examining the decade from 1977 to 1987, Revenga (1992)
analyses the impact of increased import competition on the
employment and wages in 38 U.S. manufacturing industries.
Revenga argues that a decline in the domestic price of an
imported good will result in decreased demand for the
domestically produced substitute, which in turn will cause
employment to decline in the import-competing industry.
Wage adjustments can dampen the employment effects. Based
on these links, Revenga employs OLS to estimate employment
and wage elasticities with respect to import prices using
pooled, cross-section, time series data. Her primary
finding is that import competition has a significant impact
on employment and wage levels in these 38 manufacturing
industries, with the employment response much higher in
magnitude than the wage response. Revenga takes this
differential in the employment and wage responses to be
evidence that labor is quite mobile across sectors.
A second study linking prices and wages is that of
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). Using a variety of
techniques, the authors reach a number of conclusions which
argue against trade as the cause of the sluggish growth in
real wages or the increase in wage inequality. Their
principal findings, which they argue run counter to what one
would expect on the basis of Hecksher-Ohlin theory, are
that:
1. the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor has risen,
as measured by the ratio of non-production to production
workers in manufacturing industries;
2. real wages did not fall in terms of producer prices,
but only in terms of consumer prices (the difference between
the two is accounted for primarily by the effects of a
decline in the relative price of investment goods and a rise
in the relative costs of housing); and
3. the relative wages of more-skilled (non-production)
workers increased in spite of the fact that both import and
export prices indicated that the price of skilled labor-
intensive goods declined relative to less-skilled intensive
goods.
Lawrence and Slaughter conclude by offering skill-biased
technological change as the primary cause of observed trends
in both real and relative wages.
Sachs and Shatz (1994) provide a third study linking
international prices and wage inequality. Focussing on the
period between 1978 and 1990 when U.S. trade with developing
countries expanded significantly, Sachs and Shatz examine
the patterns of U.S. trade according to a detailed breakdown
of trade by manufacturing industry (131 3-digit SIC
industries) and partner country (150 trading partners).
Their principal finding is that while the effects of
increased trade over the period were substantial (a 5
percent reduction of employment in manufacturing-sector
production workers), the impact on the wage structure was
probably small. The small effect on wages is due to the
fact that the tradeable goods sector employs only 30 percent
of the labor force, and thus the spillover effects to the
total economy are arguably not large. (However, according
to strict H-0 theory, only when all labor is employed in the
non-trade sector will factor price equalization be
inoperative across the economy). Moreover, they argue, the
fraction of trade that is with low-wage countries is simply
not large enough to have been a major cause of the growth in
wage inequality, although it probably contributed some.
Freeman (1995) argues that studies linking prices and
wages have weaknesses. The first is that price data are
incomplete and are subject to measurement error. A second
is that measuring skill by the share of production workers
in an industry, as both the Lawrence and Slaughter and Sachs
and Shatz studies do, is problematic. Most importantly,
these studies don't take into consideration a host of
factors other than trade that could affect prices, such as
shifts in consumer demand. He concludes by saying that
while price studies may shed some light on the way in which
trade may have affected relative wages, they are far from
conclusive.
While not answering all of Freeman's criticisms, a
recent study by Krueger (1997) makes major improvements on
previous studies and provides the most convincing price
study to date linking labor market shifts and trade. Using
newly-available data at the 4-digit SIC level, the study
covers the period from 1989 to 1995, a period of rising
inequality. Krueger addresses the paradox raised by
previous studies: "the lack of a positive relationship
between price growth and skill intensity... the 'price
puzzle' ."1
13 Krueger, 1997, p. 3.
Using a variety of methods to measure skill intensity,
Krueger finds that in industries that are less skill-
intensive compared with other industries, prices have not
grown as fast. He also finds that "...the relationship
between skill-intensity and price growth is roughly of the
right order of magnitude to be consistent with the shift in
relative wages among skill groups over this time period."
In his conclusion, Krueger points out that finding a
relationship between price growth and skill intensity is
consistent with other explanations for growing wage
inequality, specifically technological change and
institutional change. Thus, while his findings do not point
exclusively to trade as an explanation for inequality, they
do support the contention that trade should be considered
seriously when possible explanations are being explored.
Studies Utilizing Factor Content Analysis
A larger set of studies take a factor content analysis
approach to examine the effects of trade volumes on wages.
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1991) use disaggregated data on
imports and exports and on the employment of various
occupations in a range of industries to calculate the change
in domestic labor supply due to trade over the 1980s. The
labor content embodied in imports is viewed as an addition
to the domestic labor supply, while that embodied in exports
is viewed as a subtraction. The authors then use selected
elasticities to estimate the effects of the change in labor
supply due to trade on wages. Their main conclusion is that
the impacts of trade on the relative employment and wages of
the unskilled over the 1980s were modest. In their
examination of U.S. trade flows with less-developed
countries over the period 1978 to 1990, Sachs and Shatz
"4 Ibid, p. 4.
(1994) come to a similar conclusion: employment impacts on
manufacturing were modest.
Using a similar methodology to that of Borjas, Freeman,
and Katz, Murphy and Welch (1991) employ several different
assumptions about the structure of demand that affect their
results. As outlined in Deardorff and Hakura (1993), Murphy
and Welch take the increase in imports and the resulting
trade deficit as an indication of a larger increase in
overall demand in the economy. Deardorff and Hakura
explain,
"Thus an increase in net imports in a particular
sector reduces labor demand in that sector, but at the
same time it increases overall demand for goods and
therefore labor across the economy."5
This change in assumptions results in Murphy and Welch
concluding that international trade had an even smaller
impact on employment over the 1980s than do Borjas, Freeman,
and Katz. Since Borjas, Freeman, and Katz reach a similar
conclusion about the impact of the change in employment --
that it was modest -- the difference in results between the
two studies is really one of degree rather than kind.
Katz and Murphy (1991) also apply a modified factor
content analysis to the U.S. labor market over the period
1963 to 1987 in assessing the role of international trade in
shifting labor demand. They first document a number of
changes in the wage structure over this period. These are
that: 1. the college wage premium rose from 1963 to 1971,
fell from 1971 to 1979, then rose sharply between 1979 and
1987; 2. experience differentials also expanded
significantly, especially for less-educated males between
1979 and 1987; 3. overall and residual weekly wage
inequality for both men and women increased between the
later 1960s and 1987; and 4. male/female wage differentials
' Deardorff and Hakura, 1993, p. 18.
converged substantially from 1979 to 1987.
The authors apply a simple supply and demand framework
to see how much it can explain the above trends. They
conclude that fluctuations in the rate of growth in the
relative supply of college graduates combined with stable
trend demand growth favoring college graduates seem to
explain much of the change in education differentials from
1963 to 1987. This combination of supply and demand factors
also does a good job of explaining changes in experience
differentials and within-group inequality for both men and
women. However, it does not do nearly as good a job in
explaining movements in male/female differentials over the
sample period.
The authors attribute the secular growth in the
relative demand for more-educated and more-skilled workers
to shifts in product demand, skill-biased technological
change, and shifts in the international division of labor.
It is when accounting for the role of trade in the demand
shifts for better-educated or better-skilled workers that
Katz and Murphy apply factor content analysis. In comparing
trade versus domestic demand shifts, they find that trade
was not very important over the 1973 to 1979 period, but was
quite important during the 1980s when the trade deficit was
substantial. Unlike the studies discussed previously, Katz
and Murphy make no attempt to quantify the relative effects
of trade versus other factors such as technological change
or domestic sources of demand changes.
Other studies which attempt to assess reasons for the
shift in demand for more-skilled workers include Bound and
Johnson (1992) and Murphy and Welch (1988). Bound and
Johnson begin by using shifts in industry employment to
calculate the implied changes in demand for different types
of labor, holding the initial shares of each type of labor
constant. They then correct their calculations to allow for
the shares of different types of labor to shift, which they
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argue is more appropriate. They conclude that shifts in
demand do not accord well with the observed pattern of
relative wages and attribute them instead to skill-biased
technological change.
In contrast to the Bound and Johnson piece, Murphy and
Welch believe they have established the importance of demand
shifts in wage changes. Using econometric analysis, they
find that certain trade variables are significant
determinants of wages, along with other non-trade variables.
However, they are unable to make strong conclusions about
the relative role of trade versus other factors they feel
must play a role, most importantly technology. Deardorff
and Hakura criticize Murphy and Welch on this point:
"From our point of view, while these conclusions
and the arguments leading to them are impressive, we
find it difficult to know how the conclusions regarding
trade and technical progress fit together."16
Deardorff's and Hakura's criticism stems in part from
the way in which Murphy and Welch structured their
regression equations, but it also relates to a more general
problem of trying to separate out the influence of trade and
technology on wages. Not only were both factors strong
influences in the 1980s which are assumed can contribute to
growing wage inequality, but one can also influence the
other. The extent to which one actually influenced the
other over the 1980s is unclear and makes it almost
impossible to completely separate out the effects of one
without the other.
A final study utilizing factor content analysis is that
of Wood (1994). Unlike the studies discussed above,
however, Wood reaches the conclusion that trade is the
primary cause of the fall in demand for the labor of
unskilled workers in the United States and the resulting
1 Deardorff and Hakura, ibid, p. 21.
growth in wage inequality, as well as the growth in
unemployment for the less-skilled in Europe.
Wood reaches this conclusion about the influence of
trade because of several adjustments he makes to factor
content analysis in response to his critique of the
methodology. First, he argues that factor content
calculations of domestic labor displaced by imports are
biased downward because of the means by which they estimate
the less-skilled labor embodied in imported goods. Wood
states,
"In this situation, by using domestic labor
coefficients that refer to the production of different
and more skill-intensive goods, the usual method of
calculation for imports inevitably understates their
unskilled labor content."'7
Using a two-stage adjustment methodology, the first
altering labor content coefficients and the second adjusting
estimated product demand downward in response to the higher
cost of the good if it were produced domestically, Wood
arrives at a figure of labor displacement in developed
countries that is roughly twice that of conventional
studies, using the study of Sachs and Shatz discussed
earlier as a point of comparison."' Once he calculates the
effects on unskilled and skilled workers separately, he
finds that the relative demand for unskilled labor in all
developed countries dropped by 22 percent -- roughly ten
times a similar estimate by Sachs and Shatz (whose estimate
is based on data for the U.S. alone).
Wood then goes on to discuss two additional ways in
which factor content studies underestimate the effects of
trade on labor demand. The first is that conventional
studies don't factor in the ways in which trade induces
17 Wood, 1995, p. 65.
16 Wood, ibid, p. 66.
firms to change technology that economizes on unskilled
labor. Wood refers to this as "defensive innovation" used
to fend off imports, sometimes successfully and sometimes
not. Wood cites empirical evidence of acceleration in the
growth of total factor productivity over the 1980s (Sachs
and Shatz, 1994) and faster productivity growth in low-skill
compared with high-skill sectors (Lawrence and Slaughter,
1993; Leamer, 1994) to buttress his argument for the role of
defensive innovation.
Wood argues that a third means by which factor content
analysis underestimates the impact of trade is that the
estimates are confined to manufacturing, whereas the
services sector also has been affected by imports both
directly and through the loss of intermediate inputs to the
traded sector. Wood goes on to say that while there is no
way to calculate the magnitude of these effects on labor
demand precisely, it is possible to estimate them based on
what is known about service exports from developing
countries and the value added to manufacturing from the
services sector. His estimate is that doubling the
estimated impact on labor demand from manufacturing is
appropriate. All told, then, Wood concludes that
"...trade lowered the economy-wide demand for unskilled
labor by about 20 percent."19
Is this 20 percent reduction in the demand for
unskilled labor enough to account for widening wage
differentials? Wood argues that viewed alone it is not.
But if taken in conjunction with a rise in the relative
demand for skilled labor, it could be.
Several authors have offered criticisms of factor
content studies that purport to show a strong link between
trade and growing wage inequality (Lawrence, 1994; Deardorff
and Hakura, 1993; Leamer, 1994; Freeman, 1995) including
'9 Wood, ibid, p. 68.
Wood himself in the same paper. The most problematic piece
of evidence which runs counter to the trade/wages link comes
from the work of Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) discussed
previously and Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994). Both
sets of authors investigate whether the ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers has fallen in all sectors, as one would
expect from Hecksher-Ohlin theory if trade were the impetus
for expanding wage differentials. Counter to theory, the
authors find evidence of just the opposite -- the proportion
of skilled workers within sectors has risen, as measured by
the ratio of nonproduction to production workers in
manufacturing between 1979 and 1989. Both papers present
this as evidence of skill-biased technical change and
conclude that technology, not international trade, is
responsible for growing wage inequality.
Using the work of several authors (Leamer, 1994; Mishel
and Bernstein, 1994; Bernard and Jensen, 1994), Wood argues
that the increasing skill intensity found within
manufacturing sectors is not necessarily evidence that trade
doesn't matter. It is possible, for example, that trade
effects could be overwhelmed by the trend toward more skill-
intensive technology. In this case, wage disparities would
increase, as would the ratio of more-skilled to less-skilled
workers, but the effects of trade would be masked. Wood
also argues for a secular decline in the demand for less-
skilled labor that is long-standing and predates the rise in
wage differentials, perhaps in response to the increased
supply of skills. If this were so, one would have to argue
for an acceleration of the trend in technological change
over the 1980s in order to account for the sudden widening
of wage differentials by skill level. Wood asserts that the
evidence for such an acceleration is weak, as do Mishel and
Bernstein (1992).
A final argument that Wood makes is that the intra-
sectoral effects of trade could cause a rise in skill-
intensity, even absent technological change. Each sector is
comprised of many goods and processes of varying skill
intensity, with exports expanding the more skill-intensive
activities and imports shrinking the less skill-intensive.
Thus, trade alone could cause the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor to rise. Also, Wood cites the work of
Bernard and Jensen which shows that between 1980 and 1987,
almost all of the increase in wage differentials between
production and non-production workers can be explained by
the faster growth of manufacturing plants that export since
they employ more non-production workers and pay them a
higher wage.
Additional Studies on Trade and Wages
An additional study which finds strong links between
trade and growing wage differentials by skill levels is
Edward Leamer's examination of the wage effects of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA (1992). Leamer
relies on a more strict interpretation of Hecksher-Ohlin
trade theory than factor content studies. Rather than
starting from trade volumes, his chain of influence begins
with a drop in trade protection which alters prices which,
in turn, leads to wage changes. Using a two-factor (skilled
and unskilled labor) and three goods (steel, textiles, and
apparel) model, Leamer models the effects of the NAFTA under
different scenarios.
Depending on assumptions about how much relative prices
of labor and capital-intensive goods change, Leamer
estimates that the annual earnings of low-skilled workers
would drop by anywhere from roughly $500 to $9,000, while
those of the professional/technical workforce would increase
by anywhere from roughly $3,000 to $30,000. While he admits
that his estimates are highly uncertain, he believes that
they are "in the right ballpark and serve to focus attention
on the important fact that everyone need not benefit from
increased international commerce."C
Finally, two studies by Borjas and Ramey (1994a, 1994b)
examine the link between the long-run trend in wage
inequality by skill level and the trade deficit in durable
goods. In the first study (Borjas and Ramey 1994a), the
authors focus on the period 1963 to 1988 and use time-series
analysis to attempt to explain the trend in two measures of
the experience-adjusted returns to skill: the average log
wage differential between high school dropouts and college
graduates, and that between high school graduates and
college graduates.
Using cointegration analysis, Borjas and Ramey evaluate
a number of explanatory variables that have been linked in
the literature to growing wage inequality. These are the
relative supply of college graduates, the female labor force
participation rate, the aggregate unemployment rate,
research and development spending per person in the labor
force, the proportion of the workforce not in unions, the
percentage of the population that is comprised of
immigrants, the nondurable goods trade deficit, and the
durable goods trade deficit. Their principal finding is
that the only variable out of the above list which
consistently tracks the same long-run trend as the wage
inequality series is the durable goods trade deficit.
According to the authors,
"This wage variable not only follows the same
trend as wage inequality during most of the 1980's, but
also for the period from 1949 to 1979. No other single
explanation shows the same long-run consistency."2'
In a second paper (Borjas and Ramey 1994b), the authors
present a theoretical model which argues that the reason
20 Leamer, 1992, p. 45.
21 Borjas and Ramey, 1994a, p. 10.
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that wage inequality and the durable goods deficit are
linked is that durable goods industries are more
concentrated than nondurable goods industries. Durable
goods industries also have higher wage premia in large part
because many are unionized, but not all. The authors argue
that when foreign firms compete with domestic firms with
high rents and enter the domestic market through imports,
they capture some of those rents. The high school graduates
and high school dropouts employed by these firms then either
see their wages fall as rents decline or lose their
employment and must take jobs in lower-paying firms or
sectors. The net effect is that the wage differential
between college graduates and either high school dropouts or
high school graduates increases. The final section of their
paper examines wage trends in four industries, including
three unionized durables industries which account for a
large share of the trade in durable goods, and finds these
trends to be consistent with their theory.
The Borjas and Ramey theory linking industry rents with
wage declines in those industries in response to imports is
consistent with a study by Freeman and Katz (1991). Freeman
and Katz examine how firms respond to changes in product
sales, whether the reason for the demand change is domestic
factors, imports, or exports. The authors find that firms
respond to changes in sales the same way, regardless of the
source of the demand change. However, they also find that
wages are more sensitive to demand shifts in unionized
sectors where wage premia can be negotiated downward in an
22 These four industries include three durable goods
industries which account for the bulk of trade in durables: motor
vehicles and parts (SIC 371), capital goods (mostly SIC 35,
nonelectric machinery), and primary metals (SIC 33). In
addition, Borjas and Ramey include metal mining because the three
durable goods industries named above constitute a major portion
of the demand for its production. See Borjas and Ramey 1994b, p.
235.
effort to maintain employment. In non-unionized sectors
where less leeway for wage concessions existed, firms
responded more by cutting employment.
On a final note, while the Freeman and Katz study shows
that trade does not have a differential impact on firms when
compared with any other source of decline in sales demand,
Kruse (1988) finds that it does appear to have a
differential impact on workers in terms of duration of
joblessness. His results show that the duration of
joblessness among workers displaced from manufacturing
between 1979 and 1983 varied directly with the rise in the
industry's import share since 1972-74. Kruse tests a number
of hypotheses which might explain this relationship and
concludes that it is the demographic characteristics of the
workforce in highly import-impacted industries which
accounts for the results, in particular the higher
proportion of women and blue-collar workers. In addition,
high import change industries are associated with industry
decline, which in itself is correlated with longer duration
of joblessness.
Kruse doesn't find evidence to support the notion that
longer spells of joblessness are caused by the higher
reservation wages of workers displaced from inefficient
high-wage industries whose rents have attracted imports. He
also tests the "unemployment congestion" hypothesis which
links a rise in imports to employment declines in
regionally-concentrated industries and thence to high
unemployment rates in local labor markets which make
reemployment more difficult. While Kruse finds that the
state unemployment rate for the year following job
displacement has a large and statistically significant
effect on spells of joblessness, this effect appears to be
independent of any link to industries where import
competition has grown. He notes that this finding is
consistent with Freeman and Abowd's research (1990) showing
that the trade share of product markets differs largely
across industries but not across geographic areas.
In the case of both of these studies, I question the
use of state-level data to discern local labor market
effects, since local labor market boundaries are very
different than state aggregations. However, exploiting
geographic differences in a range of labor market variables,
such as the demographic makeup of the labor force or the
composition of industry, has been used by a number of
researchers in an effort to understand changing wage trends.
I will return to this issue in a later section where I
review several articles which attempt to analyze the
regional, state, or metropolitan dimensions of the widening
differential in wages by skill.
2. Technological Change
As alluded to earlier, there is no one factor that is
responsible for the growth in wage inequality over the
1980s. Instead, many factors have contributed to the sudden
widening in wage differentials and to the United States
being the most extreme example of those advanced
industrialized countries that have been studied. However,
if one factor could be said to be the one mentioned most
often in the literature as the most important force behind
wage trends, it would have to be skill-biased technological
change which has increased the demand for better-educated
workers.
Much of the recent literature which posits that
technological change is the primary cause of widening wage
differentials reaches that conclusion because of the large
fraction of the growth in inequality which cannot be
accounted for after controlling for a range of other factors
(Bound and Johnson, 1992; Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993;
Deardorff and Hakura, 1993). Since technological change is
very difficult to measure accurately, finding evidence which
directly links the growth in wage inequality to
technological change remains difficult and has resulted in
skepticism concerning the strength of its role (Mishel and
Bernstein, 1994; Davis and Topel, 1993; Levy and Murnane,
1993; Wood, 1995).
Perhaps the most convincing criticism of the technology
hypothesis, argued most strongly by Mishel and Bernstein
(1994), is that there is little evidence to support the idea
that technical change was somehow different in the 1980s
than in earlier decades, either in its rate or in its
character. Mishel and Bernstein note that existing studies
which proffer technical change as the primary agent of
growing wage inequality either fail to compare the 1980s to
earlier decades or only argue that technological change
accounts for between-group inequality while leaving the
growth of within-in group inequality unexplained. In
addition, Freeman (1996) points out that if technological
change were responsible for such a massive shift in the
earnings distribution, we should have seen more of the same
trend in other advanced countries and we should have seen
greater increases in productivity over the 1980s, which in
fact were only moderate.
Even the most ardent critics of the technology argument
don't contend that technology has not played a role in
widening wage differentials, particularly the divergence in
wages between college graduates and either high school
dropouts or graduates. Krueger (1993) provides evidence of
a wage premium associated with working with computers that
benefitted those education groups where computerization
increased the most. He estimates that computerization can
explain one third to one half of the growth in the rate of
returns to education between 1984 and 1989. But Mishel and
Bernstein (1994) raise the important point that while the
rate of computerization may have increased over the 1980s,
investment in other types of equipment decelerated. This
leaves open the question of what effect the changing mix of
technology has had on the wage structure of different
groups, a question that research has not directly addressed.
In terms of demand factors, the debate over the
relative contributions of trade v.s. technology is complex
and offers few definitive answers. Not only is there a
problem of trade and technology affecting each other, but
the data on both are problematic. On balance, I think it is
safe to conclude that in the absence of trade expansion, it
is unlikely that the wage differential between more-skilled
and less-skilled workers would have expanded to the extent
that it has. But it is equally unlikely that this wage
differential would have increased to this degree without the
strong influence of skill-biased technological change.
B. Supply Factors
If international trade and technological change were
the primary reasons for widening wage inequality, we would
expect to see more growth in inequality over the 1970s, as
well as more similar trends in other advanced industrialized
countries over the 1980s. The fact that we haven't makes it
clear that demand factors are only part of the story. Two
supply factors have played important roles: the relative
growth in the supply of college graduates relative to less-
educated workers, and immigration.
The Relative Growth in the Supplv of College Graduates
Over the 1970s, labor market demand for more educated
workers increased for many of the same reasons that it did
in the 1980s but the college/high school wage differential
actually fell during the second half of the decade (Freeman,
1976). What accounts for these seemingly inconsistent
results is that a larger proportion of the baby boom cohort
than expected based on past experience enrolled in college
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Attracted by the high
returns to education over this period as well as the
opportunity to postpone or avoid military service in the
Vietnam war, these better-educated workers swamped the labor
market and overwhelmed any increase in demand for their
skills. This large influx of young college-educated workers
not only lowered the returns to education but also increased
the returns to experience, as discussed earlier.
Over the 1980s, the growth of the relative supply of
the college-educated slowed in comparison with the 1970s in
response to the declining returns to education and also from
the effects of the "baby bust" cohorts. Since demand for
the college-educated continued to increase, in this instance
the continued growth in demand outstripped the relative
growth in supply and the education premium increased
dramatically.
Some of the most compelling evidence of the importance
of supply shifts comes from cross-national comparisons.
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, p. 34) find a "systematic
negative relationship between the size of supply shifts and
changes in education and experience premia across
countries." They report that this relationship is
particularly pronounced when examining the education premia.
Gottschalk and Smeeding cite the contrasting experience of
the Netherlands, which had the largest yearly growth in the
proportion of the labor supply that was college-educated and
experienced a decline in the college premium, and the United
States with its relatively small increase in the supply of
the college-educated and its large growth in the college
premium. They also report that supply forces were key in
limiting the growth in wage inequality in some countries,
even those with centralized wage-setting institutions.
Freeman and Katz (1994) also find that the differential
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growth in the supply of educated workers is key to
explaining differences in wage inequality trends by
education level across a wide variety of advanced countries.
Immigration
A second important factor affecting the relative supply
of more and less-educated workers in the United States is
the increased rates of immigration over the 1980s and the
changing mix of immigrant national origins. Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1991) report that between 1980 and 1988,
the immigrant share of the labor force grew approximately 35
percent and accounted for over a quarter of the total growth
in the U.S. workforce. Moreover, LaLonde and Topel (1991)
report that, compared with earlier decades, the newer
cohorts of immigrants have brought fewer marketable skills
because a larger share of them have come from source
countries with lower average levels of education. This
addition to the supply of less-educated workers adversely
affected the wages of the less-skilled, particularly U.S.
workers with less than a high school education (Freeman and
Katz, 1994).
Some debate has existed concerning the strength and
nature of the impact of increased immigration flows on the
wages of less-skilled native workers. Earlier research
tended to argue against immigration having a substantial
impact on the earnings of native workers, while more recent
research suggests the opposite. For example, an earlier
paper by LaLonde and Topel (1991) argued that the relative
rapidity with which immigrants assimilate into the U.S.
labor market results in their having similar long-run
earnings potential to native workers and that over time the
effects of recent immigrant shifts will not be significant.
In a later paper, however, Topel (1994) finds that those
geographic regions with the largest immigrant flows of less-
educated workers over the 1980s also had the largest
increases in earnings inequality.
Similarly, in an early paper Borjas (1987) finds that
the effects of immigrant supply shifts on the earnings of
native-born men are very small. In a later paper, however,
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1991) conclude that immigration
had a substantial impact on the earnings of high school
dropouts and, when combined with the effects of trade,
accounts for 40 percent of the decline in their earnings
relative to those of college graduates. Both of the later
studies emphasize that there is an important geographic
dimension to immigration and that local labor markets will
differ in the wage effects they feel.
Here again, a comparison between the United States and
another advanced industrial country, in this case Canada,
proves instructive. Card and Freeman (1993) examine the
trends in wage inequality in Canada and the United States
over the 1980s and try to explain why, given their similar
economies, the two countries differ so greatly. In addition
to the growth in the relative supply of college graduates
and other institutional factors, the authors argue that the
different immigration policies of the two countries played a
significant role. In the case of Canada, immigration policy
favored more-educated workers from source countries with
wages at or nearly comparable to those in the United States.
In the United States, in contrast, immigration policy
emphasized family reunification which tilted the composition
of immigrant flows toward those from source countries with
lower wages and lower average levels of education. This
difference was a contributing factor to the much higher
growth in the education wage differential in the United
States when compared with Canada.
C. Institutional Factors
Declining Unionization
Between 1978 and 1989, the proportion of the
nonagricultural workforce in the United States which was
unionized fell from 25 percent to 16 percent, and to only 12
percent among private sector workers (Freeman, 1993). This
accelerating deunionization contributed to the increase in
earnings inequality among men in several ways. First, it
reduced the numbers of workers who had access to jobs which
paid a union wage premium of between 20 and 25 percent,
thereby increasing the blue-collar white-collar earnings
differential. Second, because the wage distribution in
unionized firms tends to be more compressed, a decline in
the number of unionized firms also contributes to increasing
wage inequality within industries and across the economy.
Because women union members are generally better-educated
and in the high end of the female wage distribution, the
inequality-reducing effects of unions are largely confined
to male workers (Freeman, 1994).
In his study of the effects of deunionization on wage
inequality over the 1980s, Freeman (1993) reports five
principle findings. The first is that deunionization did
contribute to widening wage differentials. He estimates
that between 40 and 50 percent of the increase in the white-
collar premium and 15 to 40 percent of the increase in the
education premium can be accounted for by the decline in
unionization. Second, because of the role of unions in
reducing within-group inequality, the decline in union
density is responsible for 20 percent of the overall
increase in earnings inequality among men (a finding
consistent with that of Card, 1992). Third, earnings
inequality grew as much within comparable groups of nonunion
workers as among unionized workers, implying that unions
were not able to protect their members from other forces
leading to increased earnings inequality. Fourth, despite
many differences in the character of union institutions,
union densities, and union/nonunion wage differentials, OECD
countries exhibited the same phenomenon of narrower earnings
distributions among union workers than among nonunion
workers. Lastly, earnings differentials between high wage
and low wage industries for all workers were smaller and
grew less in countries with high rates of unionization than
in countries with low rates of unionization, "suggesting
that strong national union movements can partially offset
market pressures for rising inequality in the overall
market. " 23
In their study comparing wage inequality in Canada and
the United States over the 1980s, Card and Freeman (1993)
cite the work of Lemieux (1993) who estimates that 40
percent of the difference in wage inequality for men between
the two countries is attributable to Canada's higher
unionization rate. The authors then go on to discuss why,
given the broad range of similarities between the two
countries, Canada's rate of unionization should be so much
higher than that in the United States; private sector
unionization rates were 12 percent in the U.S. at the close
of the 1980s compared with approximately 30 percent in
Canada.2 After eliminating the possibility that the
structure of the two countries' economies diverged
significantly over the 1980s or that Canadians overall were
more approving of unions, Card and Freeman conclude that
most of the difference can be ascribed to U.S. labor law
which makes it more difficult for workers in the U.S. to
organize, with another smaller share explained by the weaker
desire of U.S. workers to join unions. These findings of
Card Freeman raise the issue that perhaps if U.S. labor law
23 Freeman, 1993, p. 135.
24 Card and Freeman, 1993, p.199.
made it easier for workers to join unions, more of them
would be interested in doing so.
The Declining Real Value of the Minimum Wage
Between 1979 and 1989, the inflation-adjusted value of
the minimum wage declined from $5.34 to $3.68, an erosion in
its value of 31 percent which left it at its lowest level at
any time in the prior three decades (Mishel and Bernstein,
1992). The fact that the timing of this dramatic decline
coincided with the equally dramatic rise in wage inequality
has led to speculation about the possible link between the
two. To date, the evidence appears to be mixed.
In an early look at the issue, Blackburn, Bloom, and
Freeman (1991) conclude that maintaining the minimum wage at
its 1979 level would have had only a small impact on the
earnings of less-skilled workers, perhaps with the exception
of Black women. Horrigan and Mincy (1993) also find that
indexing the minimum wage to the inflation rate in order to
maintain its real value would have had only a minimal impact
on earnings inequality over the 1980s. Freeman and Katz
(1994) argue that the falling value of the minimum wage has
had little impact on growing earnings inequality because,
unlike in some European countries where the minimum wage is
set much higher and affects a larger proportion of the
workforce, in the United States its value only affects those
in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution.
However, in a later paper Freeman (1996) appears to
have modified his stance somewhat in response to his review
of several more recent research papers (DiNardo, Fortin, and
Lemieux, 1994; Card and Krueger, 1995; Mishel and Bernstein,
1994). He cites the results of these papers which find that
the erosion in the value of the minimum wage was responsible
for anywhere from 10 to 50 percent of the growth in earnings
inequality over the 1980s, depending on whether one is
examining the wages of men, women, or all workers. While
not endorsing any of these papers' specific results, Freeman
concludes by saying that maintaining the value of the
minimum wage over the 1980s could have helped to counter the
dramatic decline in wages for U.S. workers at the bottom of
the earnings distribution.
IV. The Growth of Earnings Instability
The studies on earnings inequality that I have reviewed
thus far have examined the growth in the variance of
lifetime or permanent wages and earned income. New evidence
from Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994, 1995) shows that the
variation in transitory earnings has increased as well and
has contributed substantially to the overall growth in
earnings inequality. Transitory earnings are those
temporary increases or decreases in earnings that may come
from bonuses, overtime pay, or a short-term decline in the
availability of contract or contingent work. The overall
effect is to make earnings more volatile and thus to
increase the numbers of low or high earners in any given
year.
Gottschalk and Moffitt find that, comparing the 1980s
to the 1970s, both the variation in transitory and permanent
earnings increased by roughly 40 percent. They estimate
that one-third to one-half of the overall increase in annual
earnings inequality can be attributed to these increases in
earnings variability. Gottschalk and Moffitt consider three
possible explanations for the increase in earnings
instability: increases in involuntary job turnover; the
growth of parttime work; and the growth in temporary or
contingent work. They argue that, because job loss was
roughly comparable in the last two business cycle peak years
of 1979 and 1989, the rate of involuntary job loss cannot be
an important part of the explanation. Similarly, they
report that the rate of parttime employment among men was
extremely stable after the recession of the early 1980s and
the proportion of women working parttime actually declined
slightly between the early 1980s and the early 1990s.
While they discount growing parttime work and job
turnover as factors, their examination of the temporary help
industry leads them to suggest that the growth in this form
of contingent work may have contributed to earnings
variability. They cite the fact that by 1992, the temporary
help industry had grown to be as large as the steel and auto
industries combined. While they argue that the increase
in temporary employment arrangements has probably been a
contributing factor to the growth of earnings instability,
they also question the importance of its role because the
temp industry accounted for less than 2 percent of the
workforce (in the early 1990s). However, as reported by
Carre and Joshi (1997), data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics shows that workers employed in more broadly
defined "alternative employment arrangements" constituted 10
percent of the workforce in 1995.2 Since even this broader
definition of alternative work arrangements may still be too
narrow, for example by not including the internal temporary
pools of individual firms, it is possible that the actual
share of the workforce engaged in such activities is even
larger.2' All of this points to the importance of
continuing to investigate this growing sector of the labor
market.
25 Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1995, p. 147.
26 Carre and Joshi, 1997, pp. 12-13. Alternative work
arrangements include independent contractors (6.7 percent); on-
call workers/day laborers (1.6 percent); temporary workers (1
percent); and contract workers (.5 percent).
"2 Ibid, p. 12 (see footnote 4 of same).
V. Studies Exploring The Geographic Dimensions of Widening
Wage Disparities
Several recent studies have exploited the variation in
wage inequality across geographic areas in an attempt to
understand the sources of increasing wage inequality
nationally. Two such studies examine regional differences
in wage inequality (Karoly and Klerman, 1994; Topel, 1994)
while the remaining two examine differences between states
(Brauer, 1996) and metropolitan areas (Borjas and Ramey,
1995). In addition, while it does not address the issue of
wage inequality directly, the work of Noponen, Markusen, and
Dreissen (1997) examines metropolitan differences in
industry structure and provides evidence of considerable
diversity in the effects of economic restructuring on cities
over the 1980s, particularly in regard to trade.
The interest in examining regional differences in wage
inequality is in part an outgrowth of the fact that, over
the 1980s, regional wages exhibited a sharp departure from
their long-term trend toward convergence and showed clear
evidence of divergence. Browne (1989) documents this
regional divergence in her study of trends in regional per
capita income between 1929 and 1987. Browne examines the
factors causing per capita income convergence over the 1970s
with those causing divergence over the 1980s (her end year
is 1987) and finds them to be largely the same. According
to Browne,
"In general, changes in wages, or more accurately,
earnings per job were the primary source of changes in
regional per capita income in both decades. These
changes in earnings per job were attributable mainly to
changes in earnings in individual industries, rather
than to shifts in industry mix. Earnings in some of
the more locally oriented industries were particularly
volatile." 28
28 Browne, 1989, p. 27.
Browne uses nine broad industry categories: agricultural
services, forestry, fisheries, and other; mining; construction;
Browne suggests that the prominence of locally-oriented
industries in explaining wage changes points to the
importance of economic shocks that were advantageous to some
regions and disadvantageous to others. An example she cites
is the boom in oil prices in the 1970s that led to per
capita income growth in the West South Central and Mountain
regions, followed by the decline in oil prices in the 1980s
that spilled over into these regions' construction, finance,
and real estate industries. Browne posits that this and
similar shocks in other locally-oriented industries may have
reinforced the underlying trend of convergence in regional
per capita incomes over the 1970s but overwhelmed that
underlying trend in the 1980s.
A subsequent paper by Eberts (1989) starts with
Browne's observation that earnings changes are the primary
factor accounting for regional income convergence in the
1970s and divergence in the 1980s. Using a factor price
equalization framework, he then examines two possible
sources of the changes in earnings: 1. regional differences
in the return to a range of worker attributes
(characteristics) and the wage differentials among
industries and occupations; and 2. regional differences in
the level of worker attributes and the distribution of
workers among industries and occupations. He concludes
that,
".... differences in characteristic prices account for a
major share of the change in regional wages relative to
the national average. Furthermore, virtually all of
this intertemporal change in characteristic prices is
found in the occupation coefficients; industry and
manufacturing; transportation and public utilities; wholesale
trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate
services; and government and government enterprises. Thus, her
definition of industry mix is a shift from one broad category to
another. Her results do not preclude the possibility of
considerable shifts within industry categories, as she herself
points out.
55
worker characteristic variables account for very
little."
Like Browne, Eberts speculates that stochastic
disturbances or shocks have been responsible for regional
wage divergence. He questions why such shocks should have
so sudden an impact when convergence has been the trend for
so many decades. He offers several possibilities: increased
foreign competition, the collapse of oil prices in the early
1980s, and the severity of back-to-back recessions over the
period 1980 to 1982. While several regions were hit hard by
the bust in oil and agricultural commodities prices, others
such as the Pacific region were only mildly affected.
Eberts concludes by saying that, once the effects of these
shocks dissipate and regions continue to grow and develop,
absent new shocks of such magnitude the long-run trend
toward convergence should reemerge.
Given the documentation of divergence in regional wages
over the 1980s, it is not surprising that Topel (1994) also
finds evidence of increasing wage inequality within all nine
census regions, but of differing magnitudes. He takes this
to suggest that "distinctly local factors affect relative
wages" and that "the extent of labor markets is limited by
geography, at least in the intermediate run."30 Topel uses
the regional variation in the growth of wage inequality to
sort out the contribution of four factors: 1. changing skill
ratios in the workforce; 2. the increased labor force
participation of women; 3. technical change; and 4. changes
in the industrial composition of labor demand.
Counter to expectations, Topel finds that all of the
explanation for regional differences in wage inequality by
skill level lay on the supply side, with no evidence that
2 Eberts, 1989, p. 24.
Topel, 1994, p. 17.
demand factors played a role. More specifically, he finds
no support for the notion that changes in the industry
composition of labor demand due to regional specialization
and the decline of certain industries, whether due to
international trade or domestic changes in demand, were
contributing factors.
Instead, Topel argues that all regions experienced a
similar increase in the demand for more-skilled workers
because of technical change. To what extent this increased
demand resulted in increasing wage differentials based on
skill depended on the relative supplies of skilled and
unskilled workers in the region, as well as on differences
in the labor supply of high-skilled women. He cites the
example of the West, where immigration of less-skilled Asian
and Hispanic workers caused the supply of low-skilled
workers to fall by 10 log points, as compared with a decline
of 29 log points across all regions. The result was a
greater increase in wage inequality in the West than in
other regions and a reduction of wages for unskilled natives
of approximately 10 percent. Topel notes that his results
on the effects of immigration on the wages of native-born
workers run counter to those of earlier studies (Borjas,
1987; Altonji and Card, 1989, and Lalonde and Topel, 1989).
In summary, Topel's principal finding is that the regions
with the greatest improvement in the quality of their labor
supply also had the smallest growth of wage inequality.
Also using regional data, Karoly and Klerman (1994)
examine the relative contributions of sectoral and
demographic shifts in explaining the trend in wage
inequality between 1973 and 1988. The authors employ both
shift-share and regression analysis to examine the variance
in the log of hour wages, running separate tests for men and
women. The results of the shift-share decomposition show
that a shift in the age composition of the workforce as the
baby boom aged served to dampen the increase in wage
inequality for men. Working in the opposite direction,
shifts in the industrial composition of the workforce
contributed to the rise in male wage inequality,
particularly in the Rust Belt which felt the greatest impact
of declines in manufacturing. Even in the Rust Belt,
however, sectoral shifts could explain at most one-fourth of
the rise in male wage inequality.
Results from the regression analysis, however, point in
a somewhat different direction. Again counter to the
authors' expectations, for men they did not find a strong
link between changes in wage inequality and changes in the
share of durable and nondurable manufacturing employment.
Nor did they find that the share of workers in the labor
force aged 18 to 24 explained wage changes. Instead, they
found a small influence from regional business cycles and a
somewhat larger role for the decline of unionization. In
several regression models without fixed year effects, the
share of imports in the economy exhibited a strong positive
relationship with male wage inequality, accounting for
between 55 and 145 percent of within-region inequality. In
both the shift-share decomposition and the regression
analyses, demographic and sectoral changes played a smaller
role in explaining wage changes for women.
A paper by Brauer (1996), which uses regional and
state-level data, provides support for some of the
conclusions reached by Topel and Karoly and Klerman
discussed above. Consistent with Topel's supply-side
explanation, Brauer finds that earnings differentials
between male college graduates and high school dropouts
widened most in states where new immigrants were an
important part of the labor force and least in states where
the fraction of college graduates grew fastest. Again
consistent with Topel, he finds that the rate of
technological advancement accounts for some of the
difference in changing male earnings differentials across
states but that import competition played no role.
Consistent with Karoly and Klerman, Brauer also finds that
in states with above-average unionization rates, the
college/high school earnings gap for men widened less. Most
of the changes in earnings differentials for women remain
unexplained.
A final study examining the link between trade and wage
inequality with a geographic dimension is that of Borjas and
Ramey (1995). This article builds on their earlier work
(Borjas and Ramey, 1994a) which showed that the trend in
wage inequality by skill level closely tracked the trend in
the trade deficit in durable goods manufacturing between
1949 and 1989. In this study, they present a theoretical
framework which can account for the relationship between the
trade deficit in durable goods and wage inequality, and then
test it by attempting to explain differences in wage
inequality trends across metropolitan labor markets.
The theoretical framework presented by the authors is
much the same as that in a previous paper discussed above
(Borjas and Ramey, 1994a). It states that durable goods
industries tend to be highly concentrated and pay higher
wages than nondurables industries, on average. Less-
educated workers share in the rents in durables industries
through wage premiums. When foreign firms enter the
domestic market, they capture these rents that otherwise
would go to the domestic economy. The result is that wage
premiums fall for employees remaining in the industry, while
many of those losing employment in the industry will be
forced to move into lower-wage sectors. The net effect of
these events is that wage differentials based on skill
widen.
As discussed earlier, Borjas and Ramey show that even a
small group of concentrated durable goods industries can
have a sizeable impact on wage differentials by skill.
Because much of the effects of these industries are from
spillover effects, they chose to test their model across
metropolitan areas rather than industries because their
model operates at the level of competitive local labor
markets. They show that relative wage movements do differ
across cities, and thus at least in the short run it is
appropriate to treat cities as distinct economies.
Their principal finding is that there is a strong
negative correlation between the proportion of employment in
trade-impacted concentrated industries and the relative
wages of less-skilled workers, both over time and when
examining a cross-section of cities. Those cities that had
the largest declines in employment in these industries also
had the largest increases in wage inequality. However,
trade in these industries could only account for roughly 7
percent of the aggregate increase in wage inequality by
skill level. The authors conclude by saying that while
trade in concentrated durables industries has certainly
played a role in the growth of wage dispersion, it certainly
can't explain most of this phenomenon. They also suggest
that the impact of trade in these industries on wage
inequality could be far greater because of the possibility
that it has altered the wage-setting behavior of the entire
economy. However, their own analysis can not confirm or
deny this.
Lastly, the work of Noponen, Markusen, and Driessen
(1997) examines trade and the comparative advantage of
metropolitan areas. Since I use their research results as
the basis for some of my methodology in my examination of
trade and metropolitan labor markets, I discuss their work
in some detail in chapter four. However, I mention it here
because the authors show that metropolitan economies do vary
greatly in the extent to which their labor markets have been
affected by imports, exports, domestic factors, and
productivity improvements. While the authors make no
attempt to link their results with differences in wage
inequality across cities, they do provide further evidence
of the diversity of urban economies within states and
regions and thereby reinforce the rationale for studying
labor markets at the metropolitan level.
VI. Summary
Where does this review of the literature leave us in
terms of explaining the widespread rise in wage inequality
over the 1980s? The short answer to this question is that
each of the factors I cited as being a primary candidate --
trade, technology, immigration, the growth in the relative
supply of better-educated workers, deunionization, and the
erosion in the real value of the minimum wage -- are each-
responsible for roughly 15 to 50 percent of the increase,
depending on where your preferences lie and who you wish to
believe. If you simply answered "about 20 percent" to a
question about the contribution of any single factor, you
probably would not be too far from whatever the truth is.
Given the complexity of the issue and the limitations of
existing data, getting closer to that truth may be a slow
process, but worth pursuing. In that spirit, I turn now to
my own empirical work.
CHAPTER TWO: TRENDS IN THE LEVEL OF EARNINGS FOR U.S.
WORKERS, 1969 TO 1989
I. Introduction
In this chapter, I explore the trends in earned income for
U.S. workers by examining mean wage and salary income data for
the years 1969, 1979, and 1989. My purpose is to document the
declining economic position of less-educated U.S. workers over
this time period, using the 1969 to 1979 period as a reference
point. To do this, I test four hypotheses:
1. Between 1969 and 1979, the mean level of annual wage and
salary income of both high school dropouts and high school
graduates, considered separately, rose by a statistically
significant level. This was true for men as well as women and
for Whites as well as Blacks. It was also true whether all
workers are examined as a whole, or year-round/full-time (YRFT)
workers are examined separately.
2. Between 1979 and 1989, the mean level of annual wage and
salary income of high school dropouts and high school graduates,
considered separately, showed no increase of a statistically
significant amount. This was true for men as well as women and
for Whites as well as Blacks. It was true whether all workers
are examined as a whole, or those employed year-round and full-
time are considered separately.
3. Less-educated workers in different age groups did not see
their earnings increase between 1979 and 1989 to the same extent
as did workers in the same age groups a decade earlier, between
1969 and 1979.
4. As less-educated cohorts of men and women workers aged between
1969 and 1979, their earnings increased to a statistically
significant degree. However, as they continued to age from 1979
to 1989, their annual earnings either stagnated or declined.




All of the data used in this chapter's analysis are derived
from the Current Population Survey for the years 1970, 1980, and
1990. Each month the United States Bureau of the Census conducts
a survey of approximately 60,000 households to ask them questions
concerning their economic status. My analysis uses data from the
March survey, which includes supplemental retrospective questions
on income by source for the prior calendar year. Thus, the
annual earnings data applies to the years 1969, 1979 and 1989.
The 1969 and 1979 data were adjusted for inflation into constant
1989 dollars with the CPI-X1 index.'
Sample Population
The sample includes all workers between the ages of 25 and
64. The definition of worker includes those with positive wage
and salary income, but excludes all those with earnings from
self-employment and/or agriculture. Since complex tax laws can
influence how individuals report self-employment and farm
earnings, including these earnings could bias annual earnings
figures.
Earnings Measures
For the analysis of changes in earnings levels discussed in
this chapter, I chose to examine two measures of mean wage and
' In 1983, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics adopted the
CPI-X1 as its default option for adjusting its wage series for
inflation, whereas previously it had used the Consumer Price
Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). This CPI-Xl substitutes
an imputed rental value for the full housing purchase price found
in the CPI-U due to the high inflation of housing purchase prices
in the 1970s. In 1979, the CPI-Xl had a value which was 7
percent less than that of the CPI-U. By 1987, they had
completely converged and the BLS now publishes only one CPI
figure. All inflation adjustments in my analysis use the CPI-X1.
salary income. Both were chosen to solve a major problem in any
examination of annual earnings levels over the time period under
examination -- the problem that both part-time and part-year work
grew over this time period. An analysis of annual wage and
salary income for all workers would fail to separate out the
effects of the growth of part-year and part-time work from other
factors which could be causing the mean level of earnings to
change.
One straightforward solution to this problem of growing
less-than-fulltime work is to truncate the sample to include only
workers working year-round and full-time (YRFT). The Current
Population Survey defines year-round/full-time work as usually 35
hours or more per week for 50 weeks or more during the year. For
one of my wage and salary income measures, I chose to use this
approach and examine only YRFT workers between the ages and 25
and 64. The limitation of this approach is that it eliminates
information about a segment of the labor market which is
critically important if one is concerned about the low end of the
earnings distribution.
For my second earnings indicator, therefore, I chose a
measure which could be used with the entire sample population.
This measure relies on calculating a figure for hourly earnings
for each worker, based on weeks worked per year and hours worked
per week, and then multiplying this figure by 2000 (40 hours per
week and 50 weeks per year) to get an annualized hourly wage
which is a full-time/full-year equivalent. Two difficulties
emerge when using this approach with the March Current Population
Survey. The first is that, for my first year of analysis --
calendar year 1969 and CPS year 1970 -- the weeks worked per year
variable is only available as grouped data. For example, the
survey reports whether a given individual worked between 1 and 13
weeks the prior year, but that is far too large a spread in the
data to be able to calculate an hourly earnings figure with any
degree of accuracy. For calendar years 1979 and 1989 (CPS years
1980 and 1990, respectively) the data include information on
exact number of weeks worked per year.
One option for overcoming this problem with the data on
weeks of work in 1969 is to simply choose the class midpoint of
the weeks worked category and assign that midpoint to each case
where the weeks worked variable falls within that category.
However, the large spread of the weeks worked variable within
each weeks worked category renders this a very crude solution.
Fortunately, the availability of precise weeks of work data in
1979 and 1989 allowed me to employ another technique with more
satisfying results. Using the 1980 CPS data, I ran a regression
equation which estimated the number of weeks worked per year in
1979. The regression equation controls for race, sex, age, and
education, and also includes interaction terms for race by age,
sex by age, age by education, race by education, and sex by
education. It also includes a dependent variable for the
category of weeks worked with interaction terms for weeks worked
by age and by education. Employing this regression technique
allowed me to estimate a value for the annual weeks worked
variable in 1969, using coefficients derived from the 1979 data,
which would vary along a wide range depending on the
characteristics of an individual worker. In terms of its
precision, this technique is infinitely preferable over that of
simply assigning the midpoint of each weeks of work category to
each case.
Selection of Survey Years for Comparison
The comparison of wage and salary income ten years apart was
dictated by two factors. First, since annual wage income
fluctuates with the business cycle, I tried to compare peak years
of the business cycle, as is standard practice when making wage
comparisons. Since the U.S. economy entered recessions in 1980
and 1990, the best recent years for comparisons are 1979 and
1989. While 1969 is not strictly a comparable year, it was at
least relatively unscarred by recession. Second, my interest in
following age cohorts dictated that I choose years which are the
same number of years apart. The selection of 1979 and 1989 on
the basis of the business cycle dictates that 1969 be the third
comparison year since this results in each of my comparison years
being ten years apart.
The Structure of Age Cohorts
The age cohorts used in the analysis are structured in two
different ways -- by the age of the respondent at the time the
Current Population Survey was taken, and by the age of the
respondent in the first year of the survey, 1969. The first
method of grouping age data according to the respondent's age at
the time of the survey results in a "snapshot" of how various age
groups are faring at different points in time. It allows us to
answer questions such as "How were 30-40 year-olds in 1979 doing
compared with how 30-40 year-olds were faring in 1969?"
The second method of grouping respondents into age cohorts
based on their age in 1969 allows the analysis to incorporate a
lifecycle earnings approach. Many factors determine the earnings
experience of an individual: occupation, industry, education,
race, unionization, location, personal attributes, and a host of
other factors. In addition to these factors, however, age and
experience are strong determinants of an individual's earnings.
Typically, earnings start out low for those entering the labor
force but then rise as young workers acquire experience and move
up seniority ladders. The rate of earnings gain is initially
steep, slows somewhat after middle age, and then falls off
sharply as older workers work fewer hours before complete
retirement.
Unfortunately, no comprehensive data exist which allow us to
track individuals over an entire lifetime of work. However, by
looking at earnings over ten-year intervals, it is possible to
construct a picture of lifecycle earnings over the working lives
of a given age group of workers, divided also according to their
educational attainment. It allows us to answer the question, "How
do the earnings of 20-30 year-old high school graduates in 1969
change as they age to become 30-40 year-olds in 1979, and then
age to become 40 to 50 year-olds in 1989? How do these results
compare with the age-earnings profiles of earlier and later
generations?
Because the Current Population Survey is a survey of a
revolving set of households, it does not track the same
individuals over time, as a panel survey does. For this reason,
the composition of a cohort may change somewhat over a ten year
period. Reasons for joining a cohort include immigration or
leaving an institution (the CPS does not survey people in the
military or in prison), while reasons for leaving a cohort
include death, emigration, or entry into an institution.
According to a study by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress
which employed a similar methodology for constructing age
cohorts, "Analysis of the data cannot reveal the gross effects of
these changes, but the net effects appear to be small for the age
ranges up to 54." 2
The Joint Economic Committee report goes on to say that
"The significance of two other forms of entry and exit from
cohorts can be assessed with the available data. First, a person
may move from a lower to a higher educational category by
attending school longer. The proportion of men with higher
educational levels does creep up, more in the youth transition
than later transitions. The effect on the medians measured would
depend on where such people stood relative to the medians of the
older education groups. Not only were the shifts in education
relatively small but they were generally comparable in the 1970s
and 1980s. Thus, comparisons of the transitions for those two
decades should be little affected by upward creeping of
educational attainment in the two decades."
"Second, a person may leave an analyzed cohort by
2 From "Men at Work: Signs of Trouble", a staff study
prepared by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress,
Washington, D.C. September, 1992. p. 32.
withdrawing from the labor force and reporting no earnings for
the year. In theory, withdrawal could occur among those with
potential earnings above the median observed among those with
earnings. If so, such withdrawal would lower median earnings.
It seems more likely, however, that more men with earnings
prospects below the median withdraw. In fact, the poor earnings
trends for both older men and less educated middle aged men found
in this study probably understate their labor market
difficulties."3
Unlike the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) study discussed
above, this analysis includes women as well as men. How might
the inclusion of women affect the composition of age/education
cohorts? First, there is no reason to believe that the effects
of moving from a lower to a higher education category by
attending school longer would be substantially different for
women and for men. Nor is there any reason to believe that women
should be more affected by immigration and emigration, or by
death than are men. Concerning the issue of entry and exit from
the institutional populations of prison and the armed forces,
women should be less affected than men.
However, the issue the JEC study raises about withdrawal
from the labor force is not as unambiguous. As women age from
their twenties to their thirties, a share will choose to leave
the labor force because of family responsibilities. Even if that
withdrawal is brief, it probably results in more "churning" of
cohort membership for women when compared with men. The real
issue, however, is whether that increased level of churning could
significantly skew the results on the level of mean annual
earnings. Without a detailed analysis it is only possible to
speculate, but I would venture that whatever net effect exists
should be small. This is because diverse factors are operating
to pull women workers out of the labor market, and to keep them
in, at both ends of the earned income scale. For women with less
years of completed education and lower earnings, paying for child
3 Ibid, p. 32.
care may be a sufficient disincentive to continuing work outside
the home and that, coupled with low wages, may motivate them to
leave the workforce. On the other hand, women at this end of the
earnings spectrum may, instead, feel that they have no option but
to keep working in order to support themselves and their
families. At the other end of the earnings spectrum, women with
high earnings also are subject to two contradictory forces.
Those women with higher earnings who are in families with high
incomes may choose the option of leaving the paid workforce for
some period, preferring to work in the home. Others, however,
may feel that they don't wish to lose out on the financial and
professional satisfaction that work outside the home brings.
Since none of these countervailing forces would appear to
overwhelm the others, my guess is that their net effect is not
large.
Educational Attainment Measure
Educational attainment is inferred from the CPS data on the
number of years of schooling, since no data on the actual
credential received (high school, college, or graduate degree) is
available. A person with less than twelve years of schooling is
defined as someone with less than a high school degree, or a high
school dropout. Someone with 12 years of schooling is defined as
a high school graduate; those with 13 to 15 years as having "some
college", and those having 16 or more years of schooling as being
a college graduate (college +). Occasionally, the term "less-
educated worker" is used, which refers to a person with 12 years
of schooling or less, i.e. high school dropouts and high school
graduates combined. Similarly, "more-educated workers" are those
who have 13 years of schooling or more, i.e. a combination of
those with some years of college or with four years of college or
more.
Presentation of Earnings Data
The data on earned income are presented in a set of uniform
tables (tables 2.1 to 2.12). All figures discussed are in 1989
dollars. Each table includes data on mean earnings in 1969,
1979, and 1989; the standard error for each year's data; the
difference in earnings between each time period; and whether that
difference is statistically significant at the .05 level. Only
earnings changes which are statistically significant are reported
in the text with a dollar figure attached to them. Any earnings
change which is not statistically significant is discussed in the
text as being equivalent to zero, or no change. However, the
tables report all of the original data on earnings changes,
regardless of the statistical significance.
III. Research Findings
The first findings I will discuss are those based on the
Annualized Hourly Earnings (AHE) variable. As discussed earlier,
using the AHE variable allowed me to incorporate the entire labor
force between the ages of 25 and 64 into the sample. Table 2.1
displays the results of mean annualized hourly earnings (AHE)
trends for all workers of different education groups in 1969,
1979, and 1989. The first three columns show the AHE for the
three years of the study, followed by three columns of standard
errors for each of the same three years. Column seven shows the
difference in mean AHE between 1969 and 1979, while column nine
indicates whether the change in mean earnings between the two
years is statistically significant at the .05 percent level,
using a two-tailed test. The remaining columns show the same
results for 1979 and 1989. This same format is used in all of
the remaining tables throughout this chapter.
If we examine the results for All Workers in row one, we see
that between 1969 and 1979, mean AHE increased by close to
$2,000, a statistically significant amount. However, between
1979 and 1989, mean AHE dropped by $362. This same trend of a
significant increase in earnings between 1969 and 1979 followed
by a significant decline in earnings between 1979 and 1989
emerges even more starkly for workers who are high school
Table 2.1 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings for U.S. Workers by Educational Attainment in 1969, 1979, and 1989.
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dropouts and high school graduates. The decline in mean AHE
between 1979 and 1989 is most dramatic for high school dropouts,
who experienced a drop of $3,000 in annual earnings, from a total
AHE of just under $21,000 to an AHE figure of just under $18,000.
For high school graduates, the decline was close to $2,000. Even
for those with some years of college education, mean AHE dropped
by well over $1,000 between 1979 and 1989. Only workers with
four years of college or more enjoyed a significant earnings
increase in this later time period, with an increase of close to
$1,500. It is interesting to note that over the earlier time
span between 1969 and 1979, both workers with some years of
college and those with four years of college or more had stagnant
earnings -- a fact consistent with theories that an oversupply of
college-educated workers existed during the end of this time
period.4
When workers are broken down by race, interesting
differences emerge. For Whites, the earnings trends mimic very
closely those discussed above for All Workers. All White workers
and less-educated White workers (high school dropouts and
graduates) both experienced significant earnings increases over
the 1969 to 1979 time period, but significant losses in mean AHE
between 1979 and 1989. At the same time, more-educated workers
experienced stagnant earnings in the first time period, with the
trends diverging in the later time period to show a significant
drop for workers with some college but a significant increase in
earnings for those with four years of college or more.
For Blacks, on the other hand, the results do not closely
follow the trends for All Workers. In the 1969 to 1979 period,
for example, Blacks in all education groups experienced
significant earnings increases, not just less-educated workers as
was true for All Workers and for Whites. Between 1979 and 1989,
only Blacks with a high school degree showed a decline in their
4 Freeman, Richard B. (1976). The Overeducated American.
New York: Academic Press.
mean AHE, in contrast to the decline experienced by White high
school dropouts, high school graduates, and those with some years
of college. And also unlike White workers, Black college
graduates had no significant earnings increase between 1979 and
1989, in spite of a decade of economic growth and affirmative
action.
Looking at the results for all men and all women displayed
in Table 2.2, we see that the earnings trends for men closely
mirror those for Whites in both time periods -- a significant
rise in mean AHE for less-educated workers in the first period
followed by a significant decline in earnings for all education
groups. The exception to this among men were those with at least
four years of college education who experienced a significant
increase in mean annualized hourly earnings.
Among women, the earnings trends in the 1969 to 1979 period
mirrors that of men. However, the trends over the 1979 to 1989
period look quite different. First, the annual earnings of all
women increased to roughly the same degree that they declined for
all men. And while most education categories of men suffered a
significant decline in earnings (the one exception being college
graduates), among women only the earnings of high school dropouts
showed a decline. Moreover, the decline was far smaller than
that of men high school dropouts -- just under $1,000 among women
as compared with over $4,000 among men. The earnings of high
school educated women showed no change.
Among women college graduates, on the other hand, the
increase in annualized hourly earnings between 1979 and 1989 was
roughly three and a half times that for men college graduates --
$3,500 for women compared with $1,000 for men. Over the 1979 to
1989 time period, then, any decline in earnings for less-educated
women were less than that for men, while the gains for college-
educated women were considerably greater than that for men.
Men and Women Workers by Race
It is possible that some of the explanation for the
Table 2.2 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings of Men and Women Workers in the U.S. by Educational Attainment, 1969, 1979, and 1989.











































































































































Earnings figures are calculated using data from the U.S. Current Population Survey for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990.
disparate trends between Black and White workers lies in the
different experiences of Black and White men and women over this
time period. Dividing men and women workers by race into Whites
and Blacks does, indeed, reveal some important differences.
Beginning with the subcategory of White men workers, the data in
Table 2.3 show that the earnings trends from 1969 to 1979 closely
mirror those found for all men. Among White men, the categories
of all men, high school dropouts, and high school graduates each
show a statistically significant increase in earnings over this
time period, with stagnant earnings shown for those with some
college or four years of college or more. Less-educated workers
made sizeable gains between 1969 and 1979.
Among Black men, the decade from 1969 to 1979 was also one
of sizeable earnings gains for both high school dropouts and high
school graduates. Unlike White men, however, it was also a
period of considerable improvement in the earned income of Black
men with four years of college or more -- an overwhelming
increase in mean AHE of close to $9,000. Only among Black men
with some years of college did earned income stagnate.
The later decade of the study, spanning 1979 to 1989, showed
a reversal of the gains made in the earlier decade by less-
educated White men and those with some years of college.
Overall, White men as a group experienced a decline of close to
$1,500 in mean earned income over the decade, with even more
sizeable declines for both high school dropouts and high school
graduates. Among White men, only those with four years of
college or more registered a significant increase in earnings.
Among Black men, earnings were stagnant for all education groups
except high school graduates, who experienced a decline in mean
AHE of close to $4,500. This finding is consistent with that of
Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1991) who find a narrowing of the
wage differential beween Black men high school graduates and high
school dropouts. The impressive gains registered by Black
workers over the 1970s came to a virtual standstill in the 1980s,
again in spite of healthy economic growth and the presence of
75
Table 2.3 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings for Men and Women Workers by Race and Education, 1969, 1979, 1989.












































































































































































































































































Among White women, the results from the 1969 to 1979 decade
look very much like those for White men: a significant increase
in mean earned income for less-educated workers and for women as
a whole, but stagnant earnings for better-educated women. The
earnings trends for White women are also very similar to those
for Black women over this time period, with the exception that
the earnings gains for less-educated women extended up to include
gains for Black women with some years of college. However, as
was also true for White women in this earlier decade, Black women
with four years of college or more posted no significant increase
in mean earned income levels.
Over the later time period from 1979 to 1989, the results
for White women and White men diverge in several important ways.
Whereas all White men's mean earned income dropped by
approximately $1,500, for White women mean AHE grew by $1,700.
Among White women, the only education subgroup to experience a
loss in mean earnings was high school dropouts, whereas among
White men, all education groups except college graduates showed a
significant decline. Both groups of better-educated White women
(those with some college and college graduates) experienced an
increase in mean earnings. The gains among college-educated
White women were almost three times that for college-educated
White men.
The earnings results for Black women also differ in
important ways from the results for Black men. Among all Black
women, mean AHE increased by almost $1,400, whereas for all Black
men mean earnings posted no significant change. The mean
earnings of Black men high school graduates declined by a
startling $4,500, while earnings stagnated for each of the
remaining three education categories of Black men. Earnings also
stagnated for Black women high school dropouts, high school
graduates, and those with some years of college education.
However, the mean earnings of Black women with four years of
college or more increased by over $2,700. The overall gains for
Black women would have been even more impressive if they had been
shared by different education groups.
Earlier, I posed the question of whether the different
experience of Black and White men and women might help to explain
the differences found between all Blacks and Whites during both
the earlier and later time periods under examination.
Specifically, 1) what can we learn about why all education
subgroups of Black workers experienced earnings gains from 1969
to 1979, not just less-educated workers as was true for Whites:
2.) during the later time period from 1979 to 1989, why were
earnings losses more widespread among White education groups; and
3.) at the same time, why were earnings gains confined to only
White college graduates?
Reviewing my results, I find that some clues are apparent.
In regard to the first question concerning the different results
for better-educated Black and White workers between 1969 and
1979, I find that both White men and White women better-educated
workers failed to experience any earnings gains over this time
period. However, the results for Blacks were more mixed. Among
Black college graduates, only Black men benefitted from an
increase in earnings, while Black women college graduates did
not. In this case, then, separating out men and women does not
provide much additional information concerning why the results
for better-educated Whites and Blacks differed. For both better-
educated Black men and women, my guess is that, in spite of an
oversupply of college-educated workers over the 1970s, the
pressure for affirmative action hiring was great enough to boost
earnings for Black men college graduates and for Black women with
some years of college.
The second issue concerns why earnings losses were more
widespread among White education subgroups than among Black
education subgroups from 1979 to 1989. After dividing the race
data by gender, the data show that, among Whites, the answer lies
in the experience of men, rather than women. Among White men,
all education groups experienced a loss in mean earnings, whereas
among White women only high school dropouts shared this loss in
earnings. Among Black men, only high school graduates showed a
substantial loss in mean AHE (close to $4,500) while among Black
women no losses occurred.
Finally, did the earnings increase among White college
graduates between 1979 and 1989 apply equally to both men and
women, and was the lack of an increase among Black college
graduates also equally true for men and women? Among Whites,
both men and women college graduates shared an increase in
earnings, with the increase for women being roughly three times
that for men. Among Black college graduates, the absence of an
earnings increase was confined to men, while women enjoyed a
substantial increase in mean earnings of more than $2,700.
However, even this impressive gain by Black women college
graduates was not enough to increase mean earnings for Black
college graduates overall. The lack of an earnings increase for
college-educated Black men during this period is particularly
disappointing, given that this decade has been characterized as a
period of substantial demand for college graduates. In fact, the
primary evidence to support the fact of strong demand for college
graduates over this time period was the increase in their earned
income, in spite of a growth in their supply (see, for example,
Murphy and Welch, 1989a). However, this increase in earnings
does not appear to have applied to Black men.
Differences Among Age Groups
In a further attempt to understand what is driving the
earned income changes for all workers discussed earlier, I broke
workers down into ten year age groups, based on their age at the
time the Current Population Survey was taken. For example, this
allows a comparison of the earnings of workers aged 25 to 34 in
1989 with the earnings of workers aged 25 to 34 in 1979 or in
1969.
Examining the data in Table 2.4, I find that among all 25 to
34 year-olds, earnings stagnated between 1969 and 1979 and then
79
Table 2.4 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings for U.S. Workers by Age and Educational Attainment in 1969, 1979, and 1989.
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declined by close to $1,300 between 1979 and 1989. Breaking this
age group down by education category, I find that the level of
mean earned income showed no change for any group except college
graduates in the earlier decade -- who experienced a dramatic
decline of $2,700. In the 1979 to 1989 decade, however, the
level of earned income declined substantially for each education
group except college graduates, whose earnings rose by $1,700.
With the exception of college graduates, then, this 25 to 34
year-old group fared worse in the 1979 to 1989 time period than
did its predecessors in the earlier decade from 1969 to 1979.
For college graduates, the pattern of stagnant or declining
earnings between 1969 and 1979 and increasing earnings between
1979 and 1989 fits neatly into the model of an oversupply of
college graduates in the 1970s followed by a period of greatly
increased demand relative to supply for college graduates in the
1980s, discussed earlier.
Among those in the next age group, those aged 35 to 54, the
data show a sizeable increase in mean earnings between 1969 and
1979 -- close to $2,400 for the group overall. In the 1979 to
1989 period, however, earnings were flat. When the group is
broken down by educational attainment, it turns out that the
improvement in earnings found in the first time period is
confined to high school graduates, with each of the remaining
education groups showing no change. In the later time period,
however, only college graduates had stable earnings while each of
the other groups experienced a decline in earnings.
Prime age workers, those aged 45 to 54, make up the third
age group of workers. These are workers that, according to the
theory of life cycle earnings (Mincer, 1974) should be at the
height of their earning power. Between 1969 and 1979, this group
benefitted from a substantial increase in mean earnings of over
$3,000. However, earnings for this group were stagnant over the
decade from 1979 and 1989. Breaking this group down by
educational attainment, I find that high school dropouts and
graduates, as well as college graduates, all experienced an
increase in earnings over the earlier period. Earnings for those
with some college showed no change. In the later period however,
the picture looks very different. High school dropouts
experienced a substantial decline in their annual earnings of
almost $3,000 between 1979 and 1989, while earnings stagnated for
each of the remaining education groups, including college
graduates. Clearly, this later generation of prime aged workers
did not fare as well as their predecessors. A similar outcome is
apparent for the oldest group of workers -- those 55 to 64 who
are approaching retirement. For this group, all education
subgroups experienced an increase in earnings in the earlier
period, but none benefitted from an earnings increase in the
latter period and high school dropouts showed a decline of over
$1,300.
For all four age groups, then, the economic expansion of the
1980s brought only one isolated example of improved earnings --
that for the youngest group of college graduates. For all other
age and education groups over this decade, earnings either
stagnated or declined. In contrast, over the earlier decade of
the 1970s, many more age/education groups experienced an
improvement in earnings -- nearly all groups in the top two age
categories -- and only the youngest group of college graduates
showed a decline. In fact, the youngest group of college
graduates was the only age/education group to fare better over
the 1980s than over the 1970s. Not only were the youngest group
of college graduates the only age/education group to fare better
in the 1980s than in the 1970s, they were also the only age group
of college graduates to show an improvement in earnings over the
1980s.
The fact that the data for all but the youngest age group of
college graduates didn't show an increase in earnings over the
1980s may seem surprising, given that the demand for college
graduates is theorized to have increased over this decade.
Moreover, the data indicate that over the 1970s when college
graduates as a whole showed no improvement in earnings (which is
consistent with the 1970s oversupply of college graduates posited
by Freeman) older college graduates (those aged 45 to 54 or 55 to
64) actually enjoyed a considerable improvement in earnings.
Much of the explanation for these two apparent anomalies in
the structure of demand for college graduates over the 1970s and
1980s lies in the interaction between the changing premia for
education and experience. In the 1970s when the baby boom
generation joined the labor force with large numbers of college
graduates (driven to a large extent by the college deferment from
military service and the controversy over the Vietnam war), the
lack of a corresponding rate of growth in the demand for better-
educated workers resulted in an oversupply of workers with
college degrees. As a result, the earnings premium paid to
college graduates when compared with high school graduates
declined. At the same time, however, the demand for experienced
workers increased, resulting in an increase in the premium paid
to older workers. In the case of older college-educated workers,
the increase in the premium for experience appears to have been
greater than the decline in the premium for education and,
therefore, earnings increased. Over the 1980s, the premium paid
to older college-educated workers declined at the same time that
earnings for college-educated workers overall increased, both
relative to high school graduates and absolutely.
Why the premium paid to older college-educated workers
declined over the 1980s is unclear, but this finding is
consistent with the research of Pierce and Welch (1994) and
Freeman and Katz (1994) previously cited. While admittedly this
is only speculation, one possibility is that this is a result of
the increased demand for workers who are computer or technology
literate and that employers may feel that younger workers are
more likely to possess these skills.
Age by Gender
Breaking age and education groups down by gender results in
additional variation in the picture painted above of shifting
demand for college graduates in the 1970s and 1980s. Among men
college graduates in the 1970s, the youngest age group (25 to 34)
experienced a sizeable decline in earnings, while the remaining
three older age groups each experienced a sizeable increase
(Table 2.5). This is similar to the results for all college
graduates by age group, with the exception that the age group of
men 35 to 44 enjoyed an earnings increase, while that age group
among all college graduates did not. Over the 1980s, only the
youngest group of men college graduates enjoyed an increase in
mean annual earnings, while the three older groups of men college
graduates showed no improvement in their earnings. As was true
for all workers, then, only the youngest age group of male
college-educated workers fared better in the 1980s than in the
1970s.
Among college-educated women, the decade of the 1970s was
very unremarkable in terms of annual earnings changes. No age
group of women college graduates experienced any significant
change in annual earnings, nor did any age group of women with
some years of college. This is in contrast to the results for
men just discussed, where the three oldest age groups of men each
enjoyed a sizeable improvement in earnings. During the 1980s,
however, all but the oldest age group of women with four years of
college or more enjoyed a very sizeable increase in annual
earnings, ranging from $2,700 to almost $5,000. The earnings of
women in the oldest age group showed no change. It is noteworthy
that even among college-educated women, who had almost universal
increases in earnings over the 1980s, the earnings of the oldest
group of women workers showed no improvement. This could be due
to the same causes that resulted in the stagnant earnings of all
but the youngest age group of college-educated men, or it could
be due to completely different factors. One possible factor for
this age group, age 55 to 64, is that since women often marry men
who are older, some may choose to cut back on their works hours
or change to less demanding jobs as their husbands retire. For
both men and women, this tends to be an age when earnings plateau
Table 2.5 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings for U.S. Workers by Gender and Age, 1969, 1979, and 1989.
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Earnings figures are calculated using data from the U.S. Current Population Survey for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990.
ANNUAL EARNINGS
or decline slightly as workers approach retirement.
Women with only some years of a college education share the
same disappointing stagnation in earnings over the 1970s as those
women with four years of college or more, regardless of their age
group. However, in the 1980s women with some years of college
who were in the prime earning years of ages 35 to 44 or 45 to 54
increased their earnings by a considerable amount. This
improvement in earnings over the 1980s for prime-aged women is a
far more optimistic picture than that for prime-aged men with
some college, whose annualized hourly earnings either declined
considerably (by over $4,000 for those aged 35 to 44) or showed
no change. For the youngest and oldest age groups of women with
some years of a college education, annual earnings showed no
improvement in either time period.
It is noteworthy that over the 1980s, a time period of
growing demand for college graduates, none of the age groups of
men and half of the age groups of women with some years of
college (as opposed to those with four years of college or more)
showed any improvement in earnings. For the two youngest age
groups of men, earnings actually declined by a substantial amount
-- between $2,000 and $4,000. These results raise questions
about the efficacy of tracking youth into shorter-term community
college programs, particularly for men. It would be informative
to know the occupational profile of the groups of prime-aged
women with some college which did show an improvement in earnings
and to compare this with the occupational profile of the same age
groups of men.
Most age groups of men with less education fared better
during the 1970s than during the 1980s, as we would expect from
our earlier results which looked at education attainment alone.
The exceptions to this occurred among the two youngest age groups
of high school dropouts and the youngest age group of high school
graduates. In these three cases, no significant changes in
earnings were recorded between 1969 and 1979. Among the
remaining five age-education subgroups of high school dropout and
high school graduate men, the increases in annual earnings over
the 1970s were substantial. In the case of younger and less-
educated men, the lack of an improvement in annual earnings over
the 1970s is, again, a reflection of trends pulling in opposite
directions. At the same time that less-educated men as a group
saw their earnings improve over the decade, younger workers were
at an economic disadvantage because of the large cohort of baby
boom workers entering the labor market. The net effect for less-
educated but younger men was no change in mean hourly earnings
levels.
The earnings picture among less-educated women workers over
the 1970s was more varied than that for men. In the youngest age
group of women between ages 25 and 34, both high school dropouts
and graduates showed an increase in earnings, with that for
dropouts surprisingly being more than twice that for graduates.
In the next age group between 35 and 44, however, neither high
school dropouts or graduates showed any improvement in earnings.
Moving up to the age category of 45 to 54 year old women, again
we see a substantial increase in earnings for both dropouts and
graduates, but again this improvement disappears among women in
the oldest group age of workers. It is difficult to construct a
consistent story which would produce these results.
Over the 1980s, the results for less-educated women are much
more consistent for different age groups than they were over the
1970s. The youngest age group of high school dropouts
experienced a considerable decline in annual earnings of close to
$3,000, while each of the remaining groups of high school
dropouts and graduates showed no change in their level of
earnings. For less-educated men, the results between 1979 and
1989 were also very consistent, but far worse than they were for
women. In the youngest three age groups, which span the primary
earning years of ages 25 to 54, both high school dropouts and
graduates suffered devastating losses in the level of their
annual earnings, as did high school dropouts in the oldest age
group. For the oldest age group of high school graduates,
earnings showed no change. This gloomy earnings picture for a
variety of age groups of less-educated men and women workers over
the 1980s simply provides further evidence of the decline in
demand for less-educated workers generally. The fact that
several age groups of workers with some years of a college
education have also seen their earnings decline or stagnate over
the 1980s raises questions about the kinds of education and
skills that workers are receiving who attend programs that are
less than four years in duration. This appears to be of
particular concern for men.
Blacks and Whites by Age at Time of Survey
As a final examination of the data on workers grouped by age
at the time of the Current Population Survey, I broke down White
and Black workers into the same four age groups, each spanning a
decade (Table 2.6). Not surprisingly, since a majority of the
general public is White, the results for Whites by age almost
directly duplicate the results for all workers by age discussed
at the beginning of this section. In brief, these findings show
younger college-educated White workers faring poorly in the 1970s
while older college-educated White workers had improved earnings.
With the exception of the youngest age group, less-educated White
workers generally also had improved earnings. Over the 1980s, in
contrast to the earlier decade, less-educated White workers fared
poorly. Many age subgroups of high school dropouts and high
school graduates showed sizeable declines in their annual
earnings compared with the same age group a decade earlier.
Among those with four years of college or more, only the youngest
age group had a significant improvement in 1989 compared with
college graduates a decade earlier. For the three older age
groups of college graduates, earnings showed no change.
Among Black workers, breaking different education groups out
by age produced variable results. While all Blacks in the 25 to
Table 2.6 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings for U.S. Workers by Race, Age, and Education in 1969, 1979, and 1989.
The earnings variable is annual earnings calculated with predicted weeks and hours of work.
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Earnings figures are calculated using data from the U.S.
34 year old age group showed a substantial increase in annual
earnings between 1969 and 1979 of over $3,500, the only education
subgroup within this age category to show a significant
improvement in earnings was high school dropouts. High school
dropouts in the 45 to 54 and 55 to 64 year old age ranges also
enjoyed a substantial improvement in their earnings. Among high
school graduates, however, only those in the 35 to 44 year old
age group had improved earnings in 1979 when compared with the
same age/education group in 1969. This is in marked contrast to
White high school graduates where all but the youngest age groups
experienced a significant improvement in their earnings over the
1980s.
For Black workers with either some years of college or four
years of college or more, the 1970s was a decade of few changes.
Out of four age groups, only 35 to 44 year old Blacks with some
college and only 45 to 54 year old Blacks with four years of
college or more showed a significant improvement in earnings.
Over the 1980s, Black workers with only some years of college
fared decidedly worse than they had over the 1970s. Among the
four age subgroups, Blacks in the youngest two showed a sizeable
decline in annual earnings of more than $2,600, while the
earnings of Blacks in the two oldest age groups showed no change.
Among Black workers with four years of college or more, only
those in the 35 to 44 year old age group showed an improvement in
earnings, but that increase was substantial -- over $5,000
annually. The remaining three age groups of college-educated
Black workers showed no change in earnings. As discussed
earlier, this apparent lack of improvement in the earnings of
Black college graduates over the 1980s is troubling and warrants
further research as to its causes.
Lastly, the earnings results for less-educated Black workers
over the 1980s are somewhat uneven. The two youngest age groups
of high school graduates both showed substantial declines in
annual earnings, as did their White counterparts. However, Black
high school dropouts showed no change in earnings in any age
group, nor did the two oldest groups of high school graduates.
The results for Black high school dropouts are in marked contrast
to those for Whites, where all age groups of high school dropouts
experienced a substantial drop in earnings.
Given the fact that Black college graduates fared so poorly
over the 1980s when compared with their White counterparts, it is
surprising that Black high school dropouts appear to have escaped
the steep declines in earnings experienced by their White
counterparts. However, these results are consistent with earlier
findings by Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman.' In their paper
examining the earnings of Black and White workers with less than
a high school education, the authors posit that, while the
economic position of both groups deteriorated over the 1980s,
important distinctions exist in the experience of each. Among
least-educated White workers, the erosion of their economic
position has become evident through wage declines, whereas among
Blacks it has become evident through higher rates of
unemployment. For those Black high school dropouts who remain
employed, however, earnings have been more stable than they have
been for White high school dropouts. Since my analysis includes
only data on those who are employed, it is not surprising that
the earnings of Black high school dropouts should appear to be
more stable than those for Whites, assuming that Blackburn,
Bloom, and Freeman are correct in their analysis.
Summary of Research Findings
Before moving on to an examination of how the earnings of
different age cohorts of workers have changed as those workers
age, it is useful to summarize the findings thus far as they
relate to the first three of my original hypotheses. Although I
have discussed my findings for better-educated workers, my
s Blackburn, McKinley L., David E. Bloom, and Richard B.
Freeman. "Changes in Earnings Differentials in the 1980s:
Concordance, Convergence, Causes, and Consequences", NBER Working
Paper #3801, November 1991.
hypotheses only relate to my findings for less-educated workers.
Thus far, I have examined the data on annualized hourly earnings
for all workers, regardless of whether they work part-time or
full-time, part-year or full-year. The examination has separated
out workers by race, gender, and age at the time the CPS was
taken. How my hypotheses relate to year-round full-time (YRFT)
workers and workers divided by age in 1969 will be discussed in a
subsequent section of this chapter.
My first hypothesis states that between 1969 and 1979, the
annualized hourly earnings of both high school dropouts and
graduates rose by a statistically significant amount, regardless
of the worker's gender or race. Without exception, this turns
out to be true. Less-educated workers divided by men, women,
Whites, Blacks, White men or Black men, White women or Black
women, all show a significant increase in annualized hourly
earnings over the decade. My second hypothesis states that over
the later time period of my analysis -- 1979 to 1989 -- less-
educated workers did not see an increase in their AHE, regardless
of their gender or race. This hypothesis is also correct without
exception. In many cases, particularly among White men, not only
did AHE not improve, it showed an absolute decline.
The third of my hypotheses states that, compared with the
same age group a decade earlier, workers broken down into age
cohorts did not show the same improvement in AHE between 1979 and
1989 as did the earlier generation of workers between 1969 and
1979.- In the demographic categories of All workers by age, men
by age, and Whites by age, this is true across the board. Among
women by age and Blacks by age, however, there are exceptions.
In the case of women workers, high school dropouts between the
ages of 35 and 44 and 45 and 54 had bigger earnings increases
between 1979 and 1989 than did women high school dropouts of the
same age a decade earlier. Women high school graduates in these
same two age categories showed no change in AHE levels in either
decade, so they do not fit the profile outlined by the hypothesis
either. Among Black workers, two age/education groups deviate
from the scenario laid out in the hypothesis. Black high school
graduates between the ages of 35 to 44 saw no change in earnings
between 1979 and 1989, nor did their counterparts a decade
earlier. And, finally, Black high school dropouts between the
ages of 45 to 54 experienced an increase in AHE between 1979 and
1989 but it was roughly equivalent to the increase experienced by
their counterparts a decade earlier.
These last "exceptions to the rule" of my third hypothesis
exhibited by mature women and Black workers cannot be explained
away neatly. In the case of older women high school dropouts and
older Black high school dropouts both having increases in AHE
between 1979 and 1989 that were equivalent or greater than that
enjoyed by their counterparts a decade earlier, this could in
part be a function of the general improvement in economic
position experienced by women over the 1980s. Looking at the
figures for Blacks broken down separately by gender, it is clear
that it is Black women who enjoyed the increase in earnings over
the 1980s and not Black men. Unfortunately, the sample size is
not large enough to break Black men and women down by age, but my
guess is that this would not change the results. What is
difficult to explain, however, is not that women workers should
have improved earnings over the decade, but that older less-
educated women should fare well in the 1980s when, in general,
this was not a decade that was kind to either older or less-
educated workers. In a similar vein, the puzzling aspect of my
results for Black and women high school graduates is not that
their earnings did not improve over the 1980s, but that they did
not improve over the 1970s, either.
Other than these few puzzling anomalies, however, my results
provide overwhelming confirmation of my original hypotheses,
particularly hypotheses one and two. In the sections that
follow, I examine whether and to what extent this picture changes
when I analyze the data for workers working year-round and full-
time, and examine the lifecycle earnings of different cohorts of
workers as they age over the twenty year period from 1969 to
95
1989.
Findings for Workers Employed Year-round and Full-time
In this section, I compare the results for year-round and
full-time workers with those of all workers, discussed above. As
discussed in the methodology section at the start of this
chapter, the growth of part-time and part-year work schedules
presents a difficulty for those wanting to compare annual wage
trends over time. Two means of overcoming this difficulty are 1.
to create a full-time/full-year equivalent based on each worker's
hourly wage, as was done in the previous section; or 2. restrict
the population sample to those working year-round and full-time
YRFT) and examine annual wage and salary income, as will be
discussed here. Overall, those working YRFT are generally
considered to be a more privileged group of workers. Not only do
they have a much higher likelihood of receiving fringe benefits
such as medical insurance, they also receive higher hourly
earnings on average than do part-time and/or part-year workers.
Thus, if the same disheartening earnings trends for less-educated
workers that we found in the results for all workers show up in
the results for YRFT workers, this is even stronger confirmation
of the deteriorating earnings position of less-educated workers
generally.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 display the annual earned income data for
year-round/full-time workers in the years 1969, 1979, and 1989.
Rather than presenting the results for YRFT workers in great
detail, I am using my earlier discussion of the results on
annualized hourly earnings for all workers as a point of
departure. The results for YRFT workers show a remarkable
similarity to my AHE results in terms of my first hypothesis:
earnings improved significantly for both high school dropouts and
high school graduates between 1969 and 1979 for all race and
gender groups. With few exceptions, this proved to be equally
true for YRFT workers alone as it was for all workers. The three
exceptions to the rule of improving earnings over the decade of
Table 2.7 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings for U.S. Workers Employed Year-Round and Full-Time in 1969, 1979, and 1989.
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AGE 55 TO 64
ALL 24,936 28,856 30,084 205 225 282 3,920 304 **Yes** 1,228 361
LT High School 20,790 22,280 20,436 220 290 374 1,490 364 **Yes** (1,844) 473
High School 25,264 26,233 25,550 347 289 339 969 452 **Yes** (683) 445
Some College 28,805 32,666 30,969 731 602 631 3,861 947 **Yes** (1,697) 872
College + 36,561 44,834 46,332 773 718 692 8,273 1,055 **Yes** 1,498 997
Earnings figures are calculated using data from the U.S. Current Population Survey from the years 1970, 1980, and 1990.
**Yes**
**Yes**
Table 2.8 The Changing Distribution of Annual Earnings for Age Cohorts of Men and Women U.S. Workers Employed Year-Round and Ful
Age cohorts are defined according to each worker's age in 1969. In 1979, workers in the 25-29 cohort will be age 35-39, and so on.
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Std Err
Difference of Differ Significant?
30-34
ALL 16,336 19,044 21,430 245 242 313 2,708 344 **Yes** 2,386
LT High School 12,045 14,497 14,760 365 425 497 2,452 560 **Yes** 263
High School 15,603 18,067 19,404 261 314 386 2,464 408 **Yes** 1,337
Some College 18,441 19,911 22,502 716 514 717 1,470 881 2,591
College + 24,288 25,672 30,282 821 692 785 1,384 1,074 4,610
35-39
ALL 16,487 19226 20,623 241 228 369 2,739 332 **Yes** 1,397
LT High School 12,582 14,786 13,688 309 365 478 2,204 478 **Yes** (1,098)
High School 16,548 18,343 18,761 284 283 430 1,795 401 **Yes** 418
Some College 19,537 20,672 22,606 849 603 830 1,135 1,041 1,934
College + 23,368 27,585 32,493 900 643 1,190 4,217 1,106 **Yes** 4,908

















the 1970s are that, among workers in the youngest age group (ages
25 to 34), high school dropouts showed no significant improvement
in annual earnings and the figures for high school graduates
showed a slight decline in earned income. The figures for high
school dropouts in the next age group (ages 35 to 44) also showed
no increase in annual earnings.
This lack of improvement in the earnings of younger less-
educated workers is another example of a phenomenon discussed at
some length in the previous section -- i.e. that while the demand
for less-educated workers relative to their supply left them in
an advantageous position, a simultaneous trend placed younger
workers at a disadvantage. In the case of younger less-educated
workers, the net effect was no improvement in annual earnings for
younger high school dropouts and an actual decline in earnings
for the youngest group of high school graduates. This is the
same phenomenon I found when I examined the annualized hourly
earnings of all workers.
My second hypothesis states that over the later time period
between 1979 and 1989, the earned income of less-educated YRFT
workers would not increase for any demographic sub-group. Again
examining Tables 2.7 and 2.8, my results strongly confirm this
hypothesis. The two exceptions to the expectation of no earnings
increase are found in the categories of all women high school
graduates and White women high school graduates, who each show an
increase in annual earnings of approximately $700. Each of the
other race, gender, and age groups of high school dropouts and
high school graduates show either no change or a decline in
annual earnings.
For both high school dropouts and high school graduates, a
decline in earnings between 1979 and 1989 was far more common
than no change in earnings. Among high school dropouts, nine out
of the thirteen demographic subgroups I examined showed a
significant decline in annual earnings, while for high school
graduates the equivalent figure was eight out of thirteen
demographic subgroups. Only women escaped this disheartening
101
trend of stagnant or declining earnings, but even here this more
optimistic picture is confined to White women.
Overall, then, the trends in annual earned income for
workers employed YRFT look very similar to those for all workers
based on their annualized hourly earnings. For less-educated
workers, whether I examine YRFT workers alone or all workers, the
earnings gains of the 1970s virtually disappeared over the 1980s.
One place where the results for YRFT workers and all workers
diverge, however, is in the results for White women high school
graduates. Among all White women high school graduates,
annualized hourly earnings showed no change between 1979 and
1989. For White women high school graduates employed YRFT,
annual earned income increased significantly. Even so, their
earnings gains over the 1980s were only half that of their gains
over the 1970s.
IV. A More Dynamic Look at Earnings Trends
To this point in my analysis of earnings, my examination of
age groups over time has been a static one, i.e. I compared the
mean earnings of 35 to 44 year olds in 1979 with the earnings of
35 to 44 year olds in 1969 and in 1989. This approach affords a
picture of how one age group of workers has fared compared with
workers of the same age a decade earlier or later. However, it
doesn't give a more dynamic view of how one group's earnings
change over time as they grow older and gain more experience in
the labor market.
In the following section, my examination of the earnings of
workers in different age cohorts shifts to a more dynamic picture
in that I compare the earnings of 25 to 29 year olds in 1969 with
those of 35 to 39 year olds ten years later in 1979 and with
those of 45 to 49 year olds in 1989. Even though the individuals
interviewed by the Current Population Survey in each year are not
the same, the sample sizes are large enough to allow construction
of artificial age cohorts. These artificial age cohorts, in
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turn, allow us to simulate an age/earnings profile over time.
Outside of following the same group of individuals over time,
this is the best way we have to determine if age/earnings
profiles have changed significantly over time.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 present the data for the age/earnings
profiles. The data presented are for all workers and are based
on annualized hourly earnings (AHE). Beginning with the category
of all workers in the 25 to 29 year old age group (Table 2.9), we
see that their mean AHE started out at $22,575, then rose to
$26,946 for all 35 to 39 year olds ten years later in 1979, a
statistically significant increase in earnings. By 1989, the
mean AHE for 45 to 49 year olds had risen another $534 to
$27,480, an amount not statistically different than zero.
The data in Table 2.9 represent the earnings trajectory for
all workers who were between the ages of 25 and 29 in 1969, then
aged to 35 to 39 in 1979 and ages 45 to 49 in 1989. As a general
rule, these are the prime wage-earning years for workers and we
would expect that as they gain expertise and seniority, earnings
would rise with age. According to a study of male earnings
conducted by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress,
over the 1950s and 1960s men's earnings rose steadily as they
aged into mid-career and then as they approached retirement.'
This experience of the 1950s and 1960s created the expectation
among workers that, over a lifetime of work, the direction of the
earnings trajectory would be upward, even if it increased at
different rates at different points in one's career. From the
data presented in Table 2.9, however, it is clear that this
expectation was not met over the 1980s for any education group of
25 to 29 year olds in 1969 with the exception of workers with at
least four years of a college education. Over the 1970s,
earnings increased by a statistically significant amount for all
6 "Men at Work: Signs of Trouble." A staff study prepared
for the use of Members of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S.
Congress, Washington, D.C.,September 1992, pp. 5-15.
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Table 2.9 The Changing Distribution of Earnings for Age Cohorts of U.S. Workers in 1969, 1979, and 1989.
The earnings variable is annual earnings calculated with predicted weeks and hours of work.












































































































































































































Earnings figures are calculated using data from the U.S. Current Population Survey for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990.
Table 2.10 The Changing Distribution of Earnings for Age Cohorts of U.S. Men and Women in 1969, 1979, and 1989.
The earnings variable is annual earnings based on predicted weeks and hours of work.
The age cohorts are constructed based on the worker's age at the time of the Current Population Survey in 1969.
ANNUAL EARNINGS 1969-79 1969-79 1969-79 1979-89 1979-89 1979-89
69 79 89 Std Std Std Std Err Std Err
MEN MEAN MEAN MEAN Err Err Err Difference of Diff Significant? Difference of Diff Significant?
Age in 1969
25-29
ALL 24,818 32,921 32,971 270 408 412 8,103 489 **Yes** 50 580
LT High School 20,602 24,465 23,377 533 685 878 3,863 868 **Yes** (1,088) 1,114
High School 24,232 30,593 29,189 354 484 525 6,361 600 **Yes** (1,404) 714
Some College 25,686 34,586 31,784 540 1,292 667 8,900 1,400 **Yes** (2,802) 1,454
College + 30,024 40,430 43,272 828 869 967 10,406 1,200 **Yes** 2,842 1,300 **Yes**
30-34
ALL 27,421 32,841 32,594 336 449 502 5,420 561 **Yes** (247) 674
LT High School 22,792 24,488 21,939 677 610 797 1,696 911 (2,549) 1,004 **Yes**
High School 26,554 31,263 30,049 458 743 662 4,709 873 **Yes** (1,214) 995
Some College 30,391 33,667 35,637 1,034 973 1,295 3,276 1,420 **Yes** 1,970 1,620
College + 33,659 41,719 43,090 721 1,076 1,208 8,060 1,295 **Yes** 1,371 1,618
35-39
ALL 28,259 32,813 32,921 357 395 637 4,554 532 **Yes** 108 750
LT High School 22,940 25,660 21,723 697 599 653 2,720 919 **Yes** (3,937) 886 **Yes**
High School 27,337 31,451 29,055 391 561 846 4,114 684 **Yes** (2,396) 1,015 **Yes**
Some College 31,484 33,179 36,307 913 797 1,549 1,695 1,212 3,128 1,742
College + 37,375 43,270 45,812 1,011 1,096 1,662 5,895 1,491 **Yes** 2,542 1,991
WOMEN
25-29
ALL 17,995 19,104 21,457 356 323 386 1,109 481 **Yes** 2,353 503 **Yes**
LT High School 13,184 14,032 14,748 508 484 606 848 702 716 776
High School 16,501 17,054 18,105 440 376 352 553 579 1,051 515 **Yes**
Some College 19,876 20,107 24,501 961 669 1,161 231 1,171 4,394 1,340 **Yes**
College + 25,846 25,865 30,210 1,161 1,122 1,109 19 1,615 4,345 1,578 **Yes**
Table 2.10 continued:
ANNUAL EARNINGS 1969-19791969-197
69 79 89 STANDA STANDA STANDARD Standard





















































ALL 16,447 18,922 20,034 353 323 409 2,475 478 **Yes** 1,112
LT High School 12,636 14,943 15,324 355 478 1,092 2,307 595 **Yes** 381
High School 16,452 18,365 17,678 475 486 440 1,913 680 **Yes** (687)
Some College 20,758 19,891 22,316 1,996 709 968 (867) 2,118 2,425
College + 22,949 25,768 30,093 1,065 980 1,148 2,819 1,447 4,325























education levels of 25 to 29 year olds as they aged to 35 to 39,
with each group increasing their annual earnings by at least
$2,000. As this cohort of workers aged to 45 to 49 over the
1980s, however, earnings stagnated for all but the most educated
group of workers (none of the slight earnings declines for high
school dropouts and graduates or for those with some college were
statistically significant at the 95 percent level, thus they are
treated as "no change").
For the age cohort which started out between the ages of 30
and 34 in 1969, both similarities and differences exist between
its experience and the experience of the younger age cohort just
discussed. As was true for the younger age cohort, workers in
this subcategory considered as a whole did benefit from a
significant increase in earnings between 1969 and 1979. When
this group is broken down by educational attainment, high school
graduates and college graduates also had an increase in their
level of annual earnings, while high school dropouts and those
with some college had no change in earnings, unlike their younger
counterparts.
Over the 1980s, the results for this middle age cohort are
somewhat more worrisome than the results for the younger age
cohort of workers in terms of the lack of progress they suggest.
While the younger age cohort of high school dropouts had no
change in earnings between 1979 and 1989, the figures for this
middle age cohort reveal a substantial decline in mean earnings
of over $2,000. Moreover, the workers in this age cohort with
four years of college or more showed no improvement in earnings,
compared with those in the younger age cohort which enjoyed a
significant improvement in earnings. The age difference between
the two groups in 1989 -- 45 to 49 for the younger cohort
compared with 50 to 54 for the middle age cohort -- seems
inadequate to explain the differences in these results.
For the oldest age cohort of workers -- those between the
ages of 35 and 39 in 1969, aging to 45 to 49 in 1979 and then to
55 to 59 in 1989 -- the trend in annual earnings over the 1970s
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has much in common with that for the younger two age cohorts.
Each education subcategory except those with some college enjoyed
significant increases in earnings over the decade. For those
with some years of college, earnings stagnated. Over the 1980s,
however, we see the same trend we saw for the youngest two age
groups of workers where only workers with four years of college
or more experienced an increase in annual earned income. The
results also reveal a similar pattern of declining earnings for
high school dropouts that was evident for the middle age cohort,
but in the oldest age cohort high school graduates also showed a
significant decline in earnings.
While some variability exists between the three age cohorts,
a consistent underlying story emerges from this examination of
earnings over these two decades. First, with a few exceptions
already noted, most age/education subgroups saw an upward shift
in their age/earnings profiles over the 1970s. Second, over the
1980s, earnings stagnated or fell for all age/education groups
except for the youngest and oldest cohorts of college-educated
workers. The fact that we see these results for cohorts of
workers as they age and gain more experience in the labor market
only reinforces my earlier results comparing different age groups
of workers over time.
Age Cohorts Among Men and Women
In my earlier examination of earnings trends, my findings
showed that, as a general rule, women's earnings levels did not
suffer the kinds of steep declines over the 1980s that were found
in the earnings levels of men. This was particularly true when
comparing the earnings of White women with those of White men.
In this section, I examine the differences and similarities
between earnings trends for men and women age cohorts, using the
same age and education groupings as previously. These data are
presented in Table 2.10.
An examination of men's earnings reveals a similar pattern
of earnings increases over the 1970s followed by earnings
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declines or stagnation over the 1980s which I found in the
age/earnings profiles for the age cohorts of all workers. For
example, over the 1970s almost all age/education cohorts of men
had a significant improvement in earnings, the exception being
one age cohort of high school dropouts and one age cohort of
workers with some college. Over the decade of the 1980s,
however, only one age/education cohort of men showed an
improvement in earnings -- the youngest age cohort of workers
with four years of college or more. Most of the other
age/education cohorts experienced a stagnation in earnings, with
the remainder (three age cohorts of high school dropouts or high
school graduates) experiencing sizeable declines in earnings.
The earnings picture for women is more mixed. The first
thing to note, of course, is that women at all education levels
begin and end their careers at a considerable disadvantage
compared with men. Also, the 1970s were not the boom period in
earnings growth for women that they were for men. For example,
among the youngest age cohort of men, all education subgroups of
men had a significant and sizeable increase in earnings over this
period. Among women in this age group, however, no education
subgroup had an increase in earnings. The next two older age
cohorts of women fared somewhat better, with both high school
dropouts and graduates showing significant earnings increases.
Unlike all of the age cohorts of male college graduates, none of
the age cohorts of female college graduates registered any gain
in earnings over the 1970s.
While women workers did not fare as well as men over the
1970s, neither did they fare as poorly as men over the 1980s.
Among women in the youngest age cohort, each education subgroup
except high school dropouts had a significant increase in annual
earnings. In the two older age cohorts, college-educated women
had earnings improvements that were sizeable, as did women with
some years of college in the middle age cohort. Even among older
less-educated women workers, earnings did not decline as they did
for older less-educated men. Despite the improvement in earnings
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for some age/education cohorts of women and the decline in
earnings for some age/education cohorts of men, however, the mean
earnings of men were still substantially higher than those of
women in 1989 in every age/education category.
Age Cohorts Among Year-round Full-time Workers
As a final examination of whether the age/earnings profiles
of workers changed over the 1970s and 1980s, I examined data for
age cohorts of year-round and full-time workers. When examining
the data for all YRFT workers by age cohort (Table 2.11), I found
that the results were very similar to those for all workers
discussed above, especially over the 1970s. Beginning with the
age cohort that was between the ages of 25 and 29 in 1969, the
data show that each education subgroup benefitted from a
significant and sizeable increase in annual earnings over the
1970s. The earnings increase for college graduates in particular
stands out. This across-the-board increase in earnings for this
age cohort of YRFT workers was shared by the same age cohort of
all workers.
The annual earnings trends for the next two age/education
cohorts of YRFT workers are also almost exactly the same as those
for all workers in terms of whether there were significant
increases or declines in earnings. Among the age cohort that
started out between the ages of 30 and 34 in 1969, only those
with a high school education or a college education showed a
significant increase in earnings -- the same trend that I found
among all workers in this age cohort. Among those in the oldest
age cohort, the only difference between those working YRFT and
all workers was that, among YRFT workers, an increase in annual
earnings was confined to high school dropouts and college
graduates, while among all workers high school graduates enjoyed
an increase in earnings as well.
Over the decade of the 1980s, annual earnings trends for the
two groups diverged somewhat more, particularly in the middle age
cohort. Among YRFT workers in the youngest age cohort, only
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Table 2.11 The Changing Distribution of Earnings for U.S. Workers Employed Year-Round and Full-Time by Age Cohort in 1969, 1979, and
The earnings variable is annual earnings calculated with predicted weeks and hours of work.
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S. Current Population Survey for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990.Earnings figures are calculated using data from the U.
those with four years of college or more enjoyed a significant
increase in annual earnings, a result I also found for all
workers. In the middle age cohort, YRFT workers with some
college or with four years of college or more had an earnings
increase, while among all workers no education group enjoyed an
increase. For both YRFT and all workers, high school dropouts
suffered a substantial decline in earnings over this period, as
did both high school dropouts and graduates in the oldest age
cohort. College graduates in the oldest age cohort enjoyed a
significant earnings increase, shared by both YRFT workers and
all workers.
Separating out each age/education cohort into men and women
produces the results displayed in Table 2.12. Since the vast
majority of men work full-time and year-round, it is not
surprising that the results for men working YRFT should look very
similar to the results for all men. Over the 1970s, all
age/education cohorts of men enjoyed an increase in earnings.
With only two exceptions discussed previously, this was also true
for all men. Most age/education cohorts of YRFT women also
experienced earnings increases over the 1970s, with the exception
of half of the cohorts of better-educated women workers. This is
not dissimilar to my findings for all women workers, with the
exception of my results for the youngest age/education cohorts.
Among YRFT women in the youngest age cohort, all education
subgroups enjoyed an increase in annual earnings, whereas among
all women, no education subgroup experienced an increase among
the youngest group of workers.
The anomaly to be explained in these results is not that
women working YRFT should enjoy increases in earnings as they
aged over the 1970s, but why the same kinds of increases don't
appear in the data for all women workers. I can only speculate
about why this is so, but several factors may be at work. First,
this is an age bracket in which many women will choose to have
children. For some women, this may also mean opting to leave the
labor market for some period or working less than year-round and
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Table 2.12 The Changing Distribution of Earnings for Men and Women Workers Employed Year-Round/Full-Time by Age Cohort in 1969, 19;
The earnings variable is annual earnings based on predicted weeks and hours of work.
























































89 Std Std Std
































































































































































































































































































ALL 16,487 19226 20,623 241 228 369 2,739 332 **Yes** 1,397
LT High School 12,582 14,786 13,688 309 365 478 2,204 478 **Yes** (1,098)
High School 16,548 18,343 18,761 284 283 430 1,795 401 **Yes** 418
Some College 19,537 20,672 22,606 849 603 830 1,135 1,041 1,934
College + 23,368 27,585 32,493 900 643 1,190 4,217 1,106 **Yes** 4,908






















full-time. Given the crowded labor market faced by young workers
during the 1970s, choosing to reduce their attachment to the
labor market may have seemed even more attractive. This could
serve to explain why each education group among the youngest age
cohort of women workers showed no earnings increase, whereas
among the youngest age cohort of men this was not so. However,
those young women working YRFT are a group that, regardless of
their family situation, have chosen not to reduce their
attachment to the labor market and who appear to have reaped the
same kind of gains from the labor market as they aged as did
their male counterparts. Second, it may be that, given the
crowded nature of the labor market for young workers during this
period, young women were not able to secure jobs that rewarded
them with the same kind of returns to experience that their male
counterparts were able to secure. Why this should have been a
problem for women and not for men, however, is unclear.
Over the 1980s, with one exception, the results for YRFT men
workers look very similar to those for all men by age and
education cohort. Whereas most age/education cohorts of men
enjoyed an increase in mean annual earnings over the 1970s, over
the 1980s earnings either stagnated or declined in spite of more
years of experience. The youngest age cohort of college-educated
males working YRFT are an exception to this rule, as they were
among all men, along with the middle age cohort of men with
either some college or four years of college or more. The
earnings declines among less-educated men in the two oldest age
cohorts were sizeable.
Among women YRFT workers, the 1980s were a more hopeful
decade than they were among men working YRFT, the same phenomenon
we saw among all men and women. No age/education cohort of women
working YRFT suffered a decline in mean annual earnings over the
1980s, though several showed no improvement in earnings, either,
particularly those in the oldest age cohort without a college
education. With the exception of high school dropouts, those in
the youngest two age cohorts had sizeable earnings increases as
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they gained more experience in the labor market. Even at the
close of the 1980s, however, women at all education levels had a
considerable distance to travel before their earnings could match
those of men.
My original hypothesis stated that as less-educated cohorts
of men and women workers aged between 1969 and 1979, their
earnings would increase to a statistically significant degree;
however, as they continued to age between 1979 and 1989, their
earnings would either stagnate or decline. The evidence supports
this hypothesis to a large degree, although high school graduates
among all women in one age cohort and among women working YRFT in
two age cohorts proved to be an exception. Stagnant earnings
also proved to be a problem not only for less-educated workers,
but for some age cohorts of better-educated workers as well, both
men and women. It is also important to note that, in most cases,
the degree of improvement in earnings needed to qualify as
statistically significant is not large because of large sample
sizes which reduce measurement error. For example, in 1989 among
all high school graduate earners aged 25 to 29 in 1969, earnings
would need to increase by roughly $1,000 in order for the
increase to be classified as statistically significant.
Starting from a base of $24,000, this increase of $1,000 would
constitute an improvement of only 4.2 percent over a ten year
period.
The fact that so few age/education cohorts of workers made
fundamental gains in annual earnings during a period of their
lives when such gains are normally expected is rather startling.
It also serves to reinforce the results of my earlier analysis,
as well as the analyses of other researchers cited earlier, which
points to a greatly diminished set of economic opportunities over
the 1980s compared with the 1970s, particularly for the less-
educated. In the two chapters which follow, I turn to several
questions concerning the role of import penetration as one factor
in the declining economic position of less-educated workers over
the 1980s.
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CHAPTER THREE: HAS TRADE CAUSED A DISPROPORTIONATE LOSS OF
EMPLOYMENT FOR LESS-EDUCATED WORKERS IN TRADE-AFFECTED
INDUSTRIES?
I. Introduction
The precise reasons why less-educated workers have seen
their earnings drop so precipitously over the 1980s are not
perfectly clear, as explored at some length in the literature
review, but we now know which factors have probably played
important roles. Among these is international trade, which
realistically may account for approximately 20 percent of the
increase in wage inequality over the 1980s. Because they are in
the most direct competition with less-skilled workers overseas,
less-skilled workers employed in import-competing industries in
the United States would be expected to bear the initial brunt of
the employment consequences of the growth in import competition
over the 1980s. As argued by Burtless (1996),
... if trade from newly industrializing countries in Asia and
Latin America is placing special pressure on producers in
trade-affected industries, we would expect these industires
to shed low-wage workers faster than industries where
competitive pressure comes exclusively from other domestic
firms."1
Less-educated workers may be dismissed from trade-affected
industries because of the pressure from import competition to
shut down operations, to relocate less-skilled functions off-
shore, or to upgrade technology and thus eliminate less-skilled
jobs through internal restructuring. Trade can lead to a growth
in wage inequality because, without a corresponding increase in
the demand for less-educated workers in some other sector of the
economy, local labor markets are flooded with a surplus of trade-
affected workers which depresses the earnings of all less-
educated workers. To the extent that the jobs lost also paid a
wage premium, the consequences for wage inequality are amplified.
If the posited relationship between international trade and
1 Burtless, 1996, p. 30.
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the employment of the less-skilled is correct, it leads us to be
able to test a rather straightforward hypothesis. The hypothesis
is that, over the 1980s when import competition was strong, I
should be able to discern a disproportionate rate of decline in
the number of less-skilled workers employed in those industries
most negatively affected by imports when compared to the change
in the number of less-skilled workers in other categories of
industries.
To test this hypothesis, I compare the rate of change in the
absolute numbers of workers of different education levels in a
number of industry categories. Because skill-level is not a
variable within the Current Population Survey, I use educational
attainment as an imperfect substitute. The categories of
industries I compare are All Industry, Import-sensitive
Manufacturing, Non-import-sensitive Manufacturing, and All Non-
Manufacturing. I also place this comparison of changing
employment levels in different industry categories within the
framework of how the educational composition of the general
workforce changed over the same period.
Following this, I compare my initial findings and the
conclusions I draw from them with those of Burtless (1996), who
has undertaken his own analysis of whether the most trade-
affected industries have "shed" low-wage workers at a
disproportionate rate compared with industries not affected by
trade. This comparison leads me to test an additional hypothesis
that changes in the education composition of the laborforce in
import-sensitive industries do not look significantly different
from those found in non-import-sensitive industries over the
1980s. I conclude with a summary of my results.
II. Methodology
A. Data Set
To calculate employment frequencies by industry category, I
used two data sources: the 1980 Decennial Census and the 1990
Current Population Survey, both published by the U.S. Bureau of
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the Census. I chose the 1980 Decennial Census because it has a
larger sample size than the 1980 Current Population Survey. The
larger number of cases allowed me to divide the population by
gender, education, and industry group and still arrive at
statistically reliable results. Ideally, I would have liked to
use the 1990 Decennial Census, also because of the larger sample
size it contains. However, it was not available when I began my
statistical analysis. The sample size of the 1990 CPS proved to
be more than adequate for my purpose.
The sample includes all workers between the ages of 25 and
64. The definition of worker includes those with positive wage
and salary income, but excludes all those with earnings from
self-employment or agriculture. Each survey includes
retrospective questions about employment in the prior year, thus
the comparison years are 1979 and 1989, two business cycle peak
years.
B. Identifying Import-Sensitive Industries
To determine which manufacturing industries should be
classified as import-sensitive, I used data published by the
Bureau of International Affairs in the United States Department
of Labor. In a discussion paper entitled "Trade-Sensitive U.S.
Industries: Employment Trends and Worker Characteristics," author
Robert Bednarzik lists 17 three-digit SIC Code and 77 four-digit
SIC Code industries as import-sensitive over the period -1983 to
1987, a period of rising import penetration. While I would have
preferred to use the four-digit SIC code data because of the
greater detail it provides, I was constrained to work at the
three-digit level because this corresponds to the industry
classification code used by the Current Population Survey and the
1980 Decennial Census. Working at the three-digit level also
solves the problem that, with the four-digit SIC code data, a
reclassification of categories starting in 1987 makes data before
1987 and data after 1987 somewhat inconsistent, constituting a
break in series. With the broader aggregation at the three-digit
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level, this is not an issue. Table 3.1 lists the seventeen
import-sensitive manufacturing industries identified by
Bednarzik.
Bednarzik uses two criteria in designating industries as
import-sensitive. Industries which had an average import
penetration level over the 1982-87 time period of 30 percent or
higher, or an average annual increase in their import penetration
level of 2 percentage points or more, were labelled import
sensitive. Bednarzik explains that the precise levels of the
thresholds are arbitrary. The level of import penetration is
determined by the ratio of U.S. imports to new supply (imports
plus total domestic product shipments).2 Bednarzik writes that
he chose this indicator because it "captures the offsetting
nature of an U.S. industry's involvement in exporting; this is
important from an employment standpoint, since export gains may
more than offset import losses." 3
In large part, the three-digit industries which were
classified as import-sensitive over this period fall into the
broader two-digit industry categories of apparel, leather,
machinery, and miscellaneous manufacturing. In his discussion of
import-sensitive industries, Bednarzik notes that approximately
70 percent of the industries designated as import-sensitive in
his study were also designated as import-sensitive in an earlier
study which examined the 1972-79 period (Schoepfle 1982).
Bednarzik goes on to say that even though that study used a less-
restrictive definition of import-sensitive (an average import
penetration level of 15 percent or an annual average change in
the import penetration level of only 1 percent or more) the
3. Bednarzik utilizes four data sets: 1) Department of
Commerce, Industry Statistics Division, U.S. Trade data 1972-1987;
2) Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Establishment Survey data tape;
3) BLS unpublished Current Population Survey data; and 4)
Employment and Training Administration Trade Adjustment Assistance,
Special Summary Report by SIC code, January 1982 to December 1987.
3. Bednarzik, page 1.
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231-8 Apparel and accessories, except knit
302-4,6 Rubber products, except tires &
tubes, & plastics,footwear, and
belting.
313-4 Footwear, except rubber & plastic
315-7,9 Leather products, except footwear
328-9 Misc. nonmetallic mineral & stone
products









Construction & material handling
machines
Office & accounting machines
Machinery, ex. electrial, n.e.c.
365-6 Radio, T.V.,& Communications
equipment
374 Railroad locomotives & equipment
375,9 Cycles & misc. transp. equipment
381-2 Scientific & controlling equipment
383-5 Optical & health services supplies
386 Photographic equipment & supplies
387 Watches, clocks & clockwork
operated devices
39, ex. Misc. manufacturing industries
394
Data taken directly from U.S. Department of Labor, "Trade-
Sensitive U.S. Industries: Employment Trends and Worker
Characteristics," Economic Discussion Paper 36, Table F, page 37.
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number of import-sensitive industries in the two studies were
roughly the same. According to Bednarzik,
"This implies that import activity has increased
substantially across manufacturing industries. This pattern
is consistent with the value of the dollar which was very
weak throughout the 1970s but strong in the first half of
the 1980s." 4
In the 1980s, the automobile industry narrowly missed being
designated as import-sensitive, though it had been in the 1972-79
time period. Bednarzik largely attributes this change in status
to the fact that during the 1970s, the 1973-75 recession dampened
domestic auto sales more than imports, thus raising the level of
import penetration. Since 1982-87 was a period of economic
recovery, no such dampening of demand for domestic auto
production occurred. Also, beginning in 1981, the United States
entered into an agreement of voluntary auto export restraints on
the part of Japan. Absent this agreement, U.S. auto imports
would have been higher over the 1980s.
The Bednarzik study also does not take secondary effects
into account when calculating any one industry's rate of import
penetration. In his discussion of the auto industry, Bednarzik
notes that a 1986 study, which considered both direct and
indirect effects, found that U.S. auto imports had had a large
and negative employment effect (Stone and Sawhill). The auto
industry contracts with a large network of supplier industries
which are forced to reduce employment levels when production
cutbacks occur in auto manufacturing. If the Bednarzik study had
taken the secondary effects of the auto industry into account,
the auto industry may well have earned the classification of an
import-sensitive industry over the 1980s. However, without
performing the actual calculations, it is only possible to
speculate.
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4. Ibid, p. 3.
III. Research Findings
A. Evidence on the Rate of Employment Change by Industry
Category
If my hypothesis is correct that the growth of imports over
the 1980s caused less-educated workers to lose employment in
import-sensitive manufacturing at a disproportionate rate, then I
would expect to find the following:
a. A greater rate of decline in the numbers of less-educated
workers in import-sensitive manufacturing industries than in: the
population as a whole; all industry; non-import-sensitive
manufacturing; and all non-manufacturing.
b. The disparity between industry sectors in the rate of
decline in employment should be greater for workers with less
than a high school education (high school dropouts) than for
those workers with a high school education, since theoretically
those without a high school education will be less skilled, and
thus more subject to competition from less-skilled workers
overseas.
In terms of the first proposition -- that the rate of
decline in the numbers of less-educated workers should be greater
in import-sensitive manufacturing than in other categories of
industry or in the general population -- I find considerable
evidence to support this hypothesis. I begin by combining the
data for both workers with less than a high school education
(those completing less than 12 years of schooling) and workers
who are high school graduates (those completing 12 years of
school). I designated this combined group "less-educated
workers".
As the data in Table 3.2 reveal, the number of less-educated
workers in import-sensitive manufacturing has declined at a much
faster rate than in the other industry categories, or in the
population as a whole. For example, the number of less-educated
workers in All Non-Manufacturing Industries increased by 7.2
percent between 1979 and 1989, whereas in Import-Sensitive
Manufacturing the number declined by over 28 percent. Put
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Table 3.2 The Changing Percentage of Less-Educated Workers
Within Specific industry Groups, 1979 to 1989
High School Dropouts and High School Graduates Aged 20 to 64
General Population
Absolute Percentage
Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
LT High School 32758000 24682194 -8075806 -24.7
High School 49754000 57529811 7775811 15.6
Total 82512000 82212005 -299995 -0.36
Men
LT High School 16010000 12420000 -3590000 -22.4
High School 22100000 26440000 4340000 19.6
Total 38110000 38860000 750000 1.97
Women
LT High School 16750000 12260000 -4490000 -26.8
High School 27650000 31090000 3440000 12.4
Total 44400000 43350000 -1050000 -2.36
All Industry
Absolute Percentage
Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
LT High School 19540000 13430000 -6110000 -31.3
High School 35800000 41520000 5720000 16.0
Total 55340000 54950000 -390000 -0.70
Men
LT High School 11699000 8358293 -3340707 -28.6
High School 18214000 21376773 3162773 17.4
Total 29913000 29735066 -177934 -0.59
Women
LT High School 7842000 5066788 -2775212 -35.4
High School 17591000 20141493 2550493 14.5




Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
LT High School 1710000 917017 -792983 -46.4
High School 2356000 1989274 -366726 -15.6
Total 4066000 2906291 -1159709 -28.52
Men
LT High School 755000 419473 -335527 -44.4
High School 1251000 1104893 -146107 -11.7
Total 2006000 1524366 -481634 -24.009671
Women
LT High School 955000 497543 -457457 -47.9
High School 1105000 884382 -220618 -20.0
Total 2060000 1381925 -678075 -32.92
Non-Import-Sensitive Manufacturing
Absolute Percentage
Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
LT High School 5171000 2949946 -2221054 -43.0
High School 7379000 7558991 179991 2.4
Total 12550000 10508937 -2041063 -16.26
Men
LT High School 3478000 1955275 -1522725 -43.8
High School 4823000 5001880 178880 3.7
Total 8301000 6957155 -1343845 -16.19
Women
LT High School 1693000 994672 -698328 -41.2
High School 2556000 2557111 1111 0.0




Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
LT High School 12660000 9558118 -3101882 -24.5
High School 26070000 31970000 5900000 22.6
Total 38730000 41528118 2798118 7.22
Men
LT High School 7466000 5983545 -1482455 -19.9
High School 12140000 15270000 3130000 25.8
Total 19606000 21253545 1647545 8.40
Women
LT High School 5194000 3574573 -1619427 -31.2
High School 13930000 16700000 2770000 19.9
Total 19124000 20274573 1150573 6.02
Population figures are calculated using data from the 1980 U.S. Decennial
Census and the 1990 Current Population Survey.
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another way, over the decade between 1979 and 1989, more than one
in four less-educated workers employed in import-sensitive
manufacturing lost his or her job. Even in the other
manufacturing category -- Non-Import-Sensitive Manufacturing --
where one might expect the rate of change to be somewhat
comparable, the number declined by only 16.3 percent. In the
population as a whole and in the category All Industry, the
number of less-educated workers was roughly stable. Comparing
the rate of decline in the number of less-educated workers in
import-sensitive manufacturing to that in other sectors thus
supports the hypothesis that the loss of employment in the
import-sensitive sector has been disproportionate.
To get a more detailed picture of employment change, I next
examined the data for high school dropouts and graduates
separately (Table 3.3). When comparing high school dropouts
across sectors, the results for import-sensitive manufacturing
and non-import-sensitive manufacturing are reasonably close, with
a slightly higher rate in the import-sensitive sector -- a rate
of decline of 46.4 percent for the import-sensitive sector versus
43 percent for the non-import-sensitive sector. This is
considerably higher than the rate of decline for high school
dropouts found in non-manufacturing -- 25 percent -- which is the
same as that found in the general population.
Unlike my results for less-educated workers as a group
(combining high school dropouts and high school graduates), I
find no great disparity between the import-sensitive and non-
import-sensitive manufacturing sectors in the rate of decline of
employment for high school dropouts. This runs counter to my
original hypothesis that I would find such a disparity, and this
would point to the rise in imports as an important cause of the
decline of employment opportunities for high school dropouts. In
and of themselves, these results do not eliminate the rise of
imports during this time period as a factor in the loss of
employment of high school dropouts. It may be that imports are
an important source of employment decline in the import-sensitive
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Table 3.3 The Changing Percentage of Workers by Education Type
Within Specific Industry Groups, 1979 and 1989
Workers Aged 20 to 64
Absolute Percent
Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 79-89 78-89
General Population
Less Than High School 32758000 24682194 -8075806 -24.7
High School 49754000 57529811 7775811 15.6
Some College 24737000 30862560 6125560 24.8
College/+ 21251000 31885190 10634190 50.0
Total 128500000 144959755 16459755 12.81
All Industry
Less Than High School 19540000 13430000 -6110000 -31.3
High School 35800000 41520000 5720000 16.0
Some College 19310000 23100000 3790000 19.6
College/+ 17510000 25900000 8390000 47.9
Total 92160000 103950000 11790000 12.79
Import-Sensitive Manufacturing
Less Than High School 1710000 917017 -792983 -46.4
High School 2356000 1989274 -366726 -15.6
Some College 841000 749407 -91593 -10.9
College/+ 589000 676076 87076 14.8
Total 5496000 4331774 -1164226 -21.18
Non-Import-Sensitive Manufacturing
Less Than High School 5171000 2949946 -2221054 -43.0
High School 7379000 7558991 179991 2.4
Some College 2769000 2951965 182965 6.6
College/+ 2053000 2971504 918504 44.7
Total 17372000 16432406 -939594 -5.41
All Non-Manufacturing
Less Than High School 12660000 9558118 -3101882 -24.5
High School 26070000 31970000 5900000 22.6
Some College 15700000 19400000 3700000 23.6
College/+ 14870000 22250000 7380000 49.6
Total 69300000 83178118 13878118 20.03
Population figures are calculated using data from the 1980 U.S. Decennial
Census and the 1990 Current Population Survey.
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sector, while some other factor or combination of factors is
responsible for the results in the non-import-sensitive sector.
What the results do seem to support is the idea that, at least
for high school dropouts, the picture is considerably more
complicated than one of imports alone.
The results for import-sensitive and non-import-sensitive
manufacturing are also interesting in the differing experience of
high school graduates over the decade. While the number of high
school graduates increased in the non-import-sensitive sector by
2.4 percent, in the import-sensitive sector the number declined
by over 15 percent. In this case, and in spite of the much
greater size of the non-import-sensitive manufacturing sector,
the absolute number of high school graduates losing employment in
the import-sensitive sector was twice the number gaining
employment in the non-import-sensitive sector. The import-
sensitive manufacturing sector is unique in showing a decline in
employment for both high school dropouts and high school
graduates between 1979 and 1989. In fact, it also shows a ten
percent decline in the employment of workers with some college
education. All of the other industry sectors show an increase in
employment for this group, ranging from 6 percent in non-import-
sensitive manufacturing to 20 percent in non-manufacturing.
Examining alone the group of workers who are high school
graduates, then, it is clear that, as measured by both the rate
of employment decline and by absolute employment losses, they
fared worst in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector between
1979 and 1989.
The results for high school graduates discussed above run
counter to my hypothesis that the disparity between industry
sectors in the rate of employment decline would be greater for
high school dropouts than for high school graduates. This is
true not only when comparing the import-sensitive manufacturing
sector to the non-import-sensitive manufacturing sector, but also
when comparing the import-sensitive sector to the sector
comprised of all non-manufacturing industries. The data for the
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non-manufacturing sector (Table 3.3) show a rate of employment
decline for high school dropouts of -24.5, compared with
-46.4 for import-sensitive manufacturing -- a difference of
approximately 22 percentage points. For high school graduates,
the comparable figures are a decline of -15.6 percent in the
import-sensitive sector versus an increase of 22.6 percent in all
non-manufacturing -- a difference of roughly 38 percentage
points.
This analysis is not meant to imply that high school
dropouts have fared better than high school graduates in an
absolute sense. Within each industry sector, high school
dropouts have lost jobs at a rate that is at least double that of
high school graduates over the decade under analysis. What
distinguishes high school dropouts from high school graduates is
that high school dropouts have fared terribly in all four
industry categories, whereas high school graduates have not. For
high school graduates, the substantial rate of decline in
employment in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector is
unique.
The declining position of high school graduates in the
import-sensitive manufacturing sector emerges even more clearly
if the examination of the data is taken a step further. While
the preceding analysis may seem rather straightforward, it
suffers from at least one shortcoming -- it does not account for
the fact that over the decade between 1979 and 1989, the
education composition of the general population changed
considerably. The data in Table 3.3 show that, in the general
population, the number of high school dropouts declined by
approximately 25 percent between 1979 and 1989 while the number
of high school graduates rose by almost 16 percent. When
comparing the results for high school dropouts and high school
graduates, these divergent trends should be taken into account.
This presents us with the problem of how to consider the
preceding results in light of these shifts in the general
population. Ceteris paribus, we might expect the numbers of high
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school dropouts and graduates in each of our industry categories
to change by a roughly comparable percentage, if they simply
reflected the changes taking place in the education composition
of the general population. Although admittedly crude, simply
subtracting the percentage change in the number of workers in
each education category in the general population from the
percentage change in the number of workers in each education
category in each industry sector gives us a means to "correct"
for underlying trends in the general population. The adjusted
data are displayed in Table 3.4.
The far right column in Table 3.4 displays the data for the
percentage change in the number of workers in each industry
category and in each education category, after adjusting for the
percentage change found in the general population. Looking at
all workers in import-sensitive manufacturing, we see that for
high school dropouts, the adjusted change is a decline of 21.7
percent, compared to a decline of 46.4 percent before the
adjustment. Performing the adjustment thus reduces the apparent
impact by more than half. For high school graduates, on the other
hand, the adjusted figure shows a decline of 31.2 percent
compared with a decline of just 15.6 percent before the
adjustment. For high school graduates, then, performing the
adjustment doubles the estimated rate of employment decline.
Thus, while the adjustment for education trends in the general
population serves to soften the apparent impact of the employment
change for high school dropouts in the import-sensitive
manufacturing sector, for high school graduates it has the
opposite effect -- the impact is amplified.
Another way to understand the significance of the adjusted
data is to think in terms of whether an individual industry
sector has been able to absorb any of the growth of a particular
education subgroup or, in the case of high school dropouts,
whether the rate of employment decline is less than or exceeds
the rate of that group's decline in the general population.
Considered in this light, we see that the import-sensitive sector
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Table 3.4 The Change in the Percentage of Workers by Education Group
By Industry Sector, 1979 and 1989, Adjusted for Changes in the Educational
Composition of the General



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Population figures are calculated using data from the 1980 U.S. Decennial


















has been unable to absorb any of the growth in the population of
high school graduates over this decade. Simultaneously, the
number of high school dropouts it employs has contracted to a far
greater extent than would be expected by looking at trends in the
general population alone. Moreover, making the adjustment
reverses the relative position of high school dropouts and high
school graduates in the import-sensitive sector -- after the
adjustment, it is high school graduates who appear to have fared
the worst as measured by the rate of employment decline.
In the import-sensitive manufacturing sector, even better-
educated workers have not fared especially well. For workers with
some college education, the adjustment to compensate for
underlying trends in education results in the rate of employment
decline going from just under 11 percent to over 35 percent. For
workers with four years of college or more, the adjustment
results in the percentage change in the number employed moving
from an increase of close to 15 percent to a decline of over 35
percent. After adjusting for employment changes in the general
population, the picture that emerges even more clearly is an
import-sensitive manufacturing sector where the opportunities for
workers with varied education levels have declined substantially.
And while college-educated workers have seen their employment
expand in this sector, less than 90,000 out of the more than 10
and a half million net new college graduates between 1979 and
1989 found work there.
In the non-import-sensitive manufacturing sector, the
adjustment for population trends results in a softening of the
apparent impact of employment loss for high school dropouts, with
the percentage change in employment declining from negative 43
percent to negative 18 percent. This is similar to the results
for the import-sensitive manufacturing sector, though the
adjusted employment change in the import-sensitive sector was
slightly larger -- close to negative 22 percent. For workers in
the other three categories of education -- high school graduates,
those with some years of college, and those with four years of
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college or more -- the adjustment causes the percentage
employment change to go from positive before the adjustment to
negative afterwards. Here again, however, compared with the
import-sensitive manufacturing sector, the percentage employment
declines in the non-import-sensitive sector for workers in these
three education categories are considerably lower.
In the all non-manufacturing sector, the adjustment results
in virtually cancelling out the percentage employment change in
each education category, with the exception of high school
graduates. Even after adjusting for the increase in the number
of high school graduates in the general population, this sector
shows a net increase in employment of 7 percent for high school
graduates. This increase is testimony to the role that the non-
manufacturing sector has played in absorbing the growing
population of high school educated workers -- both those entering
the labor market and those transferring into this sector after
losing employment in manufacturing.
Returning to my original hypothesis, I theorized that I
would find a greater rate of decline in the numbers of less-
educated workers in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector
than in the other industrial sectors I examined. My findings did
indeed show a greater rate of decline in the numbers of less-
educated workers in the import-sensitive sector. This finding
supports the idea that the rise in imports between 1979 and 1989
did have an adverse effect on less-educated workers.
My second hypothesis was that I would find that the
disparity between industry sectors in the rate of decline in
employment should be greater for high school dropouts than for
those workers with a high school education, since theoretically
those without a high school education are less skilled and are at
greater risk for competition with less-skilled workers overseas.
In this case, my findings do not support the hypothesis. I did
find that the rate of decline in employment was much greater for
high school dropouts than for high school graduates in each
industry sector examined. However, there was much less variance
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in the rates of employment decline in each sector for high school
dropouts than existed in the same rates in each sector for high
school graduates. Again, what distinguishes these results is the
fact that high school dropouts fared badly in all sectors,
whereas for high school graduates the dramatic drop in employment
was limited to the import-sensitive manufacturing sector.
The difference in the results for high school dropouts and
high school graduates underscores the importance of analyzing the
data for workers in these two education groups separately. My
findings raise the question of whether something fundamentally
different might be affecting the labor market outcomes of high
school dropouts and high school graduates. For high school
graduates, the industry categories of import-sensitive and non-
import-sensitive appear to be meaningful, even though the growth
of imported goods is clearly only part of the story. For high
school dropouts, however, some additional mix of factors appears
to be operating which has greatly diminished their employment
opportunities across each industry category. These factors may
include the decline in union representation, the growth in
immigration of less-skilled workers, and skill-biased technical
change.
B. Results for Men and Women Workers
Just as analyzing the data for high school dropouts and
graduates separately revealed some interesting differences, so
may looking at the data for men and women workers separately.
To a great extent, when the employment figures for men and women
are examined separately the results share a great similarity to
the results for all workers just discussed. The data for men and
women high school dropouts show the same dramatic drop in
employment in each industry category as did the data for all high
school dropouts over this decade (Table 3.5). The rate of
employment decline for high school dropouts was greatest in the
import-sensitive manufacturing sector (44 percent for men, 48
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Table 3.5 The Changing Percentage of Men and Women Workers by Education Type
Within Specific Industry Groups, 1979 and 1989
Workers Aged 20 to 64
General Population
Absolute Percentage
Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
Less Than High School 32758000 24682194 -8075806 -24.7
High School 49754000 57529811 7775811 15.6
Some College 24737000 30862560 6125560 24.8
College or More 21251000 31885190 10634190 50.0
Total 128500000 144959755 16459755 12.81
Men
Less Than High School 16010000 12420000 -3590000 -22.4
High School 22100000 26440000 4340000 19.6
Some College 12150000 14790000 2640000 21.7
College or More 12310000 17240000 4930000 40.0
Total 62570000 70890000 8320000 13.30
Women
Less Than High School 16750000 12260000 -4490000 -26.8
High School 27650000 31090000 3440000 12.4
Some College 12580000 16070000 3490000 27.7
College or More 8941000 14640000 5699000 63.7





Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
Less Than High School 19540000 13430000 -6110000 -31.3
High School 35800000 41520000 5720000 16.0
Some College 19310000 23100000 3790000 19.6
College or More 17510000 25900000 8390000 47.9
Total 92160000 103950000 11790000 12.79
Men
Less Than High School 11699000 8358293 -3340707 -28.6
High School 18214000 21376773 3162773 17.4
Some College 10270000 11747468 1477468 14.4
College or More 10629000 14639820 4010820 37.7
Total 50812000 56122354 5310354 10.45
Women
Less Than High School 7842000 5066788 -2775212 -35.4
High School 17591000 20141493 2550493 14.5
Some College 9043000 11356239 2313239 25.6
College or More 6881000 11257758 4376758 63.6





Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
Less Than High School 1710000 917017 -792983 -46.4
High School 2356000 1989274 -366726 -15.6
Some College 841000 749407 -91593 -10.9
College or More 589000 676076 87076 14.8
Total 5496000 4331774 -1164226 -21.18
Men
Less Than High School 755000 419473 -335527 -44.4
High School 1251000 1104893 -146107 -11.7
Some College 607000 481004 -125996 -20.8
College or More 488000 520709 32709 6.7
Total 3101000 2526079 -574921 -18.5398581
Women
Less Than High School 955000 497543 -457457 -47.9
High School 1105000 884382 -220618 -20.0
Some College 234000 268403 34403 14.7
College or More 101000 155366 54366 53.8





Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
Less Than High School 5171000 2949946 -2221054 -43.0
High School 7379000 7558991 179991 2.4
Some College 2769000 2951965 182965 6.6
College or More 2053000 2971504 918504 44.7
Total 17372000 16432406 -939594 -5.41
Men
Less Than High School 3478000 1955275 -1522725 -43.8
High School 4823000 5001880 178880 3.7
Some College 2021000 2054129 33129 1.6
College or More 1702000 2289111 587111 34.5
Total 12024000 11300395 -723605 -6.02
Women
Less Than High School 1693000 994672 -698328 -41.2
High School 2556000 2557111 1111 0.0
Some College 748000 897836 149836 20.0
College or More 351000 682392 331392 94.4





Worker Number Number Change Change
Category 1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
All
Less Than High School 12660000 9558118 -3101882 -24.5
High School 26070000 31970000 5900000 22.6
Some College 15700000 19400000 3700000 23.6
College or More 14870000 22250000 7380000 49.6
Total 69300000 83178118 13878118 20.03
Men
Less Than High School 7466000 5983545 -1482455 -19.9
High School 12140000 15270000 3130000 25.8
Some College 7642000 9212335 1570335 20.5
College or More 8439000 11830000 3391000 40.2
Total 35687000 42295880 6608880 18.52
Women
Less Than High School 5194000 3574573 -1619427 -31.2
High School 13930000 16700000 2770000 19.9
Some College 8061000 10190000 2129000 26.4
College or More 6429000 10420000 3991000 62.1
Total 33614000 40884573 7270573 21.63
Population figures are calculated using data from the 1980 U.S. Decennial
Census and the 1990 Current Population Survey.
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percent for women), followed closely by that in the non-import-
sensitive manufacturing sector (41 and 44 percent, respectively).
In both the import-sensitive and non-import-sensitive
manufacturing sectors, the rates of employment decline for men
and women high school dropouts are fairly close together -- at
most a four percentage point difference. But while the rate of
employment decline for men and women high school dropouts is less
in the non-manufacturing sector (20 percent for men and 31
percent for women), the 11 percentage point difference between
the rates for men and women is more than twice that found in
either manufacturing sector. And while the rate of employment
decline for men in the non-manufacturing sector is only half that
for men in either manufacturing sector, the rate for women in
non-manufacturing is close to three fourths of that for women in
either manufacturing sector.
Why the rate of employment decline for women high school
dropouts in non-manufacturing should be so much higher than that
for men is not readily apparent. A small piece of the
explanation may be that the numbers of women without a high
school education have declined slightly faster than the numbers
of men high school dropouts -- a decline of 26.8 percent for
women compared with a decline of 22.4 percent for men. I suspect
that a second piece of the explanation lies in the array of
occupations that men and women hold in the non-manufacturing
sector and how the structure of those occupations has changed
over this time period. It may be, for example, that more
occupations which have held opportunities for less-educated women
(entry-level positions in retail sales and health care, for
example) have been subject to a greater degree of skills
upgrading than those occupations which have held the same sorts
of opportunities for less-educated men (for example, janitors,
transit workers, workers in mining and natural resources).
A third contributing factor in explaining the greater rate
of decline in the employment of women high school dropouts in the
non-manufacturing sector may be the faster rate of decline of
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women, when compared with men, in employment in the labor market
overall. My estimates show that while the number of women
without a high school education declined by 26.8 percent in the
general population between 1979 and 1989, in my category All
Industry the number of women high school dropouts declined by
over 35 percent -- a gap of close to nine percentage points. For
men, a gap also exists (a decline of 22.4 percent in the general
population versus 28.6 percent in All Industry) but at six
percentage points it is considerably smaller.
Based on my data, I can only speculate about how much the
greater rate of decline in the employment of women high school
dropouts is a demand side issue and how much is a supply side
issue. Since many women have family responsibilities and thus
require child care in order to work, it may be that the decline
in the real value of the minimum wage has meant that fewer less-
educated women are finding it profitable to work. On the other
hand, the greater rate of employment decline may simply be an
artifact of demographic differences between men and women. If
working women high school dropouts tended to be older in 1979
than working men high school dropouts, then the greater decline
in the number of working women high school dropouts may simply be
a result of the fact that more of them reached retirement age
over the decade. Or, as mentioned earlier, the restructuring of
occupations and industries may be responsible.
Another similarity between the results for the category All
Workers and those for men and women workers examined separately
emerges when we look at the data for high school graduates. As
was true for All workers, for both men and women high school
graduates the import-sensitive manufacturing sector is the only
industry sector where employment declined between 1979 and 1989.
For men high school graduates, employment in import-sensitive
manufacturing declined by close to 12 percent and for women by 20
percent. In the non-import-sensitive manufacturing sector,
employment for men and women high school graduates remained
stable while in the all non-manufacturing sector it expanded by
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20 percent for women and by 25 percent for men. Here again,
then, the distinction between import-sensitive and non-import-
sensitive appears to be meaningful for both men and women high
school graduates but not for men or women high school dropouts.
Returning to the original hypothesis that I explored in this
section -- that the growth of imports over the 1980s caused less-
educated workers to lose employment in the import-sensitive
manufacturing sector at a disproportionate rate -- I find strong
evidence to support this hypothesis when I examine all less-
educated workers and high school graduates alone. My second
hypothesis that differences in the rate of employment change
between sectors would be greatest for high school dropouts turned
out to be false. Instead, the rates of employment decline for
high school dropouts turned out to be quite consistent across
sectors because high school dropouts fared poorly in each. High
school graduates, on the other hand, did clearly fare the worst
in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector -- the only sector
where their total employment declined.
III. A Comparison of Findings
In a paper assessing whether international trade is to blame
for worsening income and earnings inequality in the U.S.,
Burtless (1996) concludes that the pattern of employment cuts in
trade-affected and non-trade-affected industries argues against a
strong role for trade. On the face of it, his findings appear to
directly contradict mine. However, I believe that the difference
in our choice of indicators can reconcile the dissimlarity of our
conclusions.
Burtless purports to test whether industries which can be
classified as the most trade-affected "shed" low-wage workers
faster than those unaffected by trade. He begins by citing the
fact that between 1969 and 1993, trade-affected industries
reduced the percentage of their less-educated workforce
substantially: in 1969, the percentage of male workers without a
147
high school degree in trade-affected industries dropped from 42
percent to 18 percent while the share of female workers without a
high school degree fell from 45 percent to 17 percent. He then
argues that industries least affected by trade exhibited a
similar pattern, reducing the share of their male workforce
without a high school degree from 36 percent to 13 percent (he
gives no comparable figures for the female workforce). According
to Burtless,
"If anything, industries unaffected by trade cut their use
of low-skill workers even faster than trade-affected
industries -- a pattern that is extremely hard to square
with the claim that foreign trade is the main factor behind
soaring wage inequality."[
However, I would argue that what Burtless has measured is
not whether trade-affected industries have shed less-educated
workers at a faster rate than have industries least affected by
trade, but instead how the internal education composition of
these two industry groups has changed over time. To take an
extreme example, based on Burtless' figures it is theoretically
possible that the group of industries that is least affected by
trade has not cut a single job for high school dropouts but has
simply expanded by adding lots of jobs for workers who are more
educated. The share of this industry group's total workforce
without a high school degree would decline dramatically without a
single low-wage worker being "shed". On the other hand, trade-
affected industries could have implemented huge cuts in
employment for male and female high school dropouts. While the
numbers cited by Burtless on changes in workforce composition
would still look very similar between the two categories of
industries, the experience of high school dropouts within the two
groups of industries would be very different. In and of
themselves, then, the numbers presented by Burtless don't
necessarily tell us very much.
Burtless, 1996, p. 30.
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To explore this point further, I undertake an analysis
similar to that of Burtless utilizing my own data and again using
the four industry categories of all industry, import-sensitive
manufacturing, non-import-sensitive manufacturing, and all non-
manufacturing. My hypothesis is that changes in the education
composition of the workforce in the import-sensitive industry
sector will not be significantly different than that found in the
other three industry sectors. My results are presented in the
following section.
The Evidence on Internal Workforce Restructuring
To compare my conclusions with those of Burtless, I examine
three separate indicators of industry laborforce composition.
The first is the changing share of employment held by less-
educated workers in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector
compared with the shares held by less-educated workers in all
industry, in non-import-sensitive manufacturing, and in non-
manufacturing between 1979 and 1989. The second indicator I
examine is the ratio of more-educated to less-educated workers in
these same industry groups over the same time period. The last
indicator is the same as that used by Burtless: the education
composition of the male and female workforce within industry
sectors, in my case in 1979 and in 1989.
I begin by comparing the data for different education groups
of workers in All Industry over the decade to that of workers in
import-sensitive manufacturing over the same time period (Table
3.6). Again, I am looking for evidence that the share of less-
educated workers declined more sharply in the import-sensitive
industry sector than in other industry sectors. Beginning with a
comparison of all high school dropouts in the category All
Industry with all high school dropouts in import-sensitive
manufacturing, the first thing to note is that the share of high
school dropouts is much higher in import-sensitive manufacturing
in both 1979 and 1989. However, the rate of decline in the share
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Table 3.6 The Changing Composition of the Workforce by Education Type within Specific Industry Groups, 1979 and 1989
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2.84 2.04 -0.80 -28.30










6.15 3.26 -2.89 -46.97





































































































































Ratio of Share of Absolute Rate of
Less-Educated/ Change Change
More Educated in Ratio in Ratio
1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
2.60 1.77 -0.83 -31.83






3.87 2.25 -1.62 -41.87





































































































































Ratio of Share ol Absolute Rate of
Less-Educated/ Change Change
More Educated in Ratio in Ratio
1979 1989 1979-89 1979-89
1.27 1.00 -0.27 -21.30










1.32 0.98 -0.34 -25.46
0.6 1.3
Key to education categories: <HS: less than a high school education; HS:
Sm Coll: some years of college; Coll/+: four years of college or more.
a high school education (12 years);
Population figures are calculated with data from the 1980 U.S. Decennial Census
and the 1990 Current Population Survey.
of high school dropouts between 1979 and 1989 is actually greater
in All Industry -- a rate of decline of 39 percent compared with
32 percent in import-sensitive manufacturing. Since the share of
high school graduates increased in all sectors, the remaining
analysis will focus on the results for high school dropouts.
Examining men and women workers separately reinforces these
results. As was the case for all workers, for both men and women
the rate of decline in the share of high school dropouts was
higher in All Industry than in import-sensitive manufacturing.
In order to get a more comprehensive measure of the internal
restructuring of these industry sectors, I compared the ratios of
less-educated workers (high school dropouts plus high school
graduates) to more educated workers (those with some college plus
college graduates) (Table 3.6). By this measure, I find that the
ratio declined in both All Industry and in import-sensitive
manufacturing by approximately one quarter, with a slightly
greater rate of decline in the import-sensitive sector. In both
1979 and 1989, however, the level of the ratio is much higher in
the import-sensitive manufacturing sector.
Continuing with my examination of the ratio of less-educated
to more-educated workers in All Industry and in import-sensitive
manufacturing, I separated out the results for men and women.
Among men, the rate of decline in the ratio was greater in All
Industry, whereas for women it was greater in import-sensitive
manufacturing. The level of the ratio was also much higher among
women in the IS manufacturing sector than among women in All
Industry, or among men in both sectors. However, these data are
calculated on a small sample size of better-educated women in the
import-sensitive manufacturing sector and thus caution dictates
not overstating the ramifications of the results.
Next, I performed a comparison of the import-sensitive (IS)
manufacturing sector with the non-import-sensitive (NIS)
manufacturing sector using the same indicators of the changing
shares of each education group over the decade and the ratios of
less-educated to more-educated workers. Looking at All Workers
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in both industry sectors, I found that the share of high school
dropouts in 1979 was very close to equal -- roughly 31 percent
for the IS manufacturing sector and 30 percent for the NIS
sector. However, the rate of decline in the share of dropouts
was greater in the NIS manufacturing sector -- a rate of decline
of 40 percent compared with 32 percent for the IS sector. These
results mirror those comparing the IS manufacturing sector to All
Industry discussed above.
Examining the results in these two manufacturing sectors for
women and men separately does not alter this picture appreciably.
Among men, the share of high school dropouts declined at a
considerably faster rate (40 percent) in the NIS manufacturing
sector than in the IS sector (29 percent). The share of women
high school dropouts also declined at a faster rate in the non-
import-sensitive sector, though the disparity between it and the
rate among women in the IS sector was not nearly as greater as
the disparity between men found in the two sectors.
The ratio of the share of less-educated to more-educated
workers can give us a summary of what is happening to the
internal structure of these two sectors. In the import-sensitive
sector, it dropped from 2.84 to 2.04 for All workers, a decline
of 28 percent. A similar change in the ratio from 2.6 to 1.8 in
the NIS manufacturing sector produced a similar rate of decline
of 32 percent. Here again, there is no evidence that whatever
internal restructuring happened over the decade was more severe
in the trade-sensitive sector.
Examining the ratios for men and women separately presents a
slightly contradictory picture. For men, the ratio declined more
in the non-import-sensitive sector -- 28 percent compared with 17
percent -- while for women it fell at a slightly greater rate in
the import-sensitive sector -- 47 percent versus 42 percent.
This evidence of a more dramatic restructuring in the education
composition of women in the IS sector is something I also found
in All industry and in the NIS sector. In each case, the ratio
of less-educated to more-educated workers dropped at a more
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dramatic rate among women than among men. This is not because
the share of less-educated women declined at a far faster rate
than the share of less-educated men, but because the share of
more-educated women increased at a faster rate than did that of
men. Again, with small sample sizes of better-educated women in
the import-sensitive manufacturing sector in particular, one must
be careful not to overstate these differences. However, a
similar differential between men and women can be found in the
non-manufacturing sector where sample sizes are not an issue.
This points to the growth of women in management and other high-
level occupations as a probable explanation for at least some of
the difference.
As a final examination of the changing share of the
workforce by education, I compare the import-sensitive
manufacturing sector with the non-manufacturing (NM) sector.
Beginning with data for All Workers in the first four rows of
Table 3.6, again I note that the share of high school dropouts in
the IS manufacturing sector is almost double that in the NM
sector in both 1979 and 1989. The rate of decline in the share
of high school dropouts, however, is higher in non-manufacturing
-- a rate of decline of 37 percent versus 32 percent. Examining
the data for men and women separately, I find that the rate of
decline in the share of employment for male high school dropouts
was slightly higher in the non-manufacturing sector, but the two
figures are not widely divergent -- 33 versus 30 percent. Among
women high school dropouts, the rate of decline in employment
shares was higher in the non-manufacturing sector.
Looking again at the summary measure of internal
restructuring -- the ratio of less-educated to more-educated
workers -- I find that for all workers, the ratio declined at a
more rapid rate in the IS sector than in the non-manufacturing
sector -- 28 percent versus 21 percent. This is the one small
piece of reliable evidence that runs counter to my hypothesis.
The rate of change in the ratio was almost identical for men in
the two sectors. As noted earlier, the ratio for women declined
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at a much higher rate in the IS sector than it did in the non-
manufacturing sector -- 47 percent versus 25 percent. However,
as also noted earlier, the small sample size of better-educated
women in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector requires
caution in overstating any conclusions based on these results and
I consider these results for women to be tentative.
As one final test of the restructuring hypothesis, I examine
the education composition of men and women workers separately
within industry sectors. For example, among women in the import-
sensitive manufacturing sector, has the share of women without a
high school education declined and at what rate compared with
other sectors? This is the same question that Burtless examined.
Table 3.7 displays the results. In column one, row one, we see
that in 1979 24.3 percent of the men in IS manufacturing were
high school dropouts, compared with 16.6 in 1989 -- a drop of
almost 32 percent. A similar drop of 31 percent in the share of
women workers who are high school dropouts is found in this
sector. Looking at the results for high school dropouts in each
sector, I see no evidence that the educational restructuring that
occurred in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector is somehow
different in character or degree than that found in other
sectors. If anything, quite the opposite since the rate of
change in the share of different gender/education groups in the
import-sensitive manufacturing sector has been equalled or
exceeded by that found in the non-import-sensitive manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors.
My research thus confirms my own hypothesis, as well as the
findings of Burtless, on the narrow question of whether the
education composition of the workforce has shifted in
fundamentally different ways in different sectors of industry --
with one small exception the evidence shows that it hasn't.
However, my analysis also underscores the point that it is
possible to find evidence of a disproportionate rate of
"shedding" of less-educated workers from trade-sensitive
industries, as I argue I did earlier, while at the same time also
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Table 3.7 The Changing Composition of Men and Women Workers by Education Type















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Key to education categories: <HS: less than high school; HS: high school education (12 years);
Sm Coll: some years of college; Coll/+: four years of college or more.
Population figures are calculated with data from the 1980 U.S. Decennial Census and the 1990 Current Population Survey.
finding that the education composition of these same industries
has not shifted in a fundamentally different way than that found
in non-trade-sensitive industries.
Which is the more appropriate indicator with which to gauge
the influence of international trade on the employment of low-
wage workers? I would argue that examining the differential rate
of employment decline among different industries provides a much
clearer picture of the effects of trade on less-educated or low-
wage workers than does an analysis of the changing education
composition of the laborforce. This is especially true given
that the employment share of one education group in an industry
sector is determined not only by whether its own employment
numbers are increasing or decreasing but also by changes in the
employment of workers in the other education groups.
IV. Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored the possibility that one reason
for the decline in mean wages for high school dropouts and high
school graduates documented earlier was that these two categories
of workers were losing employment at a faster rate because of the
increased level of import penetration over the 1980s. My first
hypothesis was that I would find a greater rate of decline in
employment for less-educated workers in the sector comprised of
import-sensitive manufacturing industries than in three other
industry aggregates -- non-import-sensitive manufacturing, all
industry, and all non-manufacturing. My findings provided strong
confirmation for this hypothesis. When I grouped high school
dropouts and high school graduates together and examined less-
educated workers as a whole, I did find that their rate of
employment decline was greatest in the import-sensitive
manufacturing sector.
My second hypothesis was that I would find that whatever
differential in the rate of employment decline existed between
the import-sensitive manufacturing sector and other sectors would
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be greatest for high school dropouts, since they would face the
most competition from less-educated workers overseas. Instead, I
found that high school dropouts fared poorly in all sectors, thus
the differential between sectors was actually small. For high
school graduates, on the other hand, a significant differential
did exist between the import-sensitive manufacturing sector and
other sectors, in particular because the import-sensitive sector
was unique in showing a decline in total employment for high
school graduates. These results raise the possibility that
something fundamentally different is happening in the labor
market for high school dropouts and high school graduates. It is
conceivable, for example, that a combination of factors, import
penetration among them, has made the labor market less hospitable
to high school dropouts in all sectors. For high school
graduates, import penetration may be a primary reason for their
employment loss. The other labor market factors which appear to
be affecting high school dropouts may either not be operating in
the labor market for high school graduates or there is some
counterforce which masks their effects, causing net employment to
grow in the non-trade-sensitive sectors I examined.
The final hypothesis I tested was that the import-sensitive
manufacturing sector would show no evidence of a more fundamental
internal workforce restructuring along educational lines than
would the other industry sectors I examined. This hypothesis was
also confirmed. The share of high school dropouts within each
sector actually declined faster in the non-import-sensitive
manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector than it did
in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector. Because the share
of high school dropouts declined so substantially, the share of
high school graduates rose in all sectors.
The overall picture that emerges from this analysis is of a
declining population of high school dropouts which is faring
badly across the economy, probably for a variety of reasons of
which import penetration may be one; and a growing population of
high school graduates which have fared poorly in the import-
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sensitive manufacturing sector but have found expanded employment
opportunities elsewhere. High school graduates have fared poorly
in the import-sensitive manufacturing sector because of
contracting employment, not because of a fundamental internal
restructuring which has been to their disadvantage compared with
other sectors.
Because high school dropouts appear to be at a severe
disadvantage in each of the four industry sectors examined and
because the employemnt loss found for high school graduates in
the import-sensitive manufacturing sector has been offset by
expanding employment opportunities for high school graduates
elsewhere, linking the higher level of import penetration of the
1980s with the decline in mean wages for less-educated workers
would seem to be a difficult task, based on this evidence alone.
However, according to Hecksher-Ohlin theory, the traded sector
can have a much more profound impact on wages than its size would
indicate. Also, according to the research of Kruse discussed in
the literature review, there are specific reasons why workers
laid off from the traded sector might have more difficulty in
attaining new sources of employment. It is also possible that
the effects of trade are played out very differently in local
labor markets. For example, in a given labor market, the loss of
employment due to import penetration may affect less-educated
workers to a significant degree because there is no
countervailing employment gain for these workers in other local
industries. In the next chapter, I explore the possible ties
between wages, employment, and import penetration in local labor
markets. I undertake this by analyzing whether living in a
trade-sensitive labor market matters to workers' hourly wages,
their probability of being employed, or the hours they work per
year.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MODELLING THE EFFECTS OF IMPORT PENETRATION ON
EARNINGS AND EMPLOYMENT IN METROPOLITAN LABOR MARKETS
I. Introduction
In this final piece of data analysis, I examine whether the
large growth in commodity imports over the 1980s contributed to
the deteriorating earnings and employment position of less-
educated American workers. To accomplish this, I test two
separate regression models. The first uses microdata and
examines whether residing in an import-sensitive labor market
affected a worker's earnings, probability of employment, or
annual hours of work in 1989. The second utilizes SMSA-level
data and examines whether the import-sensitivity of a
metropolitan labor market helps to explain its mean level of
annual earnings or its labor force participation rate in 1989.
Consistent with my assertion that local labor markets vary
significantly in the extent to which they have been affected by
import penetration, in both cases I do find local labor market
effects. In the microdata model, I find that the effects of
import-sensitivity show up most strongly in the earnings
equations for women workers, less-educated workers, and African-
American and Hispanic workers. The effects of imports on either
annual hours of work or the probability of employment were
negligible. In the SMSA-level model, I find effects on the mean
level of earnings with the strongest influence showing up in
women's earnings. The effects on the SMSA labor force




My analysis starts from the premise that if the growing
import penetration of the 1980s contributed to the declining
economic position of less-educated workers in the U.S., it should
be possible to see significant differences in the earnings and
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employment of workers who live (and usually work) in labor
markets which were sensitive to import penetration versus those
who live in labor markets which were not negatively affected by
import penetration. My intent is to duplicate the general
approach of Katz and Revenga in their comparison of earnings
trends in Japan and the United States over the period 1973 to
1987 (Katz and Revenga, 1989), but to do so on a purely domestic
basis. In their study, Katz and Revenga try to explain the
growing college/high school wage differential in the United
States over the 1980s by considering the contributions of
demographic, macroeconomic, trade, and institutional factors. In
order to separate out these complex factors, Katz and Revenga
compare the wage experience of workers in the United States, a
country with a large trade deficit over the 1980s, with Japan, a
country with a large trade surplus over the same period.
I chose to focus my research on the effects of imports
rather than on the overall effects of trade (imports plus
exports) for several reasons. The first is that in the
literature on the impact of trade over the 1980s, it is the
growth of imports from developing countries which is generally
cited as the reason for greatest concern. Freeman (1995), for
example, cites the fact that U.S. imports from less-developed
countries rose from 14 percent of overall imports in 1970 to 35
percent in 1990, with the volume of imports consisting of light
manufactured goods increasing eleven-fold between 1955 and 1992.1
Second, while it is certainly true that most industries both
export and import, there are a range of manufacturing industries
which can be characterized as import-sensitive, as discussed in
chapter three, and these industries have a higher share of less-
skilled, women, and minority workers than non-import-sensitive
industries. The consequence of this is that the growth of
imports over the 1980s may have had a differential impact on
subgroups of the workforce. Especially on the local labor market
Freeman, 1995, pp. 19-20.
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level, the loss of jobs in an import-sensitive industry does not
necessarily mean that workers will be reemployed, and at the same
wages, in the export or services sector, even if those sectors
are expanding. Thus, examining the effects of living in an SMSA
with an import-sensitive industry structure may tell us more
about what is happening at the low-wage and low-skill end of the
labor market than if I were to combine import and export industry
employment data to get a more comprehensive measure of "trade"
sensitivity. Examining the effects of imports without the
mediating effects of exports gives the most extreme view of how
wages and employment could be influenced by the growth of imports
over the 1980s.
Ideally, one would like to be able to compare the effects of
imports alone with the effects of "trade" (imports plus exports),
but a last more pragmatic problem remains. As described below, I
used data from Markusen et al to characterize the import-
sensitivity of 211 SMSAs. The Markusen data covers the time
period from 1978 to 1986, a period when the value of imports grew
steadily but the value of exports stagnated. The wage and
employment data I am using spans the time period between 1979 and
1989, two business cycle peaks, thus the two sets of data have
different end years. Between 1986 and 1989, imports continued to
grow steadily, thus continuing the trend of earlier in the
decade. For exports, however, the 1986 to 1989 time period was
one where the trend of stagnation found between 1979 and 1986
changed dramatically. Export volumes rose steeply over this
three year span. Consequently, while the 1978 to 1986 timeframe
is arguably representative of the decade spanning 1979 to 1989 in
terms of import trends, the same cannot be said vis a vis export
trends. For all of these reasons, I elected to examine imports
alone.
To begin, I needed a means to categorize local labor markets
by the import sensitivity of their industrial structures.
Ideally, I wanted a means by which I could place local labor
markets on a continuum of sensitivity to import penetration. In
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this way, I could address the question of whether the import
sensitivity of an SMSA's industry structure could explain any of
the variance in workers' earnings, hours of work, and probability
of employment. A second related question I address is whether
the import sensitivity of an SMSA helps to explain its mean level
of annual earnings or its labor force participation rate.
Markusen, Noponen, Shao, and Driessen performed an analysis
of the trade orientation of United States subregions, states, and
cities (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas or SMSAs)
covering the period from 1978 to 1986 (Noponen and Shao, 1990;
Markusen, Noponen, and Driessen, 1991). Since SMSAs correspond
most closely to discrete labor market areas, I chose to perform
my analysis on the SMSA level. Markusen et al constructed an
innovative shift-share model which allowed them to impute the
percentage of employment lost or gained for each Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) due to changes in imports,
exports, and other factors based on each SMSA's industrial
composition.
In a traditional shift-share model, the difference between
an individual SMSA's employment growth rate and that of the
national average would be explained by three components: a
national growth component, an industry mix component, and a local
competitive advantage component. The national growth component
is simply the expected growth in employment in the SMSA if
employment had grown at the same rate as the national average.
The local industrial mix component measures the growth in
employment if every industry in the SMSA had grown at the same
rate as the industry did nationally. And the competitive shift
component aggregates the difference in an SMSA's local individual
industry growth rates from the growth rate of the individual
industry nationally. This accounts for a city's "competitive
advantage," and is equivalent to a residual term, embodying all
that can't be explained by the national growth rate or the local
industrial mix components. The innovation accomplished by
Markusen et al is that they were able to disaggregate both the
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national growth and industrial mix components into subcomponents.
These subcomponents included an import, export, domestic, and
labor productivity component.
Because trade data are not compiled on the SMSA level, it is
impossible to disaggregate the "competitive advantage" residual
term. The sign and relative magnitudes of the import, export,
domestic, and labor productivity national growth components were
the same for all SMSA's studied, reflecting the SMSA's
proportional share of each of these national growth effects.
Therefore, these data are a poor indicator of SMSA differences in
import-sensitivity. For the nation as a whole over the period
studied, imports soared, exports expanded modestly, domestic
demand expanded robustly, and labor productivity improved
substantially. For each SMSA, then, this yielded a negative and
large "national import" component, a positive but small national
export component, a larger and positive "national domestic"
component, and an even larger and negative "national labor
productivity" component.
However, the signs and magnitudes of the industrial mix
growth rate subcomponents vary among SMSA's and reveal the extent
to which each SMSA's particular mix of industries performed
better or worse than the nation in each of these markets. For
example, if the "import industrial mix" component is positive,
this suggests that the SMSA's industrial mix is less vulnerable
to import penetration than is the nations's. The "domestic
industrial mix" component indicates the extent to which an SMSA's
industrial mix is responsive to domestic demand factors.
Markusen et al state that,
"In our model, the import and export industrial mix
components are quite useful in characterizing an SMSA'S
industrial mix. The relative size of each compared with the
domestic component reveals the extent to which each SMSA's
experience is tied to the international economy and illustrates
the degree to which an SMSA's slow growth experience is
influenced by its inability to compete with imports, by stagnant
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or shrinking export demand, or by changes in apparent domestic
consumption."
In order to compute these local industrial mix
subcomponents, Markusen et al spliced together international
trade data by disaggregated industry, which is only available by
value of commodities traded (rather than by employment), and
County Business Patterns data, which contains employment data for
the same industries at a highly disaggregated local scale, but no
commodities value information. According to Markusen et al,
"The employment effects represented by these subcomponents,
then, are 'hypothetical' or 'imputed', in that they show the
expected job gain or loss if employment to output ratios have
remained constant over the period studied."
Markusen et al go on to say that rarely does it happen that
employment to output ratios remain constant because of gains in
labor productivity, which lowers the ratio of employment to
output. In order to compensate for productivity effects, a
"labor productivity industrial mix" component was added. While
Markusen et al report that it would be preferable to allocate the
labor productivity growth factor across the export, import, and
domestic components, the data is not available to do this.
The Markusen shift-share analysis employs U.S. international
commodity trade data (EA622 for exports and FA245 for imports),
domestic employment (County Business Patterns) and national
output data from 1978 to 1986 on a set of highly disaggregated
industries (3-digit Standard Industrial Classification [SIC]
level) to assess the relative industrial and trade performance of
all 320 U.S. metropolitan areas existing in 1986. Markusen et al
"built up 140 manufacturing 3-digit SIC industries from data on
10,500 7-digit TSUSA (Tariff Schedule of the U.S. annotated)
import commodities and 4,500 7-digit export commodities, plus
data on national output for the same SICs from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce."
The SMSA shift-share data of Markusen et al are attached as
Appendix A.
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There are several limitations of using the data from
Markusen et al which should be noted. As outlined by Markusen et
al, "there are conceptual and data accuracy problems which may
lead to the underestimation of the industry mix shares. If
establishments are incorrectly allocated to SIC codes in the CBP
data, or if commodities are incorrectly allocated in the trade
schedules, then industrial mix effects, whether positive or
negative, will be underestimated. More troubling is the fact
that interindustry and multiplier effects are not charted with
the shift share technique, leading to further underestimation of
industry mix effects. For both these reasons, our industrial mix
components should be considered minimum estimates."
"Second, it should be reiterated that we are only modelling
the expected effects of industry structure vis-a-vis export,
import, and domestic demand on a [metropolitan areas's]
employment growth performance. Considerable attention should be
paid to the fact that the residual shift components remain large
for most regions, regardless of technique chosen. Our results
are of interest chiefly because they enable policymakers to view
the significance of trade versus domestic market growth as past
and potential contributors to [metropolitan] growth."
Third, as mentioned earlier, since no international
commodity trade data exist on an SMSA level, the employment
effects of changes in imports and exports are simply imputed
based on national industry averages. However, we know that
import penetration doesn't necessarily affect all parts of an
industry equally. In the case of expanding textile imports, for
example, we would expect that textile industry employment in
SMSA's with lower productivity production facilities would be
more heavily affected than that of SMSA's which are either
corporate headquarters or where state-of-the-art production
facilities are located. These distinctions, however, cannot be
reflected in the import and export estimations.
Fourth, the Markusen et al shift-share model is based solely
on trade and employment data for manufactured goods. It
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incorporates no information on either services or agricultural
commodities, whether directly or through interindustry linkages.
Since manufactured commodities make up the vast bulk of traded
goods, I do not expect that this limitation is very worrisome.
Finally, also as mentioned earlier, it would be preferable to be
able to allocate the productivity component and the residual
local competitiveness component to the import, export, and
domestic demand subcomponents. Because this cannot be done due
to trade data limitations, the employment changes ascribed
specifically to trade effects will be underestimated in many
cases.
Because of data limitations, the absolute estimate of
employment change ascribed to imports and exports is undoubtedly
not exact in many cases. However, the Markusen data does make it
possible to place SMSA's on a relative scale of sensitivity to
import penetration.
The Econometric Model
Two distinct statistical earnings models are presented. The
first tests the hypothesis that the import sensitivity of one's
SMSA of residence helps to explain the variance in workers'
probability of employment, their annual hours of work, and their
hourly earnings. In addition to the SMSA trade data from
Markusen et all, for this model I used microdata from the 1980
Decennial Census and the 1990 Current Population Survey. These
data sets contain information on annual earnings and employment
for individuals for 1979 and 1989, respectively. For simplicity,
I refer to this as the microdata model.
The microdata econometric model employs the human capital
framework for analyzing the determinants of earnings, as
developed by Mincer [1958, 1974], Schultz [1961], and Becker
[1964], among others. In such a statistical earnings function,
earnings are determined, in large part, by investments in
education and training, as well as by personal characteristics
such as race, sex, and geographic region of residence.
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The second model tests the hypothesis that the import
sensitivity of SMSAs can help to explain the variance in mean
annual earnings and in the labor force participation rate of
SMSAs. For this model, I constructed a data set with SMSA-level
variables using, again, the 1980 Decennial Census, the 1990
Current Population Survey, and the SMSA trade data from Markusen
et al. I refer to this as the SMSA model.
The microdata regression equation includes four categories
of independent variables used in standard earnings models:
demographic characteristics (race and marital status), human
capital variables (education and age), geographic variables
(subregion of residence and the mean level of earnings in each
SMSA), and industry. Seven separate equations are estimated
based on gender, race, and education breakdowns. These seven
population sub-categories are: all men, all women, men with a
high school education or less, women with a high school education
or less, men with a college education or more, women with a
college education or more, and all Blacks and Hispanics. This
allows both the intercept and the variable coefficients to vary
for each subgroup, reflecting the possibility that the trade and
other variables may affect each differently. In order to
eliminate the increased variance introduced by including those at
either the beginning or end of their working careers, I limited
the sample to persons of prime age: those between the ages of 25
and 54.
For the human capital variables age and education, I
included a quadratic form of each: age squared (AGE2) and
education squared (EDUC2). This is a standard means of
accounting for the fact that the relationship between income and
age or income and education is not strictly linear. As people
age, their earnings typically rise initially as they enter their
prime earning years, then fall off gradually heading into
retirement. In general, then, we would expect the AGE2
coefficient to be negative. On the other hand, as education
increases, earnings typically increase disproportionately. In
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general, then, we would expect the quadratic form of the
education variable to have a positive coefficient.
Including both a linear and quadratic form of the age and
education variables allows for the estimation of a broad range of
non-linear effects on earnings, hours, and employment. However,
the linear and quadratic forms of each variable are highly
correlated with one another: the correlation coefficient for the
AGE and AGE2 variables is .99, and between EDUC and EDUC2 it is
.98 (Appendix B). In order to remedy this problem of high
correlation between the linear and quadratic forms of the age end
education variables, I created a new linear form of each (AGEZ
and EDUCZ) by taking the original variables and subtracting the
mean level of each. The quadratic form of each variable is then
simply the square of this new linear variable. The correlation
coefficient for the transformed age variables is now only .37,
while that for the transformed education variables is only -.41.
The resulting coefficient for the linear form of education now
expresses the main influence of education on earnings, etc.,
while the quadratic form of the education variable now represents
only the residual variance that could not be explained by the
linear term.
A variable for geographic subregion of residence is included
because, even though regional income and employment differentials
diminished over the decade of the 1970s, the evidence shows that
not only do they persist but they appear to have widened over the
1980s and should be controlled for (see Browne, 1989; Eberts,
1989). I also included a second geographic variable in the
earnings equations only: the mean level of annual earnings in
each SMSA in 1979, expressed in 1989 dollars. This variable is
included to control for non-trade related earnings differentials
between SMSAs. The SMSA mean earnings are calculated for 1979
because this is the business cycle peak year nearest the start of
the period over which the trade variables were calculated: 1978
to 1986.
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The inclusion of the fourteen dummy variables for industry
was based on the need to control for sectoral differentials in
wages and employment which are not related to trade. For
example, had industry dummy variables not been included, it could
have been argued that the SMSA trade variables were picking up
the effects of the greater likelihood of working in the auto
industry in city X and of working in the textile industry in city
Y. Including the industry dummies allows one to say whether,
even after controlling for industry of employment, living in a
city whose industry structure is more or less sensitive to
imports matters in explaining the variance in earnings, hours,
and employment.
As I had originally conceived the model, in addition to
these more standard earnings equation variables, a set of
independent variables for trade were included. These trade
variables were derived from the industry mix component of the
Markusen et al shift-share analysis data discussed above. The
import variable was the imputed percentage of total employment
lost or gained in an SMSA between 1978 and 1986 due to
manufacturing commodity imports, based on that SMSA's industry
mix (the import industrial mix component). The export variable
was the imputed percentage of employment lost or gained between
1978 and 1986 due to manufacturing commodity exports, again based
on the SMSA industry mix (the export industrial mix component).
The domestic variable expressed the effect of national
domestic demand shifts on local industries over the same time
period. Markusen et al used a convention from national income
accounting in calculating the domestic demand component that
domestic sales, or demand, is equal to total output minus
(exports plus imports). In their analysis, then, the domestic
demand component is a residual. The labor productivity variable
was the percentage of employment in an SMSA lost or gained
between 1978 and 1986 due to the "extent to which labor
productivity growth rates of the SMSA's unique industrial mix
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deviate from those expected from national overall productivity
growth."
I found running an earnings equation with the import,
export, and domestic variables at the same time to be
problematic. I believe this is due, at least in part, to the
residual character of the domestic variable. Rather than
omitting either the domestic or the export variable, which would
have resulted in a biased estimate of the import variable, I
decided to employ an alternative methodology. Instead of
estimating separate coefficients for the import, export,
domestic, and productivity variables (the local industry mix
components), I decided to estimate one coefficient for a total
employment change variable.
The total employment change variable is a sum of the local
industry mix components (import + export + domestic +
productivity). It is identical to estimating a model with each
individual component included, as long as I make the simplifying
assumption that the coefficients for each should be the same. I
am arguing that a one percent change in employment should have
the same effect on earnings, hours, and employment, regardless of
the source of that change in employment.' Thus, if one loses
one's job, it shouldn't matter that the cause of the job loss was
a textile mill shutting down due to import penetration or a K
Mart closing because of a lack of domestic demand. Once a
coefficient is estimated that gives the effect of a one percent
For an empirical investigation into this question on the
employer side, see Freeman and Katz (1991). As discussed
previously in the literature review, they find that the employer
response to product demand shifts is the same, regardless of
whether the source of the demand shift is domestic, import, or
export-related. Kruse (1988) does find evidence that workers
displaced by international trade do have longer spells of
joblessness than workers losing employment for other reasons.
However, since he argues that this is largely due to the
demographic characteristics of the workforce in import-sensitive
industries (i.e. the higher percentage of women and blue-collar
workers) these effects should be picked up by the demographic
variables (sex and education) included in the models.
176
change in SMSA employment on the dependent variable, it is a
simple matter to go back and multiply this coefficient by the
imputed employment change attributable to each of the four
subcomponents and thus to calculate their individual effects. A
list of SMSAs used in the regression analysis with the values of
the employment change, import, export, domestic, and productivity
variables are included as Appendix C.
Lastly, while the 1980 Census is an unweighted sample, the
1990 Current Population Survey is weighted to compensate for the
under-sampling of different regions and demographic groups. When
performing regression analysis, a number of options are available
when working with a weighted sample. One can simply ignore the
sample weights and run the regression on the unweighted sample.
Alternatively, one can calculate the mean sample weight, and then
divide each person's weight by this mean weight.
I ran my estimated model using both techniques and found
only very small differences in the results, and none that changed
any of the substantive findings. For example, using the
unweighted sample, the coefficient for SMSA employment change
(EMPCH) in the microdata earnings model was .45 for women,
compared with .44 using the mean sample weight technique. The
adjusted R squareds were very close to each other and the
magnitude and signs of the other variables in the model did not
change depending on the technique I used. This held true when I
ran both the weighted and unweighted equations on the full range
of microdata models. Therefore, I am only reporting my findings
which come from running the microdata models using the second
technique: dividing each person's weight by the mean sample
weight. For comparison purposes, I have included a
representative sample of results using both weighting techniques
in Appendix D.
III. Results of the Microdata Models
Again, three separate microdata models were run: one with
the log of hourly earnings as the dependent variable, one with
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annual hours of work as the dependent variable, and the last with
the probability of employment as the dependent variable. In each
case, separate equations were run for seven different demographic
groups as follows: all women, women with a high school education
or less, women with a college education or more, all men, men
with a high school education or less, men with a college
education or more, and all African-Americans and Hispanics. In
each case, the population was restricted to those between the
ages of 25 and 54 in 1989.
In the equation estimating hourly earnings, the coefficient
for the independent variable for total employment change in the
SMSA was positive and significant at the .01 level for each of
the seven demographic groups. Based on the adjusted R2 figures,
the model explained between eleven and twenty-seven percent of
the variance in hourly earnings, depending on the demographic
group examined. The explanatory power of the model was greatest
for men (an adjusted R2 of .27) and least for women with a
college education or more (an adjusted R2 of .11).
While the regression results clearly indicate that the total
employment change variable belongs in the model, its contribution
to the explanatory power of the model is actually quite minimal
at the margin. If the model is run with and without the
employment change variable, at most an additional one percent of
the variance in hourly earnings is explained, dependent on the
demographic group in the sample. This should serve as a caution
about overstating the role of employment change, and hence
imports, in hourly earnings. However, since the adjusted R2
levels are so low, it is also true that other omitted variables
are contributing to an explanation of the variance in hourly
earnings. If these omitted variables are correlated with
employment change, it is possible that a more fully specified
model would show employment change, and hence imports, to be a
more important explanatory factor.
A second reason to be cautious about assessing the impact of
imports is that, across all SMSAs, the mean level of employment
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change attributable to imports was somewhere between four and
eight tenths of one percent -- very close to zero. On average,
then, the impact of imports on hourly earnings was negligible.
However, while the effect of imports tends to wash out at the
national level, the local effects can be substantial. Using
counterfactual analysis, I compared the earnings of someone
living in an SMSA with an imputed loss of seven percent of its
total employment due to import penetration -- an "import-
sensitive" city -- with those living in an SMSA with an imputed
gain of seven percent of its employment because of its import
industry mix -- an "import-resistant" city (Table 4.1). For
women, the model predicts a differential in hourly earnings of
over six percent when comparing the effects of living in an
import-resistant versus an import-sensitive city. Hourly
earnings dropped by 52 cents from $8.73 to $8.21, working out to
a loss of just over $1,000 annually.
The counterfactual analysis also shows that the negative
effect of import penetration is greatest on a percentage basis
for women with a high school education or less, and for African-
Americans and Hispanics. On an absolute basis, the effect of
imports when comparing those in import-sensitive and import-
resistant SMSAs is surprisingly uniform: roughly fifty cents per
hour for all but two groups: men with a college education and men
with a high school education or less. For men with a high school
education or less, the earnings differential is thirty-seven
cents per hour, while for those with a college education or more
it is seventy-eight cents per hour.
Do these results indicate that import penetration has
greater negative consequences for the college-educated than for
those with no college education? Not necessarily. The model is
run on data which have both positive and negative values of the
import variable. If the positive effects of living in an
"import-resistant" SMSA are high for those with a college
education but low for those with a high school education or less,
this could result in a larger coefficient for the import variable
179
TABLE 4.1
Predicted Hourly Earnings Differential Between those living
in an import-sensitive SMSA to those living in an import-




Women $.52 6.3 $ 1,040
Women HS/Less .52 7.6 1,040
Women Coll/+ .50 4.5 1,000
Men .50 4.5 1,000
Men HS/less .37 4.0 740
Men Coll/+ .78 5.1 1,560
Blacks and Hispanics .49 6.3 980
* An import-sensitive SMSA is defined as one with an imputed
loss of 7 percent of total employment between 1978 and 1986
because of an industry mix which was vulnerable to imports.
Conversely, an import-resistant SMSA is one which gained 7
percent of total employment over the same time period.
++ The annual change in earnings is calculated by
multiplying the hourly earnings figure by 2000 hours, the
equivalent of year-round and full-time work.
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for the college-educated. However, it would not indicate that
those with a college education had been more "hurt" by import
penetration than those with only a high school education or less.
The microdata model shows a clear effect of imputed
employment change in an SMSA due to imports on predicted hourly
earnings for each of the seven demographic groups analyzed.
However, the results of the two models predicting annual hours of
work and the probability of employment show that imputed SMSA
employment change had few, if any, effects. In the case of the
model predicting annual hours of work, the SMSA employment change
variable is only statistically significant for African-American
and Hispanic workers considered as a group. However,
counterfactual analysis reveals that the actual effect is
negligible. In the case of the model predicting the probability
of employment, the coefficient for the SMSA employment change
variable is statistically significant for all men, men with a
high school education or less, African-Americans and Hispanics,
and women with 16 years of education or more. Here again,
however, counterfactual analysis reveals that the actual effect
is negligible.
In the following section, I discuss the microdata
regressions results for each of the seven demographic groups in
greater detail, beginning with the model predicting hourly
earnings. A summary table of regression coefficients and their
level of statistical significance for each demographic group and
for each of the three microdata equations is attached as Appendix
E.
Results for Women from the Microdata Hourly Earnings Model
Beginning with the results for women with earnings, age 25
to 54, I find that the employment change variable is positive and
the T value indicates that it is statistically significant at the
.01 percent level (Table 4.2). The coefficient of .436 means
that if the imputed percentage change in SMSA total employment
were to change by one percentage point (.01), hourly earnings
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Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects
of SMSA Employment
in 1989.






















































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was












would change by four tenths of one percent (.00436). Again, I am
making the assumption that any change in total SMSA employment
should have the same effect, regardless of its source.
Therefore, the value of the coefficient for SMSA total employment
change (.436) is also the value of the coefficient for the effect
of a change in total SMSA employment due to import, exports,
domestic sources, or productivity.
In order to assess the importance of the import variable, I
constructed a counterfactual analysis table (Table 4.3). Using
this table, I calculated the effect of living in an SMSA which
had an imputed loss of 7 percent of its employment because of
import penetration versus living in an SMSA with an imputed
employment gain of 7 percent due to imports. I then compared
these values based on a seven percent loss or gain in employment
to the effect of living in a city where the value of the import
variable is set at the mean level of total employment change for
all SMSAs of
(-0.006).
I chose a 7 percent change in total SMSA employment as a
reasonable figure for the counterfactual comparison because it is
large enough to give a sense of what the largest expected effect
might be, without being so high that it is an extreme value.
Approximately 8 percent of SMSAs in the sample have an absolute
value of total employment change imputed to imports of 7 percent
or more in the Markusen data (Appendix C). For the total
employment change by SMSA variable (EMPCH), the values range from
-.55 to .93, with over 80 percent of cities having absolute
values of 7 percent or higher.
At the bottom of Table 4.3, three hourly earnings figures
are recorded. When the import variable is set at the mean, the
computed value of hourly earnings is $8.44. When the import
variable is set at -0.07, the hourly earnings figure drops to
$8.21. Taking the ratio of these two numbers, I find that the
value of hourly earnings drops by almost 3 percent when comparing
an SMSA with the mean level of employment change to one with an
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Table 4.3: Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Log of Hourly Earnings
in 1989 for Women Workers Ages 25-54
Regression Regression Actual Changing
Variables Coefficients Mean Product Mean Product
INTERCEP 1.4564 1.0000 1.4564 1.0000 1.4564
IMPORT 0.4361 -0.0060 -0.0026 -0.0700 -0.0305
DOM 0.4361 0.0750 0.0327 0.0750 0.0327
EXPORT 0.4361 0.0024 0.0010 0.0024 0.0010
PROD 0.4361 -0.0413 -0.0180 -0.0413 -0.0180
MARRIED -0.0070 0.6117 -0.0043 0.6117 -0.0043
NHBLACK -0.0674 0.1493 -0.0101 0.1493 -0.0101
HISP -0.0464 0.0847 -0.0039 0.0847 -0.0039
AGEZ 0.0073 0.3365 0.0025 0.3365 0.0025
AGE2 -0.0005 66.6375 -0.0311 66.6375 -0.0311
EDUCZ 0.0855 0.0078 0.0007 0.0078 0.0007
EDUC2 0.0026 6.6512 0.0173 6.6512 0.0173
SMSAHR79 0.0373 11.6670 0.4348 11.6670 0.4348
NEW 0.1661 0.0495 0.0082 0.0495 0.0082
MAT 0.1016 0.1670 0.0170 0.1670 0.0170
ENC 0.0336 0.1781 0.0060 0.1781 0.0060
WNC -0.0122 0.0531 -0.0006 0.0531 -0.0006
SAT 0.0341 0.1968 0.0067 0.1968 0.0067
ESC -0.0340 0.0484 -0.0016 0.0484 -0.0016
WSC -0.0305 0.1029 -0.0031 0.1029 -0.0031
PAC 0.0460 0.1659 0.0076 0.1659 0.0076
NATRES 0.0110 0.0070 0.0001 0.0070 0.0001
MINING 0.5214 0.0023 0.0012 0.0023 0.0012
CONS 0.2323 0.0138 0.0032 0.0138 0.0032
NONDUR 0.2799 0.0649 0.0182 0.0649 0.0182
DUR 0.3756 0.0700 0.0263 0.0700 0.0263
TUC 0.4665 0.0528 0.0246 0.0528 0.0246
WSALE 0.3294 0.0274 0.0090 0.0274 0.0090
FIRE 0.3363 0.1026 0.0345 0.1026 0.0345
BUS 0.1664 0.0617 0.0103 0.0617 0.0103
PERS -0.1588 0.0435 -0.0069 0.0435 -0.0069
ENTMENT 0.1319 0.0097 0.0013 0.0097 0.0013
PROF 0.2183 0.3483 0.0760 0.3483 0.0760
PUB 0.3824 0.0525 0.0201 0.0525 0.0201
LNWAGE 2.1334 LNWAGE 2.1055
HOURLY WAGE 8.4432 HOURLY WAGE 8.2109
Lnwage when: 1.Import=Mean 8.44
2.lmport=-.07 8.21
3.Import=.07 8.73
Ratio of 1/2 1.028
185 Ratio of 3/2 1.063
employment loss of 7 percent. If the value of the import
variable is set at a gain of 7 percent of employment, the hourly
earnings figure rises to $8.73. Comparing the hourly earnings of
women in an SMSA that has an imputed gain of 7 percent of
employment versus an SMSA with an imputed loss of 7 percent of
employment, I find that living in an SMSA negatively affected by
import penetration results in the loss of 52 cents per hour, or
over a six percent decline in the level of hourly earnings. For
a woman working full-time and year-round (2000 hours), the annual
loss in earnings would be $1,040.00.
Using the counterfactual table, it is possible to plug in
individual SMSA import variable values from the data from
Markusen et al. While the results shouldn't be interpreted as
what actually happened to women's earnings in these individual
SMSAs over the 1980s, they do give a relative picture of how
different city's industrial structures may have affected that
city's earnings. For example, the model predicts that in Flint
Michigan, with an imputed employment loss of 10 percent, the
average hourly wage of women will be sixty-two cents lower in
1989 than in Gary, Indiana -- a city where the imputed employment
change is a gain of 7 percent. On an annual basis, the
comparative differential in earnings would be $1,240.00, or just
over seven and a half percent.
Of the industry variables, all but that for natural
resources (NATRES) have coefficients which are statistically
significant at the .01 level, and all the coefficients are
positive except that for personal services (PERS). Looking just
at the size of the coefficients in column 1 of Table 4.3, women
gain most from employment in mining, followed by transportation,
utilities, and communications (TUC); then the public sector
(PUB), and then durable goods (DUR).
As expected, the coefficients for the age (AGEZ) and
education (EDUCZ) variables are both positive and significant.
The coefficient for the education quadratic (EDUC2) is also
positive and significant, a reflection of the fact that the
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returns to education for women, as with other groups, increase at
an accelerating rate with each additional year. The coefficient
for the age quadratic (AGE2), however, is negative, reflecting
the fact that the rate of return to age is higher in youth and
then declines gradually with advancing age.
The mean level of earnings in each SMSA in 1979, the
variable SMSAHR79, turns out to be the strongest predictor of
hourly earnings in 1987 when we measure the product of the
coefficient and the mean. Again looking at Table 4.3, out of a
total value of the dependent variable LNWAGE (the log of hourly
earnings) of 2.13, the variable for the mean level of earnings in
1979 contributed .4348, or just over 20 percent. This is
evidence that, even after accounting for one's region of
residence and industry of work, one's SMSA of residence and its
relative economic fortune still matters. Of the subregional
variables, only the coefficients for New England and the Middle
Atlantic are statistically significant. They are also both
positive, with the coefficient for the Middle Atlantic being
roughly two thirds the size of that for New England.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, for women, being
African-American is slightly more deleterious to one's earnings
than being Hispanic. The coefficients for both variables
(NHBLACK and HISP) are negative and significant, with the
coefficient for the HISP variable being roughly two thirds that
for NHBLACK. The coefficient for the dummy variable for whether
one is married or not is also negative, but the T statistic is
not significant.
Differences by Educational Attainment Among Women
Women were divided into two education subcategories: those
with 12 years of school or less (high school graduates and high
school dropouts), and those with 16 years of college or more
(college graduates and those with postgraduate education,
although there is no information on whether someone actually
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received a college degree or not). These women were between the
ages of 25 and 54 in 1989 and received some earned income.
By comparing the coefficient of the import variable for all
women (.44/Table 4.2) and women with a high school education or
less (.53/Table 4.4), we can see that a loss or gain of
employment had a slightly larger effect on women with less
education. For women with a college education or more, the
effect on earnings of employment loss in the SMSA was even less
(the coefficient for the import variable is .31/Table 4.5).
Since the demand for less-educated workers relative to more-
educated workers has fallen over the past decade, it follows that
the earnings of workers with less education would be more elastic
in response to employment loss.
In spite of the larger coefficient for the import variable
for less-educated women, however, when the same counterfactual
comparison of hourly earnings for those in a highly negative
import-affected SMSA (one with an employment loss of 7 percent)
and those in a positively affected SMSA (one with an employment
gain of 7 percent) was performed, the results showed that the
hourly earnings differentials for the three groups were almost
identical (Tables 4.6 and 4.7). For women high school dropouts
and graduates, the differential was fifty-two cents per hour, for
college graduates fifty cents per hour, and for all women fifty
cents per hour. Because less-educated women earn less per hour,
on a percentage basis the effect on their earnings was the
greatest: a differential of 7.7 percent, compared with a
differential of just 4 percent for college-educated women and 6.3
percent for all women.
The age and education variables and their quadratic terms
follow the same general pattern found for all women: all but the
age quadratic term is positive and statistically significant at
the .01 level; the age quadratic term is negative and significant
at the .01 level. The coefficient for the education variable is
larger for the subgroup of high school dropouts or less (.082)
than it is for college graduates (.038). This reflects the fact
188
Table 4.4 Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects
of SMSA Employment Change on the Hourly Earnings in 1989 of Women




































































































































































Table 4.5 Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects
of SMSA Employment Change on the Hourly Earnings in 1989 of Women





















































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was













Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Log of Hourly Earnings in 1989
Women with a high school education or less, age 25-54.
Variable Coefficient Mean Product Mean Product
INTERCEP 1.3769 1.0000 1.3769 1.0000 1.3769
IMPORT 0.5302 -0.0050 -0.0026 0.0700 0.0371
DOM 0.5302 0.0628 0.0333 0.0628 0.0333
EXPORT 0.5302 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
PROD 0.5302 -0.0356 -0.0189 -0.0356 -0.0189
MARRIED 0.0050 0.6146 0.0031 0.6146 0.0031
NHBLACK -0.0600 0.1671 -0.0100 0.1671 -0.0100
HISP -0.0662 0.1195 -0.0079 0.1195 -0.0079
AGEZ 0.0058 -0.0021 -0.0000 -0.0021 -0.0000
AGE2Z -0.0003 69.9700 -0.0176 69.9700 -0.0176
EDUCZ 0.0816 -0.0043 -0.0004 -0.0043 -0.0004
EDUC2Z 0.0038 2.7766 0.0104 2.7766 0.0104
SMSAHR79 0.0296 11.6154 0.3434 11.6154 0.3434
NEW 0.1457 0.0435 0.0063 0.0435 0.0063
MAT 0.1014 0.1709 0.0173 0.1709 0.0173
ENC 0.0446 0.1868 0.0083 0.1868 0.0083
WNC -0.0016 0.0557 -0.0001 0.0557 -0.0001
SAT 0.0369 0.1921 0.0071 0.1921 0.0071
ESC -0.0019 0.0551 -0.0001 0.0551 -0.0001
WSC -0.0296 0.1030 -0.0030 0.1030 -0.0030
PAC 0.0872 0.1560 0.0136 0.1560 0.0136
NATRES -0.0234 0.0088 -0.0002 0.0088 -0.0002
MINING 0.4115 0.0015 0.0006 0.0015 0.0006
CONS 0.2623 0.0158 0.0041 0.0158 0.0041
NONDUR 0.2392 0.0893 0.0214 0.0893 0.0214
DUR 0.3214 0.0881 0.0283 0.0881 0.0283
TUC 0.4803 0.0549 0.0264 0.0549 0.0264
WSALE 0.2708 0.0279 0.0076 0.0279 0.0076
FIRE 0.3333 0.1020 0.0340 0.1020 0.0340
BUS 0.1430 0.0604 0.0086 0.0604 0.0086
PERS -0.0595 0.0640 -0.0038 0.0640 -0.0038
ENTMENT 0.0675 0.0101 0.0007 0.0101 0.0007
PROF 0.1410 0.2337 0.0329 0.2337 0.0329
PUB 0.4005 0.0468 0.0188 0.0468 0.0188
Lnwage 1.9387 1.9785
Hourly wage 6.9497 7.2315
Hourly Wage 1.Import=Mean 6.95
2.Import=-.07 6.71
3.Import=.07 7.23
Ratio of 1/2 1.0358
Ratio of 3/2 1.0775
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Table 4.7
Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Log of Hourly Earnings in 1989
Women with 16 Years of Education or More, Age 25-54.
Variable Coefficient Mean Product Mean Product
INTERCEP 1.6812 1.0000 1.6812 1.0000 1.6812
IMPORT 0.3091 -0.0079 -0.0024 0.0700 0.0216
DOM 0.3091 0.0899 0.0278 0.0899 0.0278
EXPORT 0.3091 0.0047 0.0014 0.0047 0.0014
PROD 0.3091 -0.0483 -0.0149 -0.0483 -0.0149
MARRIED -0.0171 0.6090 -0.0104 0.6090 -0.0104
NHBLACK 0.0135 0.1019 0.0014 0.1019 0.0014
HISP 0.0035 0.0410 0.0001 0.0410 0.0001
AGEZ 0.0083 0.0201 0.0002 0.0201 0.0002
AGE2 -0.0008 62.4161 -0.0499 62.4161 -0.0499
EDUCZ 0.0377 -0.0164 -0.0006 -0.0164 -0.0006
EDUC2 0.0526 0.7886 0.0415 0.7886 0.0415
SMSAHR79 0.0338 11.7584 0.3979 11.7584 0.3979
NEW 0.2304 0.0615 0.0142 0.0615 0.0142
MAT 0.1612 0.1817 0.0293 0.1817 0.0293
ENC 0.0998 0.1628 0.0162 0.1628 0.0162
WNC -0.0029 0.0464 -0.0001 0.0464 -0.0001
SAT 0.0942 0.2055 0.0193 0.2055 0.0193
ESC -0.0171 0.0388 -0.0007 0.0388 -0.0007
WSC -0.0122 0.1038 -0.0013 0.1038 -0.0013
PAC 0.1101 0.1654 0.0182 0.1654 0.0182
NATRES 0.1178 0.0069 0.0008 0.0069 0.0008
MINING 0.6438 0.0034 0.0022 0.0034 0.0022
CONS 0.3017 0.0099 0.0030 0.0099 0.0030
NONDUR 0.3663 0.0392 0.0144 0.0392 0.0144
DUR 0.5083 0.0397 0.0202 0.0397 0.0202
TUC 0.4228 0.0392 0.0166 0.0392 0.0166
WSALE 0.4524 0.0217 0.0098 0.0217 0.0098
FIRE 0.3794 0.0892 0.0338 0.0892 0.0338
BUS 0.2115 0.0622 0.0132 0.0622 0.0132
PERS -0.5158 0.0154 -0.0080 0.0154 -0.0080
ENTMENT 0.1933 0.0098 0.0019 0.0098 0.0019
PROF 0.2964 0.5404 0.1602 0.5404 0.1602
PUB 0.3618 0.0522 0.0189 0.0522 0.0189
Lnwage 2.4552 2.4793
Hourly Wage 11.6485 11.9323
Hourly Wage 1.Import=Mean 11.65
2.lmport=-.07 11.43
3.lmport=.07 11.93
Ratio of 1/2 1.02
Ratio of 3/2 1.04
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that, once women are at the point of having 16 years of
education, each additional year of education may not bring in
that much additional earnings. For those with less education,
however, the difference in earnings between having only 11 years
of education and having 12 years of education (going from being a
dropout to having a high school diploma) may be sizeable.
The coefficients for the age variable, on the other hand,
are fairly similar to one another for both education groups. The
age coefficient for the college group (.008) is just slightly
higher than that for the high school or less group (.006). The
higher coefficient for the college group reflects the slightly
greater returns to experience that we would expect for those with
more education. In terms of the dummy variables for major
industry of employment, the only result which looks very
different depending on which education group is examined is the
result for the personal services (PERS) variable. For women with
a high school education or less, the personal services variable
is negative, but its lack of statistical significance means that
it may not be different than zero. For women with at least a
college education, however, the coefficient for the personal
services industry dummy is negative, large (-.52), and
statistically significant at the .001 level.
The omitted industry dummy variable in these models is
retail sales. Thus, the difference in the effect of employment
in personal services is probably attributable to the fact that
for college graduates, working in a personal services job is
likely to be much lower paid than working in retail trade,
whereas for high school dropouts and graduates, the pay
differential between the two sectors is likely to be much
smaller. In a similar vein, all of the industry variable
coefficients for college-educated women are larger than for high
school dropouts and graduates. The one interesting exception to
this is the coefficient for employment in the public sector,
which is higher for high school dropouts and graduates than for
those with a college education. Compared with working in retail
194
trade, then, employment in the public sector is very advantageous
for the earnings of less-educated women and the differential
between the two sectors is greater than for college-educated
women.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that the coefficients for
the dummy variables for non-Hispanic Blacks (NHBLACK) and
Hispanics (HISP) are not statistically significant for college-
educated women, but they are both negative and statistically
significant for women who are either high school dropouts or high
school graduates. Given the growing wage inequality between
Whites and African-Americans as a whole over the 1980s, these
results for college-educated women are encouraging. For the
less-educated group, the size of the coefficients for the two
race categories are very close (-.06 for non-Hispanic Blacks and
-.066 for Hispanics), an indication that the disadvantages of
race are roughly equal for the two groups, at least in terms of
hourly earned income.
Results for Men from the Microdata Hourly Earnings Model
In their most notable aspects, the results for men are very
similar to the results for women. The coefficient for the total
employment change in the SMSA (EMPCH) is large, positive, and
statistically significant (Table 4.8). The age and education
variables, in both their linear and quadratic forms, are
statistically significant and each has the expected sign:
positive for all but the age quadratic. The coefficients for the
two race variables -- Non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic -- were
both negative and significant, while all but one of the industry
variables coefficients were statistically significant (the one
exception for men was the entertainment industry variable, for
women natural resources).
Contained within these apparent similarities, however, are
some interesting differences. The coefficient of the variable
for the total employment change within the SMSA, which also
represents the value for the effect of employment loss due to
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Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects









































































































































































Source DF Squares Square F Value Prob>F
Model 30 2049.53631 68.31788 203.185 0.0001
Error 16417 5519.96497 0.33623
C Total 16447 7569.50128
Root MSE 0.57986 R-square 0.2708
Dep Mean 2.45073 Adj R-sq 0.2694
C.V. 23.66061
The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was
constructed using data from Noponen and Yang.
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import penetration, is only three-quarters the size for men that
it is for women (.31 for men versus .44 for women). This would
seem to indicate that women are substantially more affected by
employment change over this time period, including that from
import penetration, than men. However, when I translate this
into "real" terms by repeating the counterfactual analysis that I
did for women (comparing the hourly wage of someone in an SMSA
with a seven percent gain in employment because of imports versus
the hourly wage of someone in an SMSA with a seven percent loss
in employment) the difference is barely discernible (Table 4.9).
For women, the difference in the average wage between the two
SMSA's is fifty-two cents per hour, whereas for men it is fifty
cents per hour. Because women have lower mean earnings, on a
percentage basis the differential is more striking: 6.3 percent
for women versus 4.5 percent for men. However, on an annualized
basis the difference in earnings would be about the same for both
groups: roughly $1,000.
A second difference in the results for men and women can be
found in the size of the coefficient for the two race variables:
Non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic. For both men and women, the
coefficients for both variables are negative and statistically
significant. For men, however, the coefficient for the Non-
Hispanic Black variable is close to three times that for women (-
.20 versus -.07) and the coefficient for the Hispanic variable is
over three times that for women (-.17 versus -.05). As we would
expect, this tells us that the earnings levels for White, Black,
and Hispanic women workers are much more clustered together than
they are for men workers. It also tells us that Black men do
worse than Hispanic men when their earnings are compared with
those of White men, but in the case of women it is Hispanic women
who do relatively the worst.
The age/earnings profile also appears to be somewhat
different for men than for women. The coefficient on the linear
age variable (AGEZ) is roughly twice as large for men as women,
reflecting the fact that men receive greater returns for
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Table 4.9
Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Log of Hourly Earnings in 1989
Men, Age 25-54
Variable Coefficient Mean Product Mean Product
INTERCEP 1.5558 1.0000 1.5558 1.0000 1.5558
IMPORT 0.3122 -0.0060 -0.0019 -0.0700 -0.0219
DOM 0.3122 0.0745 0.0233 0.0745 0.0233
EXPORT 0.3122 0.0027 0.0009 0.0027 0.0009
PROD 0.3122 -0.0413 -0.0129 -0.0413 -0.0129
MARRIED 0.1990 0.6625 0.1319 0.6625 0.1319
NHBLACK -0.1997 0.1138 -0.0227 0.1138 -0.0227
HISP -0.1688 0.1039 -0.0175 0.1039 -0.0175
AGEZ 0.0150 -0.0035 -0.0001 -0.0035 -0.0001
AGE2 -0.0004 66.7181 -0.0257 66.7181 -0.0257
EDUCZ 0.0735 0.0421 0.0031 0.0421 0.0031
EDUC2 0.0020 8.9779 0.0177 8.9779 0.0177
SMSAHR79 0.0515 11.7163 0.6031 11.7163 0.6031
NEW 0.1217 0.0479 0.0058 0.0479 0.0058
MAT 0.0607 0.1694 0.0103 0.1694 0.0103
ENC 0.0359 0.1827 0.0066 0.1827 0.0066
WNC -0.0129 0.0469 -0.0006 0.0469 -0.0006
SAT 0.0122 0.1872 0.0023 0.1872 0.0023
ESC -0.0190 0.0458 -0.0009 0.0458 -0.0009
WSC -0.0483 0.0989 -0.0048 0.0989 -0.0048
PAC 0.0438 0.1813 0.0079 0.1813 0.0079
NATRES -0.1932 0.0167 -0.0032 0.0167 -0.0032
MINING 0.4673 0.0062 0.0029 0.0062 0.0029
CONS 0.2036 0.1087 0.0221 0.1087 0.0221
NONDUR 0.2688 0.0745 0.0200 0.0745 0.0200
DUR 0.2784 0.1630 0.0454 0.1630 0.0454
TUC 0.3027 0.1054 0.0319 0.1054 0.0319
WSALE 0.1839 0.0567 0.0104 0.0567 0.0104
FIRE 0.2290 0.0605 0.0139 0.0605 0.0139
BUS 0.0978 0.0707 0.0069 0.0707 0.0069
PERS -0.1297 0.0205 -0.0027 0.0205 -0.0027
ENTMENT -0.0452 0.0112 -0.0005 0.0112 -0.0005
PROF 0.0501 0.1242 0.0062 0.1242 0.0062
PUB 0.2579 0.0613 0.0158 0.0613 0.0158
LNWAGE 2.4507 2.4149




Ratio of 1/2 1.037
Ratio of 3/2 1.045
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experience than do women. The returns to education, however,
appear to be approximately the same for men and women (a
coefficient for men of .073 and for women of .085).
For both men and women, the only regional variables with
statistically significant coefficients were New England and the
Middle Atlantic. In each case and for both groups, the
coefficients were positive. For men, both coefficients were
somewhat smaller than for women, perhaps reflecting the fact that
these two regions were centers for metropolitan services sector
growth where women were most likely to find high paying jobs. In
fact, the returns to women of working in a wide range of
industries versus working in retail sales (the base case dummy
variable) were higher than for men. The industry coefficients
for the wholesale, durable goods, mining, business,
transportation/utilities/communications, professional services,
and public sector industries were all larger for women than for
men. This is as much a reflection of the limited opportunities
for women in retail sales as it is of the comparatively better
opportunities in other industries.
Lastly, while marriage has no apparent effect on women's
hourly earnings, it has a positive effect on those of men. Men's
earnings may gain from marriage because the weight of family
responsibilities makes men more diligent, or because women select
men to marry whom they perceive as having better abilities to
provide financially. For women, on the other hand, childbearing
and child rearing responsibilities may lead to greater parttime
work, to curtailing advanced education, or to leaving the labor
force over some time period. In each case, the impact on women's
earnings can be expected to be neutral at best, but probably
negative.
Differences by Educational Attainment Among Men
In comparing the results for men with a high school
education or less with men with four years of college or more, I
find that the coefficient on the employment change variable is
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slightly larger for those with a college education (Tables 4.10
and 4.11). Again, this undoubtedly has more to do with the fact
that the college-educated have had larger earnings gains than
high school graduates in cities which have gained employment,
rather than having done worse than high school graduates in
cities which have lost employment.
For both groups of male workers, the employment change
variable was positive, statistically significant, and large
enough to be noteworthy. I again performed the counterfactual
analysis comparing those living in an SMSA which lost 7 percent
of total employment due to imports versus those living in an SMSA
which gained 7 percent of total employment (Tables 4.12 and
4.13). It showed that the hourly earnings of high school
graduates were 37 cents per hour lower if they lived in the city
with high import penetration, whereas college-educated men had
earnings which were 78 cents per hour lower. Conversely, one
could say that the gains to college-educated men of living in a
city with an industrial structure favorable to imports was double
that for men with a high school education. On a percentage
basis, however, the relative gains and losses were much closer
for the two education groups: college-educated men had a five
percent gain in hourly earnings from living in the city with the
import-favorable industrial structure, while the gain for those
with a high school education or less was roughly four percent.
The coefficient for the dummy variable for African-American
was also considerably larger for college-educated men compared
with that for men with a high school education or less (Tables
4.10 and 4.11). For both groups, the coefficient for the
variable NHBLACK was negative and statistically significant, but
for college-educated men it was roughly 50 percent larger (-.25
compared with -.16). In contrast, however, the coefficients for
the dummy variables for Hispanic origin (HISP) were nearly
identical for both education groups, and nearly identical to that
for African-Americans with a high school education or less.
Compared with the base case group of white men, then, African-
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Table 4.10 Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects
of SMSA Employment Change on the Hourly Earnings in 1989 of Men




















































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was














Table 4.11 Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects
of SMSA Employment Change on the Hourly Earnings in 1989 of Men




















































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was















Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Log of Hourly Earnings in 1989
Men with a High School Education or Less, Age 25-54
Variable Coefficient Mean Product Mean Product
INTERCEP 1.3345 1.0000 1.3345 1.0000 1.3345
IMPORT 0.2800 -0.0043 -0.0012 -0.0700 -0.0196
DOM 0.2800 0.0597 0.0167 0.0597 0.0167
EXPORT 0.2800 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001
PROD 0.2800 -0.0344 -0.0096 -0.0344 -0.0096
MARRIED 0.2223 0.6498 0.1444 0.6498 0.1444
NHBLACK -0.1643 0.1372 -0.0225 0.1372 -0.0225
HISP -0.1691 0.1596 -0.0270 0.1596 -0.0270
AGEZ 0.0129 -0.0387 -0.0005 -0.0387 -0.0005
AGE2 -0.0002 71.7790 -0.0141 71.7790 -0.0141
EDUCZ 0.0760 -0.0093 -0.0007 -0.0093 -0.0007
EDUC2 0.0037 4.8942 0.0183 4.8942 0.0183
SMSAHR79 0.0560 11.6518 0.6528 11.6518 0.6528
NEW 0.1157 0.0400 0.0046 0.0400 0.0046
MAT 0.0287 0.1778 0.0051 0.1778 0.0051
ENC 0.0111 0.1889 0.0021 0.1889 0.0021
WNC 0.0238 0.0446 0.0011 0.0446 0.0011
SAT -0.0168 0.1909 -0.0032 0.1909 -0.0032
ESC -0.0462 0.0517 -0.0024 0.0517 -0.0024
WSC -0.1044 0.0946 -0.0099 0.0946 -0.0099
PAC 0.0397 0.1771 0.0070 0.1771 0.0070
NATRES -0.1570 0.0271 -0.0043 0.0271 -0.0043
MINING 0.4826 0.0065 0.0031 0.0065 0.0031
CONS 0.2104 0.1584 0.0333 0.1584 0.0333
NONDUR 0.2612 0.0861 0.0225 0.0861 0.0225
DUR 0.2486 0.1854 0.0461 0.1854 0.0461
TUC 0.2967 0.1212 0.0360 0.1212 0.0360
WSALE 0.1709 0.0514 0.0088 0.0514 0.0088
FIRE 0.0773 0.0295 0.0023 0.0295 0.0023
BUS 0.0192 0.0676 0.0013 0.0676 0.0013
PERS -0.2008 0.0229 -0.0046 0.0229 -0.0046
ENTMENT 0.0125 0.0083 0.0001 0.0083 0.0001
PROF 0.0370 0.0579 0.0021 0.0579 0.0021
PUB 0.2973 0.0370 0.0110 0.0370 0.0110
LNWAGE 2.2535 2.2351




Ratio of 1/2 1.0182
Ratio of 3/2 1.0396
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Table 4.13
Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Log of Hourly Earnings in 1989
Men with a College (16 years) Education or More, Age 25-54
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT MEAN PRODUCT MEAN PRODUCT
INTERCEP 1.8164 1.0000 1.8164 1.0000 1.8164
IMPORT 0.3563 -0.0082 -0.0029 0.07 0.0249
EXPORT 0.3563 0.0049 0.0017 0.0049 0.0017
DOM 0.3563 0.0911 0.0325 0.0911 0.0325
PROD 0.3563 -0.0486 -0.0173 -0.0486 -0.0173
MARRIED 0.1812 0.6843 0.1240 0.6843 0.1240
NHBLACK -0.2506 0.0679 -0.0170 0.0679 -0.0170
HISP -0.1570 0.0361 -0.0057 0.0361 -0.0057
AGEZ 0.0189 0.0563 0.0011 0.0563 0.0011
AGE2 -0.0007 61.7399 -0.0453 61.7399 -0.0453
EDUCZ 0.0607 0.0442 0.0027 0.0442 0.0027
EDUC2 -0.0223 0.8318 -0.0185 0.8318 -0.0185
SMSAHR79 0.0471 11.8217 0.5571 11.8217 0.5571
NEW 0.1551 0.0648 0.0101 0.0648 0.0101
MAT 0.1071 0.1756 0.0188 0.1756 0.0188
ENC 0.0684 0.1738 0.0119 0.1738 0.0119
WNC 0.0131 0.0466 0.0006 0.0466 0.0006
SAT 0.0959 0.1892 0.0181 0.1892 0.0181
ESC 0.0786 0.0397 0.0031 0.0397 0.0031
WSC 0.0430 0.0989 0.0043 0.0989 0.0043
PAC 0.0495 0.1709 0.0085 0.1709 0.0085
NATRES -0.2667 0.0053 -0.0014 0.0053 -0.0014
MINING 0.5395 0.0069 0.0037 0.0069 0.0037
CONS 0.2432 0.0383 0.0093 0.0383 0.0093
NONDUR 0.3251 0.0655 0.0213 0.0655 0.0213
DUR 0.3778 0.1271 0.0480 0.1271 0.0480
TUC 0.3900 0.0636 0.0248 0.0636 0.0248
WSALE 0.2487 0.0604 0.0150 0.0604 0.0150
FIRE 0.3758 0.1069 0.0402 0.1069 0.0402
BUS 0.2853 0.0726 0.0207 0.0726 0.0207
PERS 0.1190 0.0135 0.0016 0.0135 0.0016
ENTMENT -0.0647 0.0139 -0.0009 0.0139 -0.0009
PROF 0.1479 0.2667 0.0394 0.2667 0.0394
PUB 0.2940 0.0835 0.0245 0.0835 0.0245
LNWAGE 2.7505 2.7784
HOURLY WAGE 15.6503 16.0926
HOURLY WAGE
1. Import=Meai 15.65 Ratio of 1/2 1.0222
2. Import=-.07 15.31 Ratio of 3/2 1.0509
3. lmport=.07 16.09
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Americans and Hispanics with a high school education or less and
Hispanics with four years of college or more all experienced a
similar degree of disadvantage in their hourly earnings. For
African-American men with four years of college or more, the
inequality in earnings between them and their white couterparts
was considerably larger.
For both education groups of men, the effect of living in
New England was positive when compared with living in the
Mountain region. For the college-educated, residence in either
the Middle Atlantic states or the South Atlantic states also had
a positive effect on earnings. For those men with a high school
education or less, the effect of residence in the West South
Central region was negative, roughly to the same degree that
living in New England was positive.
One reason that living in the West South Central region may
show a negative effect on the hourly earnings of men with less
education is that this region's industrial structure is heavily
based in natural resources. Over the 1980s, all of the natural
resource-based industries -- agriculture, forestry, and
mining/extraction -- experienced a simultaneous contraction for a
variety of reasons. The economies of the West South Central
States: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas, were hard hit
by this contraction, in particular by the recession in the oil
industry over the 1980s.
The industry variable results show some interesting
similarities, and some predictable differences. For both
education groups of men, employment in the natural resources,
mining, construction, nondurable, durable, wholesale, and public
sectors had statistically significant effects on hourly earnings
when compared to employment in retail trade (the base case dummy
variable). With the exception of employment in natural
resources, all of the effects were positive.
With one interesting exception, the industry coefficient was
also larger for college-educated men than for those with a high
school education or less. In other words, the gains for college-
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educated men from working outside of retail sales were greater
than for men with a high school education or less, and the
disadvantage from working in the natural resources sector was
greater. The exception to this was found in public sector
employment, where the effect on hourly earnings was almost
identical for both education groups.
College-educated men also showed statistically significant
hourly earnings gains from employment in the fire/insurance/real
estate (FIRE), business services (BUS), and professional services
(PROF) sectors, whereas men with less education did not. For
less-educated men, employment in the personal services sector
(PERS) had a negative effect on hourly earnings, while it had no
such effect on the hourly earnings of those with four years of
college or more.
Results for African-American and Hispanic Workers from the
Microdata Earnings Model
Due to limitations of sample size, I pooled African-American
and Hispanic men and women for the final microdata earnings
model. The coefficient for the employment change variable is
positive, statistically significant, large enough to be of
importance, and just slightly larger than that for all women
(Table 4.14). Again using the counterfactual analysis discussed
previously, African-American and Hispanic workers considered as a
group show a loss of 52 cents per hour from living in a city with
an imputed loss of 7 percent of its total employment between 1978
and 1986 because of an industry structure negatively affected by
imports (Table 4.15). This is almost identical to the estimated
earnings loss for all women, all men, and for both education
groups of women considered separately. On a percentage basis,
the hourly earnings loss of 6.7 percent is slightly higher than
the loss of 6.3 percent found for all women.
As was true for men, but not for women, the hourly earnings
of African-American and Hispanic workers are positively affected




Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects

















































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was















Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Log of Hourly Earnings in 1989
All Non-hispanic Blacks and Hispanics, Age 25-54.
Variable Coefficient Mean Product Mean Product
INTERCEP 1.3753 1.0000 1.3753 1.0000 1.3753
IMPORT 0.4563 -0.0080 -0.0037 -0.0700 -0.0319
DOM 0.4563 0.0775 0.0354 0.0775 0.0354
EXPORT 0.4563 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002
PROD 0.4563 -0.0359 -0.0164 -0.0359 -0.0164
FEMALE -0.1571 0.4749 -0.0746 0.4749 -0.0746
MARRIED 0.0771 0.5448 0.0420 0.5448 0.0420
AGEZ 0.0114 0.0268 0.0003 0.0268 0.0003
AGE2 -0.0004 65.2981 -0.0247 65.2981 -0.0247
EDUCZ 0.0733 -0.0305 -0.0022 -0.0305 -0.0022
EDUC2 0.0035 11.6556 0.0407 11.6556 0.0407
SMSAHR79 0.0398 11.7859 0.4689 11.7859 0.4689
NEW 0.1169 0.0170 0.0020 0.0170 0.0020
MAT 0.0805 0.1655 0.0133 0.1655 0.0133
ENC 0.0799 0.1281 0.0102 0.1281 0.0102
WNC -0.0184 0.0179 -0.0003 0.0179 -0.0003
SAT 0.0299 0.2351 0.0070 0.2351 0.0070
ESC -0.0099 0.0466 -0.0005 0.0466 -0.0005
WSC -0.0241 0.1398 -0.0034 0.1398 -0.0034
PAC 0.0984 0.2195 0.0216 0.2195 0.0216
NATRES 0.0443 0.0229 0.0010 0.0229 0.0010
MINING 0.4227 0.0035 0.0015 0.0035 0.0015
CONS 0.1865 0.0567 0.0106 0.0567 0.0106
NONDUR 0.2682 0.0874 0.0234 0.0874 0.0234
DUR 0.3012 0.1065 0.0321 0.1065 0.0321
TUC 0.4061 0.0978 0.0397 0.0978 0.0397
WSALE 0.2323 0.0317 0.0074 0.0317 0.0074
FIRE 0.2328 0.0620 0.0144 0.0620 0.0144
BUS 0.0906 0.0662 0.0060 0.0662 0.0060
PERS -0.1442 0.0514 -0.0074 0.0514 -0.0074
ENTMENT 0.1729 0.0093 0.0016 0.0093 0.0016
PROF 0.1852 0.2207 0.0409 0.2207 0.0409
PUB 0.3576 0.0573 0.0205 0.0573 0.0205
Lnwage 2.0829 2.0546
Hourly Wage 8.0275 7.8036
Hourly Wage
When: 1 .Import=Mean 8.03
2.Import=-.07 7.80
3.Import=.07 8.32
Ratio of 1/2 1.0295
Ratio of 3/2 1.0667
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and women, the gains from marriage for these two groups is less
than half that for all men. Somewhat surprisingly given the
persistence of employment discrimination, the coefficients for
the linear education variable are very similar for all women, all
men, and African-Americans and Hispanics (.085, .073, and .073,
respectively). The results for the age variable, however, show
that the returns to age for men are roughly double that for
women, with the returns to African-Americans and Hispanics
falling between the two.
Compared with living in the Mountain region (the base
case), African-Americans and Hispanics showed no advantage to
living in either New England or the Middle Atlantic region as
both men and women did. However, living in the Pacific region
did positively affect hourly earnings. With the exception of
working in the natural resources industry (which had a
statistically insignificant coefficient) and working in the
personal services industry (which had a negative coefficient),
all the industry effects were positive and statistically
significant. The biggest gains for Hispanics and African-
Americans came from employment in mining,
transportation/utilities/communications, or the public sector.
Results of the Microdata Model Predicting Annual Hours of Work
In this model, annual hours of work in 1989 were predicted
for workers with positive wage and salary income. African-
Americans and Hispanics, considered together, were the only
demographic group where the coefficient on the SMSA employment
change variable was statistically significant (Table 4.16).
However, after performing the counterfactual analysis comparing
the hours of a worker living in a city with an imputed loss of
seven percent of employment versus the hours of a worker in a
city with an imputed gain of seven percent of employment, the
difference in annual hours of work for Blacks and Hispanics
turned out to be negligible (Table 4.17).
213
Table 4.16 Results of a Regression Model Estimating the Effects
of SMSA Employment Change on the Annual Hours of Work in 1989 of




















































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was
constructed using data from Noponen and Yang.
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Table 4.17
Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating Annual Hours








































































































































































































Annual Hours of Work=













For a worker living in the city with the imputed gain of
seven percent of employment, calculated annual hours of work were
1920, versus 1885 hours for those in the employment-losing city.
This differential of 35 hours is less than one full-time work
week and represents a change of less than two percent. In the
Current Population Survey, annual hours of work are calculated by
multiplying together the weeks per year that people report
working the previous year and the usual hours per week that
people report working the previous year. A calculated
differential of 35 hours in a year is well within the margin of
error one might expect in survey results of this type.
Therefore, it is safe to say that in this model SMSA employment
change due to imports, or any other source, has no effect on the
annual hours of work of those employed. However, it could also
be that because of the inexactitude inherent in how the dependent
variable hours of work is derived from the CPS, the model is
simply not well enough specified.
Results of the Microdata Model Predicting the Probability of
Employment
In this model, the probability of employment in 1989 was
estimated for persons age 25-54. The same seven demographic
subcategories were used here as for the other two models
discussed above. While the previous two models predicting hourly
earnings and annual hours of work were OLS models, in this case
I fit a logistic regression model. In this model, the dependent
variable is a binary response variable, based on the survey
question of whether someone was employed the previous year
(1989), yes or no? For persons with a given profile of
characteristics, the logistic regression model allows one to
estimate the probability of being employed, based on the sample
response.
For the categories of all men, men with a high school
education or less, and African-Americans combined with Hispanics,
the coefficient for the variable of total employment change in
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the SMSA proved to be statistically significant and positive
(Tables 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20). The total SMSA employment change
variable was also statistically significant for women with 16
years of education or more, but in this case the sign was
negative (Table 4.21). In other words, the model indicates that
for more-educated women, the greater the total employment loss in
their SMSA of residence, the greater their chances were of being
employed in 1989. For men with less education and for African-
Americans and Hispanics, the opposite was true.
There is no easy way to explain these counter-intuitive
results for better-educated women. No doubt there are some SMSAs
in which heavy employment losses in male-dominated sectors (some
durable goods industries, for example) have been accompanied by
employment gains in female-dominated sectors with a high demand
for college-educated workers (for example, advanced services).
However, it would be surprising if this scenario could explain
the results across so many SMSAs.
As it turns out, however, even a large change in the size of
the total SMSA employment change variable has a negligible impact
on the probability of being employed for any of the four
demographic groups: all men, men with a high school education or
less, African-Americans combined with Hispanics, and women with
16 years of education or more. When using the counterfactual
analysis to compare persons living in an SMSA with a seven
percent total employment gain to persons living in an SMSA with a
seven percent total employment loss, the change in the
probability of being employed was 1 percentage point or less
(Tables 4.22,4.23,4.24 and 4.25). Here is a second case where a






Results of a LOGIT Regression Model Estimating the
SMSA Employment Change on the Probability of
in 1989 for Blacks and Hispanics.
























































































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was

































Table 4.19 Results of a LOGIT Regression Model Estimating the
Effects of SMSA Employment Change on the Probability of
Employment in 1989 for Men with a High School Education or Less.



























































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was





Results of a LOGIT Regression Model Estimating the
SMSA Employment Change on the Probability of
in 1989 for All Men.

































































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was





Results of a LOGIT Regression Model Estimating the
SMSA Employment Change on the Probability of
in 1989 for Women with a College Education or More.





















































































































































































The regression was run using Current Population Survey data.
The EMPCH (employment change by SMSA between 1978 and 1986) was
constructed using data from Noponen and Yang.
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Table 4.22
Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Probability of Employment in 1989

































































LOG OF THE ODDS RATIO:
When Import = Mean
(Exponentiated)
Probability of work in 1989
When Import = -.07
(Exponentiated)











































































































































Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Probability of Employment in 1989













































































































































































































LOG OF THE ODDS RATIO:
When Import = Mean
(Exponentiated)
Probability of work in 1989
When Import = -.07
(Exponentiated)













Counterfactual Analysis Table for Calculating the Probability




































































































LOG OF THE ODDS RATIO:
When import = mean:
(exponentiated)
Probability of work in 1989:
When import = -.07
(exponentiated)
















































































































Counterfactual Table for Calculating the Probability of Work in 1989





































































































































































LOG OF THE ODDS RATIO
When import = mean:
(Exponentiated)
Probability of work in 1989:
When import = -.07:
(Exponentiated)




























































Adjusted R Squared = .52
NEW MIDATL
X Coefficients
Std Error of Coefficients
1.348683 5997.834 5685.439 1240.594 885.334 180.7098 619.199 -127.404 -1562.89 -1126.37
0.135307 2095.793 1003.134 866.1261 774.2816 981.4338 782.8863 991.1883 869.3389 1089.481
T STATISTIC 9.96755 2.861845 5.667676 1.432348 1.143426 0.184128 0.790918 -0.12854 -1.7978 -1.03386
All Men Workers 25-54
Regression Output:
Constant












Std Error of Coefficients
Adjusted R Squared = .42
NEW MIDATL ENC WNC SAT ESC WSC MTN
1.558042 4476.543 7188.502 2132.519 1693.236 754.9551 676.0493 117.804 -1552.74 -903.48
0.190622 2952.575 1413.226 1220.208 1090.816 1382.655 1102.939 1396.397 1224.734 1534.873
8.173448 1.516149 5.086591 1.747669 1.552265
ENC WNC, SAT ESC WSC MTN
T STATISTIC 0.546019 0.612953 0.084363 -1.26782 -0.58863
Table 4.26 cont'd
All Women Workers 25-54
Regression Output:
Constant












Std Error of Coefficients
Adjusted R Squared = .41
NEW MIDATL ENC WNC SAT ESC WSC MTN
0.87657 8990.606 3876.761 267.1163 -312.852 -788.851 753.4316 -318.44 -1548.67 -1313.04
0.127276 1971.39 943.5895 814.7142 728.3215 923.1775 736.4154 932.353 817.7363 1024.811
T STATISTIC 6.887176 4.560542 4.108525 0.327865 -0.42955 -0.8545 1.023107 -0.34154 -1.89385 -1.28125
Key to Variables:
SMSAWG: Mean wage by SMSA in 1979.
EMPCH: Imputed percentage of employment lost or gained in an SMSA because of industry structure.
Regions: NEW, New England; MID, Mid-Atlantic; ENC, East North Central; WNC, West North Central
SAT, South Atlantic; ESC, East South Central; WSC, West South Central; MTN, Mountain.
The ommitted region variable in the regression is Pacific.
IV. Results of the SMSA Models
The second econometric model tests the hypothesis that the
import sensitivity of SMSAs can help to explain the variance in
either the mean annual earnings or the labor force participation
rate of SMSAs. For this model, I constructed a data set with
SMSA-level variables using, again, the 1980 Decennial Census, the
1990 Current Population Survey, and the SMSA trade data from
Markusen et al. I refer to this as the SMSA model, as distinct
from the previously described microdata model.
As a preliminary step to executing the regression model, I
ran two procedures to test the underlying assumption that there
existed enough variance in mean SMSA annual earnings to be
explained. The first procedure simply involved calculating the
mean level of annual earnings in each SMSA, and then testing the
mean for statistical significance at the .05 percent level by use
of a t-test. Any city with too small a sample size to produce a
mean with a meaningful t statistic was eliminated from the
sample.
The second step involved performing an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) procedure using a general linear models (GLM) framework.
The GLM results showed a sufficient level of variance among SMSA
mean annual earnings to justify performing regression analysis
with the mean level of annual earnings by SMSA as the dependent
variable. For both procedures, separate iterations were
performed for men, for women, and for all persons since separate
regression models would also be run for each.
The first set of SMSA model equations has the mean level of
annual earnings by SMSA in 1989 as the dependent variable.
Separate equations are specified for three different population
groups, each age 25-54: all workers, all men workers, and all
women workers. A worker is defined as anyone with positive wage
and salary income in 1989. The regression model is a standard
application of ordinary least squares (OLS). Three independent
variables are included in the equation: the mean level of annual
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earnings in each SMSA in 1979 (SMSAWG), the percentage change in
total employment by SMSA between 1978 and 1986 (EMPCH), and the
Census subregion in which each SMSA is located.3
When the regression equation is run on the sample of all
workers, the coefficient on the SMSA employment change variable
proves to be statistically significant at the .05 percent level
(Table 4.26). For each one percent change in total employment,
the model estimates a change in SMSA mean annual earnings of
sixty dollars. Taking the sixty dollar figure to represent the
effect of a one percent change in total SMSA employment, it is
possible to calculate the effect on annual earnings of employment
change due to imports in each SMSA, as well as that due to
domestic and export factors (Table 4.27). This simply requires
multiplying the imputed employment change due to each factor in
each SMSA (again taken from the data from Markusen et al) by
sixty dollars. Since I am most interested in the effects of
import penetration, the SMSAs in Table 4.27 are listed in
descending order of negative impact due to import penetration.
Thus, the first SMSA listed -- Poughkeepsie, New York -- has the
highest loss of mean annual earnings due to imports ($1,221),
Portland, Maine has the second highest loss ($837), and so on.
The data in the last row of Table 4.27 show the average
effect of changes in total SMSA employment on annual earnings
across all SMSAs in the sample. Column four shows that the
average effect of imports has been, essentially, zero ($0.77).
3 NEW for New England (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island), MIDATL for Middle
Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania) ), ENC for East
North Central (Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois), WNC
for West North Central (Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, Kansas,
Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota), SAT for South Atlantic
(Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida) ESC
for East South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee), WSC for West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, Texas), and MTN for Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming). The omitted region dummy is
Pacific (California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, Alaska).
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Table 4.27
Estimated Effect of Employment Change Attributable to Import, Domestic, and Export Factors
On Mean Annual Earnings for All Workers by SMSA
SMSA NAME Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
CODE Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Export % Export $
6460 Poughkeepsie, NY 0.27 1620 -0.20 -1221 0.98 5856 0.25 1491
6400 Portland, ME 0.00 19 -0.14 -837 0.23 1400 0.02 115
7400 San Jose, CA 0.36 2186 -0.12 -729 0.73 4393 0.16 945
640 Austin, TX 0.93 5558 -0.11 -659 0.61 3685 0.14 867
2640 Flint, MI -0.21 -1256 -0.10 -623 -0.03 -190 -0.03 -178
4600 Lubbock, TX -0.19 -1149 -0.10 -598 0.56 3348 0.14 833
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.00 7 -0.09 -549 0.05 319 -0.02 -139
2655 Florence, SC -0.12 -748 -0.09 -534 0.18 1105 0.01 46
7920 Springfield, MO 0.08 500 -0.08 -507 0.13 795 -0.02 -96
1080 Boise City, ID 0.33 2004 -0.08 -489 0.45 2690 0.15 896
440 Ann Arbor, MI -0.09 -521 -0.07 -431 0.07 409 0.01 43
960 Binghamton, NY -0.01 -52 -0.07 -425 0.41 2452 0.05 279
8520 Tucson, AZ 1.13 6773 -0.07 -414 0.56 3386 0.10 592
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX -0.07 -443 -0.07 -413 0.04 248 -0.01 -78
7240 San Antonio, TX 0.01 59 -0.07 -392 0.22 1324 0.04 227
2320 El Paso, TX 0.07 426 -0.06 -368 0.00 2 -0.01 -54
4280 Lexington-Fayette, KY -0.11 -686 -0.06 -364 0.38 2290 0.11 642
8960 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton- 0.60 3615 -0.06 -364 0.42 2534 0.10 623
Delray Beach, FL
6520 Provo-Orem, UT -0.03 -205 -0.06 -351 -0.08 -452 0.01 47
8680 Utica-Rome, NY -0.24 -1415 -0.06 -351 0.23 1382 0.04 245
6200 Phoenix, AZ 0.29 1748 -0.05 -305 0.36 2143 0.07 390
6480 Providence-Pawtucket- -0.17 -1008 -0.05 -304 0.01 34 -0.03 -151
Woonsocket, RI
1120 Boston 0.05 278 -0.05 -281 0.26 1563 0.04 266
4160 Lawrence 0.05 278 -0.05 -281 0.26 1563 0.04 266
4560 Lowell 0.05 278 -0.05 -281 0.26 1563 0.04 266
6640 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.36 2179 -0.05 -275 0.32 1947 0.07 393
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 0.62 3692 -0.05 -271 0.58 3476 0.07 419
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.30 1788 -0.04 -266 0.33 1958 0.08 478




7480 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA
2880 Gadsden, AL
5600 New York, NY
1720 Colorado Springs, CO
7160 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT
7840 Spokane, WA
7320 San Diego, CA




5120 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI
6840 Rochester, NY
8320 Terre Haute, IN
4000 Lancaster, PA
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI
7485 Santa Cruz, CA
280 Altoona, PA







































































































































































































































































































Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Export % Export $
1920 Dallas, TX 0.04 245 -0.02 -91 0.18 1107 0.01 43
2000 Dayton-Springfield, OH -0.19 -1143 -0.01 -83 0.04 255 -0.01 -85
9320 Youngstown-Warren, OH -0.39 -2315 -0.01 -82 -0.19 -1129 -0.03 -158
8400 Toledo, OH -0.18 -1071 -0.01 -79 -0.05 -276 -0.02 -94
9160 Wilmington, DE-NJ-MD -0.22 -1314 -0.01 -72 -0.02 -95 -0.00 -21
3710 Joplin, MO 0.13 762 -0.01 -71 0.02 105 0.00 16
3810 Killeen-Temple, TX 0.16 982 -0.01 -67 0.31 1884 0.05 314
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 0.33 1960 -0.01 -62 0.09 528 -0.01 -37
8000 Springfield, MA -0.17 -1004 -0.01 -56 0.11 632 0.01 64
9140 Williamsport, PA -0.20 -1197 -0.01 -56 0.04 254 -0.01 -59
5360 Nashville, TN 0.07 401 -0.01 -54 0.01 67 -0.02 -107
4440 Lorain-Elyria, OH -0.25 -1492 -0.01 -53 -0.15 -924 -0.03 -150
200 Albuquerque, NM -0.00 -15 -0.01 -53 0.21 1232 0.02 137
4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.03 179 -0.01 -51 0.15 896 0.00 5
7800 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN -0.31 -1878 -0.01 -50 0.02 119 -0.01 -64
4720 Madison, WI 0.04 230 -0.01 -49 0.06 335 -0.01 -43
6880 ROckford, IL -0.08 -469 -0.01 -45 -0.02 -147 -0.01 -82
1760 Columbia, SC 0.09 560 -0.01 -43 0.10 573 0.01 50
3320 Honolulu, HI -0.19 -1125 -0.01 -39 0.01 71 -0.02 -94
5640 Newark, NJ -0.19 -1119 -0.01 -31 0.06 385 -0.01 -42
6440 Portland, OR -0.02 -137 -0.01 -30 0.05 288 0.01 76
7680 Shreveport, LA -0.19 -1123 -0.00 -29 0.12 704 -0.01 -71
6680 Reading, PA -0.16 -959 -0.00 -8 -0.07 -407 -0.01 -60
1280 Buffalo, NY -0.30 -1801 -0.00 -5 -0.07 -417 -0.02 -133
1640 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN -0.13 -760 -0.00 -3 0.03 164 -0.02 -97
3760 Kansas City, MO-KS -0.05 -300 0.00 0 0.09 540 -0.01 -60
8560 Tulsa, OK -0.05 -309 0.00 2 -0.00 -23 -0.02 -121
2760 Fort Wayne, IN -0.11 -641 0.00 6 -0.04 -244 -0.03 -161
1840 Columbus, OH -0.11 -648 0.00 9 0.03 189 -0.01 -50
6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ -0.18 -1096 0.00 16 0.06 347 0.00 5
7500 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 0.30 1798 0.00 17 0.18 1068 0.03 161
2900 Gainesville, FL 0.26 1575 0.00 17 0.02 127 0.01 39
3660 Johnson City-Kingsport- -0.09 -540 0.00 17 0.07 405 0.02 100
Bristol (TN), TN-VA




































































































































































































































































Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change % Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Export % Export $
6720 Reno, NV -0.08 -484 0.02 104 0.09 514 0.00 11
3680 Johnstown, PA -0.36 -2130 0.02 105 -0.30 -1803 -0.02 -145
860 Bellingham, WA -0.06 -366 0.02 109 -0.13 -766 0.00 13
160 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY -0.21 -1281 0.02 110 -0.10 -621 -0.03 -152
4680 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 0.13 770 0.02 112 -0.09 -554 -0.02 -141
3000 Grand Rapids, MI 0.13 761 0.02 116 0.00 5 -0.02 -112
4400 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -0.17 -994 0.02 116 -0.03 -166 -0.02 -142
1680 Cleveland, OH -0.27 -1606 0.02 122 -0.10 -594 -0.02 -146
2650 Florence, AL -0.17 -1034 0.02 123 -0.15 -871 -0.02 -145
920 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 0.41 2435 0.02 127 -0.10 -607 -0.04 -251
5790 Ocala, FL 0.58 3451 0.02 129 0.00 16 -0.02 -105
3400 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH -0.39 -2331 0.02 131 -0.32 -1915 -0.03 -165
5240 Montgomery, AL 0.07 411 0.02 138 -0.07 -430 -0.02 -118
460 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.01 85 0.02 142 -0.05 -317 -0.02 -149
8800 Waco, TX 0.02 101 0.02 144 -0.04 -212 -0.02 -115
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 0.15 896 0.02 144 -0.07 -449 -0.02 -141
4800 Mansfield, OH -0.23 -1373 0.02 144 -0.11 -678 -0.02 -132
1140 Bradenton, FL 0.23 1399 0.02 145 -0.03 -208 -0.01 -80
1880 Corpus Christi, TX -0.10 -620 0.02 149 -0.10 -597 -0.00 -27
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.06 -364 0.03 150 -0.04 -237 -0.03 -153
720 Baltimore, MD -0.09 -516 0.03 151 0.01 37 -0.01 -48
6800 Roanoke, VA -0.04 -240 0.03 152 -0.07 -400 -0.03 -186
780 -Battle Creek, MI -0.48 -2868 0.03 157 -0.09 -533 -0.04 -219
1620 Chico, CA 0.21 1237 0.03 162 -0.02 -143 -0.02 -95
2020 Daytona Beach, FL 0.77 4605 0.03 163 0.17 1040 -0.01 -38
3360 Houston, TX -0.18 -1090 0.03 164 -0.12 -716 -0.04 -241
9000 Wheeling, WV-OH -0.51 -3074 0.03 165 -0.14 -816 -0.02 -110
80 Akron, OH -0.35 -2110 0.03 167 -0.08 -479 -0.02 -124
1800 Columbus, GA-AL 5.42 32531 0.03 168 -0.17 -1004 -0.03 -154
6600 Racine, WI -0.22 -1340 0.03 169 -0.14 -848 -0.03 -202
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA -0.23 -1381 0.03 172 -0.09 -525 -0.02 -91
6280 Pittsburgh, PA -0.42 -2491 0.03 181 -0.19 -1131 -0.01 -88
2240 Duluth, MN-WI -0.36 -2184 0.03 185 -0.10 -625 -0.03 -153
3720 Kalamazoo, MI -0.13 -807 0.03 186 -0.02 -106 -0.02 -111
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL -0.07 -416 0.03 186 -0.10 -574 -0.01 -83
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Export % Export $
7520 Savannah, GA 0.15 917 0.03 187 -0.02 -116 -0.01 -30
6920 Sacramento, CA 0.38 2260 0.03 195 0.08 475 -0.00 -29
7120 Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA -0.08 -481 0.03 198 -0.07 -410 -0.01 -73
7880 Springfield, IL -0.51 -3087 0.03 202 -0.21 -1237 -0.05 -317
840 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX -0.28 -1651 0.04 210 -0.15 -911 0.00 30
5160 Mobile, AL -0.17 -995 0.04 211 -0.06 -336 -0.01 -45
8440 Topeka, KS -0.09 -518 0.04 211 -0.00 -21 -0.02 -96
3120 Greensboro-Winston Salem- 0.01 56 0.04 213 -0.04 -253 -0.02 -105
High Point, NC
6120 Peoria, IL -0.42 -2492 0.04 213 -0.29 -1748 -0.07 -435
3740 Kankakee, IL -0.50 -2994 0.04 215 -0.02 -114 -0.01 -87
3960 Lake Charles, LA -0.30 -1798 0.04 215 -0.16 -948 0.02 111
2920 Galveston-Texas City, TX -0.20 -1198 0.04 217 -0.19 -1162 0.01 68
8200 Tacoma, WA -0.13 -805 0.04 217 -0.09 -545 -0.01 -72
5560 New Orleans, LA -0.21 -1244 0.04 219 -0.05 -317 -0.01 -63
8120 Stockton, CA 0.21 1253 0.04 219 -0.04 -236 -0.01 -86
1480 Charlseton, WV -0.41 -2468 0.04 219 -0.21 -1242 0.01 54
2840 Fresno, CA -0.02 -108 0.04 222 -0.07 -413 -0.02 -141
4890 Medford, OR -0.02 -99 0.04 223 0.05 307 0.00 2
4120 Las Vegas, NV 0.22 1316 0.04 227 -0.04 -265 -0.02 -103
7720 Sioux City, IA-NE -0.05 -316 0.04 229 -0.04 -238 -0.01 -50
2120 Des Moines, IA -0.21 -1254 0.04 231 -0.07 -439 -0.02 -144
3980 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL -0.07 -408 0.04 232 -0.05 -295 -0.02 -106
680 Bakersfield, CA 0.00 18 0.04 235 -0.06 -379 -0.02 -123
8240 Tallhassee, FL 0.48 2856 0.04 236 -0.01 -44 -0.02 -146
3600 Jacksonville, FL 0.07 448 0.04 236 -0.06 -338 -0.01 -53
5520 New London-Norwich, CT -0.02 -139 0.04 238 -0.13 -756 -0.02 -142
5200 Monroe, LA 0.10 592 0.04 247 -0.00 -21 -0.01 -78
600 Augusta, GA 0.03 187 0.04 250 -0.08 -460 -0.02 -98
7080 Salem, OR -0.14 -859 0.04 257 -0.04 -262 -0.02 -120
7760 Sioux Falls, SD -0.00 -17 0.04 261 -0.00 -24 -0.02 -95
1000 Birmingham, AL -0.24 -1411 0.04 263 -0.20 -1186 -0.02 -131
7610 Sharon, PA -0.44 -2639 0.04 264 -0.39 -2363 -0.03 -182
760 Baton Rouge, LA -0.26 -1531 0.04 267 -0.16 -956 0.00 25
3290 Hickory, NC 0.05 317 0.04 268 -0.08 -499 -0.02 -99
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Export % Export $
6080 Pensacola, FL -0.18 -1074 0.05 270 -0.03 -192 0.00 17
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH -0.06 -386 0.05 272 -0.16 -977 -0.03 -162
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -0.46 -2763 0.05 275 -0.29 -1737 -0.08 -480
1320 Canton, OH -0.22 -1334 0.05 280 -0.23 -1356 -0.03 -200
1960 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA. -0.36 -2146 0.05 289 -0.32 -1928 -0.07 -398
5170 Modesto, CA 0.18 1051 0.05 292 -0.02 -130 -0.01 -89
3880 Lafayette, LA -0.05 -283 0.05 307 -0.15 -881 -0.05 -274
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR -0.14 -824 0.06 333 -0.02 -138 -0.01 -43
8720 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 0.05 277 0.06 337 -0.10 -627 -0.02 -100
1400 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 0.20 1170 0.06 345 -0.02 -119 -0.01 -49
5910 Olympia, WA 0.03 162 0.06 347 -0.03 -188 -0.01 -80
380 Anchorage, AK 0.41 2459 0.06 360 -0.02 -120 -0.02 -120
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN -0.44 -2644 0.07 431 -0.51 -3041 -0.03 -193
6560 Pueblo, CO -0.55 -3284 0.07 442 -0.44 -2612 -0.03 -173
AVERAGE EFFECT 0.0005 $3.13 -0.0001 ($0.77) 0.0320 $191.80 -0.0003 ($1.52) C
ACROSS ALL SMSAs
Results are derived from data taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan
Trade Sensitivity." Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic
Development, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, July 1990.
The average domestic effect is considerably larger ($198.90), but
here again the average effect is small in the context of annual
earnings. Even in the case of Poughkeepsie, New York where the
effect of imports was imputed to be the greatest, the loss of
$1,221 in annual earnings is still somewhat small when considered
by the standard of its mean level of total annual earnings --
estimated to be $32,000 in 1989 (Appendix F). In this example,
the loss of $1,221 amounts to 3.8 percent of Poughkeepsie's mean
annual earnings -- not a negligible amount, but as an upper bound
not that remarkable, either. Thus, while the effect of
employment change due to import penetration is measurable, one
must nevertheless conclude that it is not large.
Of the remaining independent variables, the variable for
mean SMSA earnings in 1979 (SMSAWG79) and the variable for the
New England subregion (NEW) are both statistically significant at
the .05 percent level (Table 4.26). The variable for the New
England subregion shows a large premium of $5,685 in mean annual
earnings for SMSAs in New England.
Results for Men and Women
The regression model results for women workers mirror those
discussed above for all workers. The employment change variable
(EMPCH) is statistically significant at the .05 percent level, as
are the independent variables for New England and the mean value
of SMSA annual earnings in 1979 (Table 4.26). The value of the
coefficient for the employment change variable (8990) is roughly
half again as large as that for all workers (5997). This result
is consistent with the findings from the microdata model, which
show that the effect of employment change on earnings is greatest
for women workers.
The SMSA model results show that, for each 1 percent change
in total employment in an SMSA between 1978 and 1986, the mean
level of women's annual earnings in the SMSA can be expected to
change 90 dollars. By taking this dollar figure and multiplying
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it times the imputed change in total employment due to imports
from the Markusen data, I calculated the predicted change in
annual earnings due to imports in each SMSA (Table 4.28, column
4). The model predicts that the greatest loss in earnings from
imports would be in Poughkeepsie, New York (-$1830) and the
greatest gain would be in Pueblo, Colorado ($662). As was true
in the SMSA model results for all workers discussed above, if we
take the mean of the predicted change in annual earnings due to
imports in all SMSAs, the effect of imports is essentially zero
(-$1.16). However, because women's mean annual earnings are
lower than that for all workers, the drop in earnings of $1,000
attributable to imports that the model predicts for San Jose,
California or Austin, Texas begins to look more substantial.
When the same SMSA model is run for men workers, on the
other hand, the employment change variable turns out not to be
statistically significant and the size of the coefficient is
roughly half that for women workers -- a $45 change in annual
earnings for each one percent change in total employment, versus
a $90 change for women (Table 4.26). The change in men's
earnings for each SMSA calculated from the regression results are
included as Table 4.29; however, because of the lack of
statistical significance for the employment change variable,
these results will not be discussed in any further detail. In
both the regression results for men and those for women, the
variables for the New England subregion (NEW) and the mean level
of annual earnings in 1979 (SMSAWG79) are the only other
independent variables with statistically significant
coefficients.
Whether the SMSA model is run with the mean level of annual
earnings by SMSA for all workers, men workers, or women workers
as the dependent variable, it does explain a substantial portion
of the variance in SMSA annual earnings. Based on the adjusted R
squared, for all workers the model explains 52 percent of the
variance in SMSA mean annual earnings, for men 42 percent, and
for women 41 percent (Table 4.26). To get a sense of how much of
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Table 4.28
Estimated Effect of Employment Change Attributable to Import Domestic, and Export Factors
On Mean Annual Earnings for Women Workers by SMSA
SMSA NAME Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
CODE Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Exports % Exports $
6460 Poughkeepsie, NY 0.27 2428 -0.20 -1830 0.98 8778 0.25 2234
6400 Portland, ME 0.00 29 -0.14 -1255 0.23 2098 0.02 172
7400 San Jose, CA 0.36 3277 -0.12 -1092 0.73 6585 0.16 1417
640 Austin, TX 0.93 8332 -0.11 -987 0.61 5524 0.14 1299
2640 Flint, MI -0.21 -1883 -0.10 -934 -0.03 -284 -0.03 -267
4600 Lubbock, TX -0.19 -1723 -0.10 -897 0.56 5019 0.14 1248
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.00 11 -0.09 -823 0.05 479 -0.02 -208
2655 Florence, SC -0.12 -1121 -0.09 -801 0.18 1657 0.01 69
7920 Springfield, MO 0.08 750 -0.08 -759 0.13 1192 -0.02 -144
1080 Boise City, ID 0.33 3005 -0.08 -733 0.45 4033 0.15 1342
440 Ann Arbor, MI -0.09 -782 -0.07 -647 0.07 613 0.01 64
960 Binghamton, NY -0.01 -78 -0.07 -637 0.41 3675 0.05 418
8520 Tucson, AZ 1.13 10153 -0.07 -620 0.56 5076 0.10 887
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX -0.07 -665 -0.07 -620 0.04 372 -0.01 -117
7240 San Antonio, TX 0.01 89 -0.07 -588 0.22 1984 0.04 340
2320 El Paso, TX 0.07 638 -0.06 -551 0.00 3 -0.01 -80
4280 Lexington-Fayette, KY -0.11 -1028 -0.06 -546 0.38 3432 0.11 962
8960 W Plm Bch-Boca Ratn- 0.60 5419 -0.06 -545 0.42 3799 0.10 934
Delray Beach, FL
6520 Provo-Orem, UT -0.03 -308 -0.06 -527 -0.08 -678 0.01 71
8680 Utica-Rome, NY -0.24 -2122 -0.06 -526 0.23 2071 0.04 368
6200 Phoenix, AZ 0.29 2620 -0.05 -457 0.36 3212 0.07 585
6480 Provid.-Pawtucket- -0.17 -1511 -0.05 -456 0.01 51 -0.03 -226
Woonsocket, RI
1120 Boston 0.05 416 -0.05 -421 0.26 2343 0.04 399
4160 Lawrence 0.05 416 -0.05 -421 0.26 2343 0.04 399
4560 Lowell 0.05 416 -0.05 -421 0.26 2343 0.04 399
6640 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.36 3266 -0.05 -413 0.32 2919 0.07 588
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Pim By, Fl 0.62 5534 -0.05 -406 0.58 5211 0.07 628
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.30 2681 -0.04 -398 0.33 2935 0.08 717
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Exports % Exports $
3640 Jersey City, NJ -0.33 -2946 -0.04 -388 0.09 782 -0.01 -106
7480 Sta Barb-Sta Maria-Lompoc, C) 0.21 1900 -0.04 -351 0.42 3767 0.07 626
2880 Gadsden, AL -0.19 -1744 -0.04 -340 -0.20 -1810 -0.03 -260
5600 New York, NY -0.22 -1979 -0.04 -336 0.07 661 -0.01 -121
1720 Colorado Springs, CO 0.86 7766 -0.04 -330 0.29 2578 0.05 484
7160 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 0.21 1882 -0.03 -311 0.27 2417 0.04 342
7840 Spokane, WA -0.05 -452 -0.03 -304 0.15 1327 0.05 451
7320 San Diego, CA 0.30 2685 -0.03 -300 0.26 2350 0.04 333
360 Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 0.29 2608 -0.03 -276 0.32 2872 0.04 370
2560 Fayetteville, NC 0.16 1399 -0.03 -270 -0.00 -3 -0.02 -163
2680 Ft Laud-Hollywood- 0.15 1330 -0.03 -269 0.31 2766 0.04 359
Pompano Beach, FL
5120 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -0.07 -629 -0.03 -269 0.29 2568 0.05 484
6840 Rochester, NY -0.07 -613 -0.03 -244 0.13 1131 -0.01 -83
8320 Terre Haute, IN -0.31 -2743 -0.03 -244 0.06 503 -0.01 -108
4000 Lancaster, PA -0.01 -114 -0.03 -227 0.02 189 -0.01 -102
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI -0.27 -2437 -0.02 -224 -0.22 -2000 -0.02 -179
7485 Santa Cruz, CA 0.17 1526 -0.02 -224 0.21 1865 0.05 413
280 Altoona, PA -0.18 -1629 -0.02 -223 0.03 304 -0.02 -144
5880 Oklahoma City, OK 0.03 307 -0.02 -222 0.16 1473 0.00 43
5000 Miami-Hialeah, FL -0.03 -291 -0.02 -222 0.05 440 -0.01 -85
6000 Oxnard-Ventura, CA 0.70 6338 -0.02 -221 0.23 2094 0.02 215
240 Allentown-Bethlehem, PA-NJ -0.31 -2815 -0.02 -219 -0.03 -291 -0.01 -84
3440 Huntsville, AL 0.27 2435 -0.02 -204 0.32 2871 0.01 128
3240 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, P. -0.17 -1528 -0.02 -199 -0.02 -192 -0.01 -79
3160 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC -0.10 -904 -0.02 -190 0.01 82 -0.02 -152
1160 Bridgeport -0.09 -795 -0.02 -189 0.23 2067 0.04 395
8040 Stamford -0.09 -795 -0.02 -189 0.23 2067 0.04 395
5760 Norwalk -0.09 -795 -0.02 -189 0.23 2067 0.04 395
1930 Danbury -0.09 -795 -0.02 -189 0.23 2067 0.04 395
3480 Indianapolis, IN -0.25 -2238 -0.02 -180 0.07 673 -0.01 -71
9240 Worcester -0.19 -1701 -0.02 -176 0.09 851 0.02 199
2160 Detroit, MI -0.24 -2119 -0.02 -167 -0.09 -770 -0.02 -216
400 Anderson, IN -0.28 -2559 -0.02 -146 0.02 180 0.02 190
5380 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 0.15 1378 -0.02 -141 0.21 1893 0.02 149
Total Total Employ
Employ Earnings Change
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3760 Kansas City, MO-KS
8560 Tulsa, OK
2760 Fort Wayne, IN
1840 Columbus, OH
6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ
















































































































































































































































































Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Exports % Exports $
405 Anderson, SC -0.14 -1265 0.00 36 -0.06 -569 -0.03 -248
3840 Knoxville, TN -0.04 -400 0.00 39 -0.08 -733 -0.02 -136
1740 Columbia, MO -0.10 -878 0.00 39 0.01 67 -0.01 -109
8840 Washington, DC-MD-VA 0.41 3687 0.00 40 0.22 2000 0.01 128
1600 Chicago, IL -0.23 -2061 0.00 42 0.04 325 -0.01 -60
3280 Hartford -0.04 -353 0.01 51 0.08 759 -0.00 -32
5440 New Britain -0.04 -353 0.01 51 0.08 759 -0.00 -32
480 Asheville, NC -0.06 -497 0.01 52 -0.01 -81 -0.02 -187
3560 Jackson, MS -0.04 -315 0.01 56 -0.04 -395 -0.02 -172
1360 Cedar Rapids, IA -0.20 -1799 0.01 61 0.18 1607 -0.01 -70
3520 Jackson, MI -0.23 -2113 0.01 66 -0.06 -496 -0.02 -217
9040 Wichita, KS 0.07 652 0.01 67 0.16 1476 0.02 145
8160 Syracuse, NY -0.11 -1023 0.01 78 0.00 25 -0.01 -130
4920 Memphis, TN-AR-MS -0.12 -1049 0.01 91 -0.01 -134 -0.02 -158
1520 Charlotte-Gastonia- 0.02 139 0.01 91 -0.05 -477 -0.02 -170
Rock Hill, NC-SC
7600 Seattle, WA 0.04 320 0.01 91 0.14 1260 0.00 11
5080 Milwaukee, WI -0.27 -2399 0.01 95 -0.08 -761 -0.03 -266
4880 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.64 5721 0.01 98 -0.07 -646 -0.02 -148
8280 Tampa-St. Ptrsburg-CIrwter, FL 0.30 2729 0.01 99 0.08 701 0.00 9
5720 Norflk-Virg. Bch-Newprt Nws, V 0.07 621 0.01 104 -0.08 -759 -0.02 -220
5920 Omaha, NE-IA -0.21 -1932 0.01 104 0.10 881 0.01 82
870 Benton Harbor, MI -0.26 -2324 0.01 109 -0.03 -235 -0.02 -217
5960 Orlando, FL 0.73 6540 0.01 113 0.27 2425 0.01 47
2360 Erie, PA -0.24 -2189 0.01 116 -0.14 -1294 -0.01 -91
8780 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA -0.02 -141 0.01 121 0.02 204 -0.01 -74
4520 Louisville, KY -0.23 -2084 0.01 122 -0.01 -95 -0.02 -217
8480 Trenton, NJ -0.13 -1188 0.01 123 -0.03 -274 -0.02 -186
2440 Evansville, IN-KY -0.15 -1374 0.01 133 -0.02 -223 -0.02 -204
1040 Bloomington-Normal, IL -0.19 -1716 0.02 137 -0.02 -194 -0.04 -333
6780 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 0.21 1893 0.02 144 -0.01 -124 -0.00 -39
7510 Sarasota, FL 0.51 4591 0.02 144 0.06 571 -0.01 -102
5320 Muskegon, MI -0.14 -1255 0.02 148 -0.16 -1418 -0.03 -251
6720 Reno, NV -0.08 -725 0.02 155 0.09 770 0.00 16
3680 Johnstown, PA -0.36 -3193 0.02 158 -0.30 -2702 -0.02 -217
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes$ Exports % Exports $
860 Bellingham, WA -0.06 -548 0.02 164 -0.13 -1148 0.00 20
160 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY -0.21 -1921 0.02 165 -0.10 -931 -0.03 -228
4680 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 0.13 1155 0.02 168 -0.09 -831 -0.02 -211
3000 Grand Rapids, MI 0.13 1141 0.02 173 0.00 7 -0.02 -167
4400 Little Rock-N. Little Rock, AR -0.17 -1490 0.02 175 -0.03 -248 -0.02 -212
1680 Cleveland, OH -0.27 -2407 0.02 183 -0.10 -890 -0.02 -218
2650 Florence, AL -0.17 -1550 0.02 185 -0.15 -1306 -0.02 -218
920 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 0.41 3650 0.02 191 -0.10 -910 -0.04 -377
5790 Ocala, FL 0.58 5173 0.02 193 0.00 24 -0.02 -158
3400 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-Ol -0.39 -3494 0.02 197 -0.32 -2871 -0.03 -248
5240 Montgomery, AL 0.07 616 0.02 206 -0.07 -644 -0.02 -177
460 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.01 127 0.02 213 -0.05 -476 -0.02 -223
8800 Waco, TX 0.02 151 0.02 216 -0.04 -318 -0.02 -173
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 0.15 1344 0.02 216 -0.07 -672 -0.02 -212
4800 Mansfield, OH -0.23 -2058 0.02 216 -0.11 -1016 -0.02 -197
1140 Bradenton, FL 0.23 2097 0.02 218 -0.03 -312 -0.01 -120
1880 Corpus Christi, TX -0.10 -930 0.02 224 -0.10 -895 -0.00 -41
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.06 -545 0.03 225 -0.04 -355 -0.03 -230
720 Baltimore, MD -0.09 -774 0.03 227 0.01 55 -0.01 -71
6800 Roanoke, VA -0.04 -359 0.03 228 -0.07 -599 -0.03 -279
780 -Battle Creek, MI -0.48 -4299 0.03 235 -0.09 -799 -0.04 -328
1620 Chico, CA 0.21 1854 0.03 242 -0.02 -214 -0.02 -143
2020 Daytona Beach, FL 0.77 6904 0.03 244 0.17 1559 -0.01 -57
3360 Houston, TX -0.18 -1634 0.03 246 -0.12 -1074 -0.04 -361
9000 Wheeling, WV-OH -0.51 -4608 0.03 247 -0.14 -1223 -0.02 -165
80 Akron, OH -0.35 -3162 0.03 250 -0.08 -718 -0.02 -186
1800 Columbus, GA-AL 5.42 48765 0.03 252 -0.17 -1505 -0.03 -231
6600 Racine, WI -0.22 -2008 0.03 254 -0.14 -1271 -0.03 -303
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA -0.23 -2070 0.03 258 -0.09 -788 -0.02 -136
6280 Pittsburgh, PA -0.42 -3734 0.03 271 -0.19 -1696 -0.01 -132
2240 Duluth, MN-WI -0.36 -3274 0.03 277 -0.10 -937 -0.03 -230
3720 Kalamazoo, MI -0.13 -1210 0.03 278 -0.02 -159 -0.02 -167
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL -0.07 -623 0.03 279 -0.10 -860 -0.01 -124
7520 Savannah, GA 0.15 1375 0.03 281 -0.02 -173 -0.01 -45
6920 Sacramento, CA 0.38 3387 0.03 292 0.08 712 -0.00 -44
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Exports % Exports $
7120 Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA -0.08 -721 0.03 296 -0.07 -615 -0.01 -110
7880 Springfield, IL -0.51 -4627 0.03 302 -0.21 -1855 -0.05 -475
840 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX -0.28 -2475 0.04 315 -0.15 -1365 0.00 44
5160 Mobile, AL -0.17 -1492 0.04 316 -0.06 -504 -0.01 -68
8440 Topeka, KS -0.09 -776 0.04 316 -0.00 -32 -0.02 -143
3120 Greensboro-Winston 0.01 84 0.04 319 -0.04 -379 -0.02 -158
Salem-High Point, NC
6120 Peoria, IL -0.42 -3735 0.04 320 -0.29 -2620 -0.07 -652
3740 Kankakee, IL -0.50 -4487 0.04 323 -0.02 -171 -0.01 -130
3960 Lake Charles, LA -0.30 -2695 0.04 323 -0.16 -1421 0.02 167
2920 Galveston-Texas City, TX -0.20 -1796 0.04 325 -0.19 -1742 0.01 103
8200 Tacoma, WA -0.13 -1207 0.04 326 -0.09 -818 -0.01 -109
5560 New Orleans, LA -0.21 -1865 0.04 328 -0.05 -475 -0.01 -95
8120 Stockton, CA 0.21 1879 0.04 328 -0.04 -354 -0.01 -129
1480 Charlseton, WV -0.41 -3699 0.04 329 -0.21 -1862 0.01 82
2840 Fresno, CA -0.02 -162 0.04 333 -0.07 -619 -0.02 -211
4890 Medford, OR -0.02 -148 0.04 334 0.05 460 0.00 3
4120 Las Vegas, NV 0.22 1972 0.04 341 -0.04 -397 -0.02 -154
7720 Sioux City, IA-NE -0.05 -473 0.04 343 -0.04 -357 -0.01 -75
2120 Des Moines, IA -0.21 -1880 0.04 346 -0.07 -658 -0.02 -216
3980 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL -0.07 -611 0.04 348 -0.05 -442 -0.02 -158
680 Bakersfield, CA 0.00 27 0.04 352 -0.06 -568 -0.02 -185
8240 Tallhassee, FL 0.48 4281 0.04 354 -0.01 -66 -0.02 -219
3600 Jacksonville, FL 0.07 672 0.04 354 -0.06 -506 -0.01 -80
5520 New London-Norwich, CT -0.02 -209 0.04 357 -0.13 -1133 -0.02 -213
5200 Monroe, LA 0.10 888 0.04 370 -0.00 -32 -0.01 -116
600 Augusta, GA 0.03 280 0.04 375 -0.08 -690 -0.02 -147
7080 Salem, OR -0.14 -1287 0.04 386 -0.04 -393 -0.02 -181
7760 Sioux Falls, SD -0.00 -26 0.04 391 -0.00 -36 -0.02 -142
1000 Birmingham, AL -0.24 -2116 0.04 395 -0.20 -1778 -0.02 -196
7610 Sharon, PA -0.44 -3956 0.04 395 -0.39 -3543 -0.03 -273
760 Baton Rouge, LA -0.26 -2294 0.04 400 -0.16 -1433 0.00 38
3290 Hickory, NC 0.05 475 0.04 402 -0.08 -747 -0.02 -149
6080 Pensacola, FL -0.18 -1610 0.05 405 -0.03 -288 0.00 26



































































0.0005 $4.69 -0.0001 ($1.16) 0.0320 $287.51 -0.0003 ($2.28)
Results are derived from data taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan
Trade Sensitivity." Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic

































































ESTIMATED EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT CHANGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO IMPORT, DOMESTIC, AND EXPORT FACTORS
ON MEAN ANNUAL EARNINGS FOR MEN BY SMSA
(IN THIS MODEL, THE COEFFICIENT FOR EMPLOYMENT CHANGE WAS NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
AT THE .05 PERCENT LEVEL).
SMSA NAME Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
CODE Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Domes % Domes $
6460 Poughkeepsie, NY 0.27 1209 -0.20 -911 0.98 4371 0.25 1113
6400 Portland, ME 0.00 14 -0.14 -625 0.23 1045 0.02 86
7400 San Jose, CA 0.36 1632 -0.12 -544 0.73 3279 0.16 705
640 Austin, TX 0.93 4149 -0.11 -492 0.61 2751 0.14 647
2640 Flint, MI -0.21 -938 -0.10 -465 -0.03 -142 -0.03 -133
4600 Lubbock, TX -0.19 -858 -0.10 -447 0.56 2499 0.14 622
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.00 5 -0.09 -410 0.05 238 -0.02 -104
2655 Florence, SC -0.12 -558 -0.09 -399 0.18 825 0.01 34
7920 Springfield, MO 0.08 373 -0.08 -378 0.13 594 -0.02 -72
1080 Boise City, ID 0.33 1496 -0.08 -365 0.45 2008 0.15 668
440 Ann Arbor, MI -0.09 -389 -0.07 -322 0.07 305 0.01 32
960 Binghamton, NY -0.01 -39 -0.07 -317 0.41 1830 0.05 208
8520 Tucson, AZ 1.13 5055 -0.07 -309 0.56 2528 0.10 442
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX -0.07 -331 -0.07 -309 0.04 185 -0.01 -58
7240 San Antonio, TX 0.01 44 -0.07 -293 0.22 988 0.04 169
2320 El Paso, TX 0.07 318 -0.06 -274 0.00 2 -0.01 -40
4280 Lexington-Fayette, KY -0.11 -512 -0.06 -272 0.38 1709 0.11 479
8960 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton- 0.60 2698 -0.06 -272 0.42 1892 0.10 465
Delray Beach, FL
6520 Provo-Orem, UT -0.03 -153 -0.06 -262 -0.08 -338 0.01 35
8680 Utica-Rome, NY -0.24 -1056 -0.06 -262 0.23 1031 0.04 183
6200 Phoenix, AZ 0.29 1305 -0.05 -227 0.36 1600 0.07 291
6480 Providence-Pawtucket- -0.17 -753 -0.05 -227 0.01 25 -0.03 -113
Woonsocket, RI
1120 Boston 0.05 207 -0.05 -210 0.26 1167 0.04 199
4160 Lawrence 0.05 207 -0.05 -210 0.26 1167 0.04 199
4560 Lowell 0.05 207 -0.05 -210 0.26 1167 0.04 199
6640 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.36 1626 -0.05 -206 0.32 1454 0.07 293
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes$ Domes% Domes$
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 0.62 2756 -0.05 -202 0.58 2595 0.07 313
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.30 1335 -0.04 -198 0.33 1461 0.08 357
3640 Jersey City, NJ -0.33 -1467 -0.04 -193 0.09 389 -0.01 -53
7480 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria- 0.21 946 -0.04 -175 0.42 1876 0.07 312
Lompoc, CA
2880 Gadsden, AL -0.19 -868 -0.04 -169 -0.20 -901 -0.03 -129
5600 New York, NY -0.22 -986 -0.04 -167 0.07 329 -0.01 -60
1720 Colorado Springs, CO 0.86 3867 -0.04 -164 0.29 1284 0.05 241
7160 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 0.21 937 -0.03 -155 0.27 1203 0.04 170
7840 Spokane, WA -0.05 -225 -0.03 -151 0.15 661 0.05 225
7320 San Diego, CA 0.30 1337 -0.03 -149 0.26 1170 0.04 166
360 Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 0.29 1299 -0.03 -137 0.32 1430 0.04 184
2560 Fayetteville, NC 0.16 696 -0.03 -134 -0.00 -2 -0.02 -81
2680 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood- 0.15 662 -0.03 -134 0.31 1377 0.04 179
Pompano Beach, FL
5120 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -0.07 -313 -0.03 -134 0.29 1278 0.05 241
6840 Rochester, NY -0.07 -305 -0.03 -122 0.13 563 -0.01 -41
8320 Terre Haute, IN -0.31 -1366 -0.03 -121 0.06 250 -0.01 -54
4000 Lancaster, PA -0.01 -57 -0.03 -113 0.02 94 -0.01 -51
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI -0.27 -1213 -0.02 -111 -0.22 -996 -0.02 -89
7485 Santa Cruz, CA 0.17 760 -0.02 -111 0.21 929 0.05 206
280 Altoona, PA -0.18 -811 -0.02 -111 0.03 151 -0.02 -72
5880 Oklahoma City, OK 0.03 153 -0.02 -110 0.16 734 0.00 22
5000 Miami-Hialeah, FL -0.03 -145 -0.02 -110 0.05 219 -0.01 -42
6000 Oxnard-Ventura, CA 0.70 3156 -0.02 -110 0.23 1043 0.02 107
240 Allentown-Bethlehem, PA-NJ -0.31 -1402 -0.02 -109 -0.03 -145 -0.01 -42
3440 Huntsville, AL 0.27 1212 -0.02 -102 0.32 1430 0.01 64
3240 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA -0.17 -761 -0.02 -99 -0.02 -96 -0.01 -39
3160 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC -0.10 -450 -0.02 -94 0.01 41 -0.02 -75
1160 Bridgeport -0.09 -396 -0.02 -94 0.23 1029 0.04 197
8040 Stamford -0.09 -396 -0.02 -94 0.23 1029 0.04 197
5760 Norwalk -0.09 -396 -0.02 -94 0.23 1029 0.04 197
1930 Danbury -0.09 -396 -0.02 -94 0.23 1029 0.04 197
3480 Indianapolis, IN -0.25 -1114 -0.02 -90 0.07 335 -0.01 -35
9240 Worcester -0.19 -847 -0.02 -88 0.09 424 0.02 99
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Domes % Domes $
2160 Detroit, MI -0.24 -1055 -0.02 -83 -0.09 -384 -0.02 -107
400 Anderson, IN -0.28 -1274 -0.02 -73 0.02 90 0.02 95
5380 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 0.15 686 -0.02 -70 0.21 943 0.02 74
1920 Dallas, TX 0.04 183 -0.02 -68 0.18 826 0.01 32
2000 Dayton-Springfield, OH -0.19 -853 -0.01 -62 0.04 190 -0.01 -64
9320 Youngstown-Warren, OH -0.39 -1728 -0.01 -61 -0.19 -843 -0.03 -118
8400 Toledo, OH -0.18 -800 -0.01 -59 -0.05 -206 -0.02 -70
9160 Wilmington, DE-NJ-MD -0.22 -981 -0.01 -54 -0.02 -71 -0.00 -16
3710 Joplin, MO 0.13 569 -0.01 -53 0.02 78 0.00 12
3810 Killeen-Temple, TX 0.16 733 -0.01 -50 0.31 1406 0.05 234
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 0.33 1463 -0.01 -46 0.09 394 -0.01 -28
8000 Springfield, MA -0.17 -749 -0.01 -42 0.11 472 0.01 48
9140 Williamsport, PA -0.20 -894 -0.01 -42 0.04 189 -0.01 -44
5360 Nashville, TN 0.07 299 -0.01 -40 0.01 50 -0.02 -80
4440 Lorain-Elyria, OH -0.25 -1113 -0.01 -40 -0.15 -690 -0.03 -112
200 Albuquerque, NM -0.00 -11 -0.01 -40 0.21 919 0.02 103
4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.03 134 -0.01 -38 0.15 669 0.00 4
7800 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN -0.31 -1402 -0.01 -37 0.02 89 -0.01 -47
4720 Madison, WI 0.04 172 -0.01 -36 0.06 250 -0.01 -32
6880 ROckford, IL -0.08 -350 -0.01 -33 -0.02 -110 -0.01 -61
1760 Columbia, SC 0.09 418 -0.01 -32 0.10 428 0.01 37
3320 Honolulu, HI -0.19 -840 -0.01 -29 0.01 53 -0.02 -70
5640 Newark, NJ -0.19 -836 -0.01 -23 0.06 288 -0.01 -31
6440 Portland, OR -0.02 -102 -0.01 -22 0.05 215 0.01 57
7680 Shreveport, LA -0.19 -838 -0.00 -21 0.12 526 -0.01 -53
6680 Reading, PA -0.16 -716 -0.00 -6 -0.07 -303 -0.01 -45
1280 Buffalo, NY -0.30 -1344 -0.00 -4 -0.07 -312 -0.02 -99
1640 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN -0.13 -567 -0.00 -2 0.03 123 -0.02 -72
3760 Kansas City, MO-KS -0.05 -224 0.00 0 0.09 403 -0.01 -45
8560 Tulsa, OK -0.05 -231 0.00 1 -0.00 -17 -0.02 -91
2760 Fort Wayne, IN -0.11 -478 0.00 5 -0.04 -182 -0.03 -120
1840 Columbus, OH -0.11 -483 0.00 6 0.03 141 -0.01 -37
6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ -0.18 -818 0.00 12 0.06 259 0.00 3
7500 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 0.30 1342 0.00 12 0.18 797 0.03 120































































































































































































































































































Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Domes % Domes $
5320 Muskegon, MI -0.14 -625 0.02 74 -0.16 -706 -0.03 -125
6720 Reno, NV -0.08 -361 0.02 77 0.09 383 0.00 8
3680 Johnstown, PA -0.36 -1590 0.02 79 -0.30 -1346 -0.02 -108
860 Bellingham, WA -0.06 -273 0.02 81 -0.13 -572 0.00 10
160 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY -0.21 -956 0.02 82 -0.10 -464 -0.03 -113
4680 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 0.13 575 0.02 83 -0.09 -414 -0.02 -105
3000 Grand Rapids, MI 0.13 568 0.02 86 0.00 3 -0.02 -83
4400 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -0.17 -742 0.02 87 -0.03 -124 -0.02 -106
1680 Cleveland, OH -0.27 -1198 0.02 91 -0.10 -443 -0.02 -109
2650 Florence, AL -0.17 -772 0.02 92 -0.15 -650 -0.02 -108
920 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 0.41 1817 0.02 95 -0.10 -453 -0.04 -188
5790 Ocala, FL 0.58 2576 0.02 96 0.00 12 -0.02 -79
3400 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH -0.39 -1740 0.02 98 -0.32 -1429 -0.03 -123
5240 Montgomery, AL 0.07 307 0.02 103 -0.07 -321 -0.02 -88
460 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.01 63 0.02 106 -0.05 -237 -0.02 -111
8800 Waco, TX 0.02 75 0.02 107 -0.04 -158 -0.02 -86 Ln
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 0.15 669 0.02 108 -0.07 -335 -0.02 -106
4800 Mansfield, OH -0.23 -1025 0.02 108 -0.11 -506 -0.02 -98
1140 Bradenton, FL 0.23 1044 0.02 108 -0.03 -155 -0.01 -60
1880 Corpus Christi, TX -0.10 -463 0.02 111 -0.10 -445 -0.00 -20
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.06 -272 0.03 112 -0.04 -177 -0.03 -114
720 Baltimore, MD -0.09 -385 0.03 113 0.01 27 -0.01 -36
6800 Roanoke, VA -0.04 -179 0.03 114 -0.07 -298 -0.03 -139
780 -Battle Creek, MI -0.48 -2141 0.03 117 -0.09 -398 -0.04 -163
1620 Chico, CA 0.21 923 0.03 121 -0.02 -106 -0.02 -71
2020 Daytona Beach, FL 0.77 3438 0.03 122 0.17 776 -0.01 -28
3360 Houston, TX -0.18 -814 0.03 123 -0.12 -535 -0.04 -180
9000 Wheeling, WV-OH -0.51 -2295 0.03 123 -0.14 -609 -0.02 -82
80 Akron, OH -0.35 -1575 0.03 124 -0.08 -358 -0.02 -93
1800 Columbus, GA-AL 5.42 24282 0.03 125 -0.17 -749 -0.03 -115
6600 Racine, WI -0.22 -1000 0.03 126 -0.14 -633 -0.03 -151
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA -0.23 -1031 0.03 129 -0.09 -392 -0.02 -68
6280 Pittsburgh, PA -0.42 -1859 0.03 135 -0.19 -844 -0.01 -66
2240 Duluth, MN-WI -0.36 -1630 0.03 138 -0.10 -467 -0.03 -115
3720 Kalamazoo, MI -0.13 -602 0.03 139 -0.02 -79 -0.02 -83
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes $ Domes % Domes $
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL -0.07 -310 0.03 139 -0.10 -428 -0.01 -62
7520 Savannah, GA 0.15 685 0.03 140 -0.02 -86 -0.01 -22
6920 Sacramento, CA 0.38 1687 0.03 145 0.08 355 -0.00 -22
7120 Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA -0.08 -359 0.03 148 -0.07 -306 -0.01 -55
7880 Springfield, IL -0.51 -2304 0.03 151 -0.21 -923 -0.05 -237
840 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX -0.28 -1233 0.04 157 -0.15 -680 0.00 22
5160 Mobile, AL -0.17 -743 0.04 157 -0.06 -251 -0.01 -34
8440 Topeka, KS -0.09 -387 0.04 157 -0.00 -16 -0.02 -71
3120 Greensboro-Winston-Salem- 0.01 42 0.04 159 -0.04 -189 -0.02 -78
HighPoint, NC
6120 Peoria, IL -0.42 -1860 0.04 159 -0.29 -1304 -0.07 -324
3740 Kankakee, IL -0.50 -2235 0.04 161 -0.02 -85 -0.01 -65
3960 Lake Charles, LA -0.30 -1342 0.04 161 -0.16 -708 0.02 83
2920 Galveston-Texas City, TX -0.20 -895 0.04 162 -0.19 -867 0.01 51
8200 Tacoma, WA -0.13 -601 0.04 162 -0.09 -407 -0.01 -54
5560 New Orleans, LA -0.21 -929 0.04 163 -0.05 -237 -0.01 -47 LA
8120 Stockton, CA 0.21 936 0.04 163 -0.04 -176 -0.01 -64
1480 Charlseton, WV -0.41 -1842 0.04 164 -0.21 -927 0.01 41
2840 Fresno, CA -0.02 -80 0.04 166 -0.07 -308 -0.02 -105
4890 Medford, OR -0.02 -74 0.04 166 0.05 229 0.00 2
4120 Las Vegas, NV 0.22 982 0.04 170 -0.04 -198 -0.02 -77
7720 Sioux City, IA-NE -0.05 -236 0.04 171 -0.04 -178 -0.01 -38
2120 Des Moines, IA -0.21 -936 0.04 172 -0.07 -328 -0.02 -107
3980 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL -0.07 -304 0.04 174 -0.05 -220 -0.02 -79
680 Bakersfield, CA 0.00 14 0.04 175 -0.06 -283 -0.02 -92
8240 Tallhassee, FL 0.48 2131 0.04 176 -0.01 -33 -0.02 -109
3600 Jacksonville, FL 0.07 334 0.04 176 -0.06 -252 -0.01 -40
5520 New London-Norwich, CT -0.02 -104 0.04 178 -0.13 -564 -0.02 -106
5200 Monroe, LA 0.10 442 0.04 184 -0.00 -16 -0.01 -58
600 Augusta, GA 0.03 139 0.04 187 -0.08 -343 -0.02 -73
7080 Salem, OR -0.14 -641 0.04 192 -0.04 -196 -0.02 -90
7760 Sioux Falls, SD -0.00 -13 0.04 194 -0.00 -18 -0.02 -71
1000 Birmingham, AL -0.24 -1054 0.04 197 -0.20 -885 -0.02 -98
7610 Sharon, PA -0.44 -1970 0.04 197 -0.39 -1764 -0.03 -136
760 Baton Rouge, LA -0.26 -1142 0.04 199 -0.16 -714 0.00 19
Total Total Employ Earnings Employ Earnings Employ Earnings
Employ Earnings Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change $ Imports % Imports $ Domes % Domes$ Domes% Domes$
3290 Hickory, NC 0.05 237 0.04 200 -0.08 -372 -0.02 -74
6080 Pensacola, FL -0.18 -802 0.05 202 -0.03 -143 0.00 13
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH -0.06 -288 0.05 203 -0.16 -729 -0.03 -121
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -0.46 -2062 0.05 205 -0.29 -1296 -0.08 -358
1320 Canton, OH -0.22 -996 0.05 209 -0.23 -1012 -0.03 -149
1960 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-Il -0.36 -1602 0.05 216 -0.32 -1439 -0.07 -297
5170 Modesto, CA 0.18 785 0.05 218 -0.02 -97 -0.01 -66
3880 Lafayette, LA -0.05 -211 0.05 229 -0.15 -657 -0.05 -204
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR -0.14 -615 0.06 248 -0.02 -103 -0.01 -32
8720 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 0.05 207 0.06 251 -0.10 -468 -0.02 -75
1400 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 0.20 874 0.06 257 -0.02 -89 -0.01 -36
5910 Olympia, WA 0.03 121 0.06 259 -0.03 -140 -0.01 -60
380 Anchorage, AK 0.41 1836 0.06 269 -0.02 -90 -0.02 -90
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN -0.44 -1974 0.07 321 -0.51 -2270 -0.03 -144
6560 Pueblo, CO -0.55 -2451 0.07 330 -0.44 -1950 -0.03 -129
LF)
AVERAGE EFFECT 0.0005 $2.34 -0.0001 ($0.58) 0.0320 $143.16 -0.0003 ($1.13)
ACROSS ALL SMSAs
Results are derived from data taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan
Trade Sensitivity." Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic
Development, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, July 1990.
this explained variance was attributable to the inclusion of the
employment change (EMPCH) variable, I ran the model for all
workers again without the employment change variable. In this
new model, the amount of explained variance changed very little,
dropping from 52 percent to 51 percent. When I ran the model
excluding only the mean level of SMSA earnings in 1979 (SMSAWG79)
as an independent variable, however, the explained variance
dropped to 30 percent.
While it is not acceptable practice to try to ascribe
portions of total R squared in a model to individual independent
variables because of the likelihood of correlation between them,
doing this exercise does give an imprecise estimate of at least
the order of magnitude of each variable's probable contribution.'
In this case, the level of SMSA mean earnings in 1979 appears to
make a much greater contribution to explaining the variance in
SMSA mean annual earnings in 1989 than does the level of total
employment change in that SMSA between 1978 and 1986. The same
conclusion drawn about the effect of total employment change --
that it makes only a small contribution toward explaining the
variance in SMSA mean annual earnings -- would have to be made
about the effect of employment change due to imports.
Explaining the Variance in SMSA Labor Force Participation Rates
The second SMSA regression model attempts to explain the
variance in SMSA labor force participation rates (LFPR). Again,
separate regression equations are estimated for all persons (as
opposed to all workers), for men alone, and for women alone. The
only independent variables in this equation are the total SMSA
4 In fact, the level of correlation among the independent
variables in the model is actually quite low. The highest
correlation coefficient between any two variables is -.41 for
EDUCZ AND EDUC2, followed by that for AGEZ and AGE2 of .37. Most
of the remaining correlation coefficients fall below .10
(Appendix Table G).
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employment change (EMPCH) variable and a dummy variable for
geographic subregion. The equation is identical to that used to
explain the variance in SMSA mean annual earnings, with the
exception that the variable for mean SMSA earnings in 1979 is not
included. The omitted region dummy variable is that for the
Pacific region.
In each of the three regression equations (for all persons,
men, and women), the coefficient for the total SMSA employment
change variable is statistically significant at the .05 percent
level (Table 4.30). The employment change coefficient is
greatest for women (.20), slightly smaller for all persons (.17),
and smallest for men (.11). For women, then, the model predicts
that for each one percent loss in total SMSA employment, women's
labor force participation rate will drop by two-tenths of one
percent, for example from 75.6 percent to 75.4 percent.
Referring back to the counterfactual analysis that I did
using the results of the microdata model, if I compare the
predicted LFPR of women in a city losing 7 percent of total
employment because of its import industry mix to that of women in
a city gaining 7 percent of total employment, the difference
would be 2.8 percentage points. For women living in New England,
where the model predicts a LFPR of 81 percent, the appropriate
comparison would be a city with a predicted LFPR of 82.4 percent
versus one with a predicted LFPR of 79.6 percent. This is not a
large difference, but it does represent a change of 3.7 percent
and is sizeable enough not to be completely discounted.
For men, on the other hand, the size of the coefficient on
the total employment change variable is just over half that for
women. This means that, making the same comparison between an
SMSA losing seven percent of its employment and one gaining seven
percent, the differential in the LFPR between the two cities
would be only about 1.5 percentage points. Since men have a
higher LFPR than do women (the constant estimated by the model is





















Adjusted R Squared = .15
NEW MIDATL ENC WNC SAT ESC WSC MTN
0.169788 0.046722 0.022115 0.014775 0.048158 0.023562 -0.00954 -0.00187 0.002064
0.037805 0.018224 0.015726 0.014065 0.017829 0.013784 0.017732 0.015511 0.019806
T STATISTIC 4.491123 2.563776 1.406317 1.050464 2.701107 1.709413 -0.53813 -0.12027 0.104198
All Men Workers 25-54
Regression Output:
Constant













Adjusted R Squared = .10
NEW MIDATL ENC WNC SAT
0.110474 0.019485 0.016691 0.006928 0.026514 0.011407




1.303 1.2935 0.6017 1.7744 1.009 -0.96219T STATISTIC 3.5435 -1.231 0.11223
Table 4.30 cont'd
All Women Workers 25-54
Regression Output:
Constant














Adjusted R Squared = .09
NEW MIDATL ENC WNC SAT ESC WSC MTN
0.200941 0.064091 0.024858 0.015264 0.068564 0.035697 -0.00665 0.011094 0.004209
0.060206 0.029022 0.025043 0.022399 0.028393 0.021951 0.028239 0.024701 0.031542
3.33757 2.208373 0.992593 0.681474 2.414814 1.626224 -0.23555 0.449126 0.133439
Key to Variables:
EMPCH: Imputed percentage of employment lost or gained in an SMSA because of industry structure.
Regions: NEW, New England; MID, Mid-Atlantic; ENC, East North Central; WNC, West North Central
SAT, South Atlantic; ESC, East South Central; WSC, West South Central; MTN, Mountain.
The ommitted region variable in the regression is Pacific.
Compared with the SMSA model explaining the variance in SMSA
mean annual earnings, this model explains much less of the
variance in SMSA labor force participation rates. The adjusted R
squared for all persons is .15, for men .10, and for women .09
(Table 4.30). Including other SMSA-level information, such as
the age and sex composition of the labor force and the percentage
of the population enrolled in school, would undoubtedly improve
the model. Other than the employment change variable, no
independent variables have statistically significant coefficients
in the model explaining the LFPR for men. For the model run on
women, the dummy variables for the New England subregion and the
West North Central subregion have statistically significant
coefficients. For SMSAs in these regions, the model predicts
that the labor force participation rate for women will be roughly
six to seven percentage points higher than for cities in other
regions.
Calculating the city-by-city effects of import penetration
on labor force participation rates, I find similar results to
those found for annual earnings. Averaged across all SMSAs, the
effect on LFPR of employment change due to imports is negligible,
whether the population is all persons, all men, or all women
(final row of Tables 4.31, 4.32, and 4.33). However, for cities
with a high percentage of total employment change due to imports,
the effects begin to look more substantial. Again taking
Poughkeepsie, New York as the most extreme example, the model
predicts a loss in the LFPR of 4.1 percentage points for women
and 2.2 percentage points for men. As was true with the
regression model predicting annual earnings, these results are
not large enough to be striking but neither are they so small as
to be discounted.
V. Comparison of the Findings from the Microdata and SMSA
Regression Models
My findings support the hypothesis that workers' earnings
are affected by the import-sensitivity of the metropolitan area
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TABLE 4.31 EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT CHANGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO IMPORT, DOMESTIC, AND EXPORT FACTORS
ON LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE FOR ALL WORKERS BY SMSA
SMSA NAME Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
CODE Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Exports Exports
6460 Poughkeepsie, NY 0.27 0.0458 -0.20 -0.0346 0.98 0.16578 0.25 0.0422
6400 Portland, ME 0.00 0.0005 -0.14 -0.0237 0.23 0.03962 0.02 0.00325
7400 San Jose, CA 0.36 0.0619 -0.12 -0.0206 0.73 0.12436 0.16 0.02676
640 Austin, TX 0.93 0.1574 -0.11 -0.0186 0.61 0.10432 0.14 0.02453
2640 Flint, MI -0.21 -0.036 -0.10 -0.0176 -0.03 -0.0054 -0.03 -0.005
4600 Lubbock, TX -0.19 -0.033 -0.10 -0.0169 0.56 0.09478 0.14 0.02358
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.00 0.0002 -0.09 -0.0155 0.05 0.00904 -0.02 -0.0039
2655 Florence, SC -0.12 -0.021 -0.09 -0.0151 0.18 0.03129 0.01 0.0013
7920 Springfield, MO 0.08 0.0142 -0.08 -0.0143 0.13 0.02252 -0.02 -0.0027
1080 Boise City, ID 0.33 0.0567 -0.08 -0.0138 0.45 0.07616 0.15 0.02535
440 Ann Arbor, MI -0.09 -0.015 -0.07 -0.0122 0.07 0.01157 0.01 0.00122
960 Binghamton, NY -0.01 -0.001 -0.07 -0.012 0.41 0.06941 0.05 0.00789
8520 Tucson, AZ 1.13 0.1917 -0.07 -0.0117 0.56 0.09586 0.10 0.01676
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX -0.07 -0.013 -0.07 -0.0117 0.04 0.00703 -0.01 -0.0022
7240 San Antonio, TX 0.01 0.0017 -0.07 -0.0111 0.22 0.03747 0.04 0.00642
2320 El Paso, TX 0.07 0.0121 -0.06 -0.0104 0.00 0.00006 -0.01 -0.0015
4280 Lexington-Fayette, KY -0.11 -0.019 -0.06 -0.0103 0.38 0.06482 0.11 0.01817
8960 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton- 0.60 0.1023 -0.06 -0.0103 0.42 0.07175 0.10 0.01763
Delray Beach, FL
6520 Provo-Orem, UT -0.03 -0.006 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.0128 0.01 0.00133
8680 Utica-Rome, NY -0.24 -0.04 -0.06 -0.0099 0.23 0.03911 0.04 0.00694
6200 Phoenix, AZ 0.29 0.0495 -0.05 -0.0086 0.36 0.06067 0.07 0.01105
6480 Providence-Pawtucket- -0.17 -0.029 -0.05 -0.0086 0.01 0.00097 -0.03 -0.0043
Woonsocket, RI
1120 Boston 0.05 0.0079 -0.05 -0.008 0.26 0.04425 0.04 0.00753
4160 Lawrence 0.05 0.0079 -0.05 -0.008 0.26 0.04425 0.04 0.00753
4560 Lowell 0.05 0.0079 -0.05 -0.008 0.26 0.04425 0.04 0.00753
6640 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.36 0.0617 -0.05 -0.0078 0.32 0.05513 0.07 0.01111
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 0.62 0.1045 -0.05 -0.0077 0.58 0.09841 0.07 0.01186
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.30 0.0506 -0.04 -0.0075 0.33 0.05542 0.08 0.01354
3640 Jersey City, NJ -0.33 -0.056 -0.04 -0.0073 0.09 0.01476 -0.01 -0.002


























8320 Terre Haute, IN
4000 Lancaster, PA
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-
7485 Santa Cruz, CA
280 Altoona, PA






























































































































































































































































































4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA











3760 Kansas City, MO-KS
8560 Tulsa, OK
2760 Fort Wayne, IN
1840 Columbus, OH
6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Exports Exports
3680 Johnstown, PA -0.36 -0.06 0.02 0.00298 -0.30 -0.051 -0.02 -0.0041
860 Bellingham, WA -0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.00309 -0.13 -0.0217 0.00 0.00037
160 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY -0.21 -0.036 0.02 0.00312 -0.10 -0.0176 -0.03 -0.0043
4680 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 0.13 0.0218 0.02 0.00317 -0.09 -0.0157 -0.02 -0.004
3000 Grand Rapids, Ml 0.13 0.0216 0.02 0.00328 0.00 0.00013 -0.02 -0.0032
4400 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -0.17 -0.028 0.02 0.0033 -0.03 -0.0047 -0.02 -0.004
1680 Cleveland, OH -0.27 -0.045 0.02 0.00346 -0.10 -0.0168 -0.02 -0.0041
2650 Florence, AL -0.17 -0.029 0.02 0.00349 -0.15 -0.0247 -0.02 -0.0041
920 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 0.41 0.0689 0.02 0.0036 -0.10 -0.0172 -0.04 -0.0071
5790 Ocala, FL 0.58 0.0977 0.02 0.00364 0.00 0.00045 -0.02 -0.003
3400 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH -0.39 -0.066 0.02 0.00371 -0.32 -0.0542 -0.03 -0.0047
5240 Montgomery, AL 0.07 0.0116 0.02 0.00389 -0.07 -0.0122 -0.02 -0.0033
460 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.01 0.0024 0.02 0.00402 -0.05 -0.009 -0.02 -0.0042
8800 Waco, TX 0.02 0.0029 0.02 0.00407 -0.04 -0.006 -0.02 -0.0033
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 0.15 0.0254 0.02 0.00408 -0.07 -0.0127 -0.02 -0.004
4800 Mansfield, OH -0.23 -0.039 0.02 0.00409 -0.11 -0.0192 -0.02 -0.0037
1140 Bradenton, FL 0.23 0.0396 0.02 0.00411 -0.03 -0.0059 -0.01 -0.0023
1880 Corpus Christi, TX -0.10 -0.018 0.02 0.00422 -0.10 -0.0169 -0.00 -0.0008
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.00426 -0.04 -0.0067 -0.03 -0.0043
720 Baltimore, MD -0.09 -0.015 0.03 0.00428 0.01 0.00104 -0.01 -0.0013
6800 Roanoke, VA -0.04 -0.007 0.03 0.00431 -0.07 -0.0113 -0.03 -0.0053
780 .Battle Creek, MI -0.48 -0.081 0.03 0.00444 -0.09 -0.0151 -0.04 -0.0062
1620 Chico, CA 0.21 0.035 0.03 0.00457 -0.02 -0.004 -0.02 -0.0027
2020 Daytona Beach, FL 0.77 0.1304 0.03 0.00461 0.17 0.02943 -0.01 -0.0011
3360 Houston, TX -0.18 -0.031 0.03 0.00465 -0.12 -0.0203 -0.04 -0.0068
9000 Wheeling, WV-OH -0.51 -0.087 0.03 0.00467 -0.14 -0.0231 -0.02 -0.0031
80 Akron, OH -0.35 -0.06 0.03 0.00472 -0.08 -0.0136 -0.02 -0.0035
1800 Columbus, GA-AL 5.42 0.9209 0.03 0.00476 -0.17 -0.0284 -0.03 -0.0044
6600 Racine, WI -0.22 -0.038 0.03 0.00479 -0.14 -0.024 -0.03 -0.0057
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA -0.23 -0.039 0.03 0.00488 -0.09 -0.0149 -0.02 -0.0026
6280 Pittsburgh, PA -0.42 -0.071 0.03 0.00512 -0.19 -0.032 -0.01 -0.0025
2240 Duluth, MN-WI -0.36 -0.062 0.03 0.00523 -0.10 -0.0177 -0.03 -0.0043
3720 Kalamazoo, MI -0.13 -0.023 0.03 0.00526 -0.02 -0.003 -0.02 -0.0032
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL -0.07 -0.012 0.03 0.00527 -0.10 -0.0162 -0.01 -0.0023
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Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Exports Exports
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH -0.06 -0.011 0.05 0.0077 -0.16 -0.0277 -0.03 -0.0046
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -0.46 -0.078 0.05 0.00779 -0.29 -0.0492 -0.08 -0.0136
1320 Canton, OH -0.22 -0.038 0.05 0.00792 -0.23 -0.0384 -0.03 -0.0057
1960 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-I -0.36 -0.061 0.05 0.00818 -0.32 -0.0546 -0.07 -0.0113
5170 Modesto, CA 0.18 0.0298 0.05 0.00826 -0.02 -0.0037 -0.01 -0.0025
3880 Lafayette, LA -0.05 -0.008 0.05 0.00868 -0.15 -0.0249 -0.05 -0.0078
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR -0.14 -0.023 0.06 0.00941 -0.02 -0.0039 -0.01 -0.0012
8720 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 0.05 0.0078 0.06 0.00953 -0.10 -0.0178 -0.02 -0.0028
1400 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 0.20 0.0331 0.06 0.00976 -0.02 -0.0034 -0.01 -0.0014
5910 Olympia, WA 0.03 0.0046 0.06 0.00984 -0.03 -0.0053 -0.01 -0.0023
380 Anchorage, AK 0.41 0.0696 0.06 0.01019 -0.02 -0.0034 -0.02 -0.0034
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN -0.44 -0.075 0.07 0.01219 -0.51 -0.0861 -0.03 -0.0055
6560 Pueblo, CO -0.55 -0.093 0.07 0.0125 -0.44 -0.0739 -0.03 -0.0049
AVERAGE EFFECT 0.0005 9E-05 -0.0001 -2E-05 0.0320 0.00543 -0.0003 -4E-05
ACROSS ALL SMSAs
Results are derived from data taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan Trade
Sensitivity." Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic Development,
Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, July 1990.
Table 4.32
EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT CHANGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO IMPORT, DOMESTIC, AND EXPORT FACTORS
ON LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE FOR ALL WOMEN BY SMSA
SMSA NAME Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
CODE Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Export Export
6460 Poughkeepsie, NY 0.27 0.0542 -0.20 -0.0409 0.98 0.19614 0.25 0.04992
6400 Portland, ME 0.00 0.0006 -0.14 -0.028 0.23 0.04688 0.02 0.00384
7400 San Jose, CA 0.36 0.0732 -0.12 -0.0244 0.73 0.14714 0.16 0.03166
640 Austin, TX 0.93 0.1862 -0.11 -0.0221 0.61 0.12343 0.14 0.02903
2640 Flint, MI -0.21 -0.042 -0.10 -0.0209 -0.03 -0.0064 -0.03 -0.006
4600 Lubbock, TX -0.19 -0.038 -0.10 -0.02 0.56 0.11214 0.14 0.02789
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.00 0.0002 -0.09 -0.0184 0.05 0.0107 -0.02 -0.0047
2655 Florence, SC -0.12 -0.025 -0.09 -0.0179 0.18 0.03702 0.01 0.00153
7920 Springfield, MO 0.08 0.0167 -0.08 -0.017 0.13 0.02664 -0.02 -0.0032
1080 Boise City, ID 0.33 0.0671 -0.08 -0.0164 0.45 0.09011 0.15 0.03
440 Ann Arbor, MI -0.09 -0.017 -0.07 -0.0144 0.07 0.01369 0.01 0.00144
960 Binghamton, NY -0.01 -0.002 -0.07 -0.0142 0.41 0.08212 0.05 0.00933
8520 Tucson, AZ 1.13 0.2269 -0.07 -0.0139 0.56 0.11342 0.10 0.01983
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX -0.07 -0.015 -0.07 -0.0138 0.04 0.00832 -0.01 -0.0026
7240 San Antonio, TX 0.01 0.002 -0.07 -0.0131 0.22 0.04433 0.04 0.00759
2320 El Paso, TX 0.07 0.0143 -0.06 -0.0123 0.00 0.00007 -0.01 -0.0018
4280 Lexington-Fayette, KY -0.11 -0.023 -0.06 -0.0122 0.38 0.0767 0.11 0.02149
8960 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton- 0.60 0.1211 -0.06 -0.0122 0.42 0.08489 0.10 0.02086
Delray Beach, FL
6520 Provo-Orem, UT -0.03 -0.007 -0.06 -0.0118 -0.08 -0.0152 0.01 0.00158
8680 Utica-Rome, NY -0.24 -0.047 -0.06 -0.0117 0.23 0.04627 0.04 0.00821
6200 Phoenix, AZ 0.29 0.0585 -0.05 -0.0102 0.36 0.07178 0.07 0.01307
6480 Providence-Pawtucket- -0.17 -0.034 -0.05 -0.0102 0.01 0.00114 -0.03 -0.0051
Woonsocket, RI
1120 Boston 0.05 0.0093 -0.05 -0.0094 0.26 0.05236 0.04 0.00891
4160 Lawrence 0.05 0.0093 -0.05 -0.0094 0.26 0.05236 0.04 0.00891
4560 Lowell 0.05 0.0093 -0.05 -0.0094 0.26 0.05236 0.04 0.00891
6640 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.36 0.073 -0.05 -0.0092 0.32 0.06523 0.07 0.01315
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 0.62 0.1237 -0.05 -0.0091 0.58 0.11643 0.07 0.01403
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.30 0.0599 -0.04 -0.0089 0.33 0.06557 0.08 0.01603
Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Export Export
3640 Jersey City, NJ -0.33 -0.066 -0.04 -0.0087 0.09 0.01747 -0.01 -0.0024
7480 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria- 0.21 0.0425 -0.04 -0.0079 0.42 0.08417 0.07 0.014
Lompoc, CA
2880 Gadsden, AL -0.19 -0.039 -0.04 -0.0076 -0.20 -0.0404 -0.03 -0.0058
5600 New York, NY -0.22 -0.044 -0.04 -0.0075 0.07 0.01477 -0.01 -0.0027
1720 Colorado Springs, CO 0.86 0.1735 -0.04 -0.0074 0.29 0.0576 0.05 0.01081
7160 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 0.21 0.0421 -0.03 -0.007 0.27 0.054 0.04 0.00764
7840 Spokane, WA -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.0068 0.15 0.02964 0.05 0.01008
7320 San Diego, CA 0.30 0.06 -0.03 -0.0067 0.26 0.05251 0.04 0.00744
360 Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 0.29 0.0583 -0.03 -0.0062 0.32 0.06416 0.04 0.00828
2560 Fayetteville, NC 0.16 0.0312 -0.03 -0.006 -0.00 -7E-05 -0.02 -0.0036
2680 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood- 0.15 0.0297 -0.03 -0.006 0.31 0.06181 0.04 0.00801
Pompano Beach, FL
5120 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -0.07 -0.014 -0.03 -0.006 0.29 0.05737 0.05 0.01082
6840 Rochester, NY -0.07 -0.014 -0.03 -0.0055 0.13 0.02528 -0.01 -0.0019
8320 Terre Haute, IN -0.31 -0.061 -0.03 -0.0054 0.06 0.01123 -0.01 -0.0024
4000 Lancaster, PA -0.01 -0.003 -0.03 -0.0051 0.02 0.00422 -0.01 -0.0023
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI -0.27 -0.054 -0.02 -0.005 -0.22 -0.0447 -0.02 -0.004
7485 Santa Cruz, CA 0.17 0.0341 -0.02 -0.005 0.21 0.04168 0.05 0.00922
280 Altoona, PA -0.18 -0.036 -0.02 -0.005 0.03 0.00678 -0.02 -0.0032
5880 Oklahoma City, OK 0.03 0.0069 -0.02 -0.005 0.16 0.03292 0.00 0.00097
5000 Miami-Hialeah, FL -0.03 -0.007 -0.02 -0.005 0.05 0.00982 -0.01 -0.0019
6000 Oxnard-Ventura, CA 0.70 0.1416 -0.02 -0.0049 0.23 0.04679 0.02 0.0048
240 Allentown-Bethlehem, PA-NJ -0.31 -0.063 -0.02 -0.0049 -0.03 -0.0065 -0.01 -0.0019
3440 Huntsville, AL 0.27 0.0544 -0.02 -0.0046 0.32 0.06415 0.01 0.00286
3240 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA -0.17 -0.034 -0.02 -0.0044 -0.02 -0.0043 -0.01 -0.0018
3160 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC -0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.0042 0.01 0.00184 -0.02 -0.0034
1160 Bridgeport -0.09 -0.018 -0.02 -0.0042 0.23 0.04618 0.04 0.00883
8040 Stamford -0.09 -0.018 -0.02 -0.0042 0.23 0.04618 0.04 0.00883
5760 Norwalk -0.09 -0.018 -0.02 -0.0042 0.23 0.04618 0.04 0.00883
1930 Danbury -0.09 -0.018 -0.02 -0.0042 0.23 0.04618 0.04 0.00883
3480 Indianapolis, IN -0.25 -0.05 -0.02 -0.004 0.07 0.01503 -0.01 -0.0016
9240 Worcester -0.19 -0.038 -0.02 -0.0039 0.09 0.01901 0.02 0.00445
2160 Detroit, MI -0.24 -0.047 -0.02 -0.0037 -0.09 -0.0172 -0.02 -0.0048
400 Anderson, IN -0.28 -0.057 -0.02 -0.0033 0.02 0.00402 0.02 0.00425
Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Export Export
5380 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 0.15 0.0308 -0.02 -0.0032 0.21 0.0423 0.02 0.00333
1920 Dallas, TX 0.04 0.0082 -0.02 -0.0031 0.18 0.03706 0.01 0.00144
2000 Dayton-Springfield, OH -0.19 -0.038 -0.01 -0.0028 0.04 0.00854 -0.01 -0.0029
9320 Youngstown-Warren, OH -0.39 -0.078 -0.01 -0.0027 -0.19 -0.0378 -0.03 -0.0053
8400 Toledo, OH -0.18 -0.036 -0.01 -0.0026 -0.05 -0.0092 -0.02 -0.0032
9160 Wilmington, DE-NJ-MD -0.22 -0.044 -0.01 -0.0024 -0.02 -0.0032 -0.00 -0.0007
3710 Joplin, MO 0.13 0.0255 -0.01 -0.0024 0.02 0.00351 0.00 0.00054
3810 Killeen-Temple, TX 0.16 0.0329 -0.01 -0.0022 0.31 0.06311 0.05 0.01051
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 0.33 0.0657 -0.01 -0.0021 0.09 0.01768 -0.01 -0.0013
8000 Springfield, MA -0.17 -0.034 -0.01 -0.0019 0.11 0.02116 0.01 0.00214
9140 Williamsport, PA -0.20 -0.04 -0.01 -0.0019 0.04 0.0085 -0.01 -0.002
5360 Nashville, TN 0.07 0.0134 -0.01 -0.0018 0.01 0.00225 -0.02 -0.0036
4440 Lorain-Elyria, OH -0.25 -0.05 -0.01 -0.0018 -0.15 -0.031 -0.03 -0.005
200 Albuquerque, NM -0.00 -5E-04 -0.01 -0.0018 0.21 0.04125 0.02 0.0046
4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.03 0.006 -0.01 -0.0017 0.15 0.03001 0.00 0.00016
7800 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN -0.31 -0.063 -0.01 -0.0017 0.02 0.004 -0.01 -0.0021
4720 Madison, Wl 0.04 0.0077 -0.01 -0.0016 0.06 0.01123 -0.01 -0.0014
6880 ROckford, IL -0.08 -0.016 -0.01 -0.0015 -0.02 -0.0049 -0.01 -0.0027
1760 Columbia, SC 0.09 0.0188 -0.01 -0.0015 0.10 0.01919 0.01 0.00167
3320 Honolulu, HI -0.19 -0.038 -0.01 -0.0013 0.01 0.00237 -0.02 -0.0032
5640 Newark, NJ -0.19 -0.037 -0.01 -0.001 0.06 0.01291 -0.01 -0.0014
6440 Portland, OR -0.02 -0.005 -0.01 -0.001 0.05 0.00963 0.01 0.00256
7680 Shreveport, LA -0.19 -0.038 -0.00 -0.001 0.12 0.02358 -0.01 -0.0024
6680 Reading, PA -0.16 -0.032 -0.00 -0.0003 -0.07 -0.0136 -0.01 -0.002
1280 Buffalo, NY -0.30 -0.06 -0.00 -0.0002 -0.07 -0.014 -0.02 -0.0045
1640 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN -0.13 -0.025 -0.00 -0.0001 0.03 0.0055 -0.02 -0.0032
3760 Kansas City, MO-KS -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0 0.09 0.01808 -0.01 -0.002
8560 Tulsa, OK -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00006 -0.00 -0.0008 -0.02 -0.0041
2760 Fort Wayne, IN -0.11 -0.021 0.00 0.00021 -0.04 -0.0082 -0.03 -0.0054
1840 Columbus, OH -0.11 -0.022 0.00 0.00029 0.03 0.00633 -0.01 -0.0017
6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ -0.18 -0.037 0.00 0.00055 0.06 0.01164 0.00 0.00015
7500 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 0.30 0.0602 0.00 0.00055 0.18 0.03578 0.03 0.0054
2900 Gainesville, FL 0.26 0.0528 0.00 0.00058 0.02 0.00424 0.01 0.0013

















































































































































































































































































































Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Export Export
5320 Muskegon, MI -0.14 -0.028 0.02 0.0033 -0.16 -0.0317 -0.03 -0.0056
6720 Reno, NV -0.08 -0.016 0.02 0.00347 0.09 0.0172 0.00 0.00036
3680 Johnstown, PA -0.36 -0.071 0.02 0.00353 -0.30 -0.0604 -0.02 -0.0049
860 Bellingham, WA -0.06 -0.012 0.02 0.00365 -0.13 -0.0256 0.00 0.00044
160 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY -0.21 -0.043 0.02 0.00369 -0.10 -0.0208 -0.03 -0.0051
4680 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 0.13 0.0258 0.02 0.00374 -0.09 -0.0186 -0.02 -0.0047
3000 Grand Rapids, MI 0.13 0.0255 0.02 0.00388 0.00 0.00016 -0.02 -0.0037
4400 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -0.17 -0.033 0.02 0.0039 -0.03 -0.0055 -0.02 -0.0047
1680 Cleveland, OH -0.27 -0.054 0.02 0.0041 -0.10 -0.0199 -0.02 -0.0049
2650 Florence, AL -0.17 -0.035 0.02 0.00413 -0.15 -0.0292 -0.02 -0.0049
920 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 0.41 0.0816 0.02 0.00426 -0.10 -0.0203 -0.04 -0.0084
5790 Ocala, FL 0.58 0.1156 0.02 0.00431 0.00 0.00053 -0.02 -0.0035
3400 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH -0.39 -0.078 0.02 0.00439 -0.32 -0.0641 -0.03 -0.0055
5240 Montgomery, AL 0.07 0.0138 0.02 0.00461 -0.07 -0.0144 -0.02 -0.004
460 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.01 0.0028 0.02 0.00476 -0.05 -0.0106 -0.02 -0.005
8800 Waco, TX 0.02 0.0034 0.02 0.00482 -0.04 -0.0071 -0.02 -0.0039
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.00483 -0.07 -0.015 -0.02 -0.0047
4800 Mansfield, OH -0.23 -0.046 0.02 0.00483 -0.11 -0.0227 -0.02 -0.0044
1140 Bradenton, FL 0.23 0.0469 0.02 0.00486 -0.03 -0.007 -0.01 -0.0027
1880 Corpus Christi, TX -0.10 -0.021 0.02 0.005 -0.10 -0.02 -0.00 -0.0009
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.06 -0.012 0.03 0.00504 -0.04 -0.0079 -0.03 -0.0051
720 Baltimore, MD -0.09 -0.017 0.03 0.00506 0.01 0.00123 -0.01 -0.0016
6800 Roanoke, VA -0.04 -0.008 0.03 0.0051 -0.07 -0.0134 -0.03 -0.0062
780 -Battle Creek, MI -0.48 -0.096 0.03 0.00525 -0.09 -0.0178 -0.04 -0.0073
1620 Chico, CA 0.21 0.0414 0.03 0.00541 -0.02 -0.0048 -0.02 -0.0032
2020 Daytona Beach, FL 0.77 0.1543 0.03 0.00545 0.17 0.03483 -0.01 -0.0013
3360 Houston, TX -0.18 -0.037 0.03 0.0055 -0.12 -0.024 -0.04 -0.0081
9000 Wheeling, WV-OH -0.51 -0.103 0.03 0.00552 -0.14 -0.0273 -0.02 -0.0037
80 Akron, OH -0.35 -0.071 0.03 0.00558 -0.08 -0.016 -0.02 -0.0042
1800 Columbus, GA-AL 5.42 1.0896 0.03 0.00563 -0.17 -0.0336 -0.03 -0.0052
6600 Racine, WI -0.22 -0.045 0.03 0.00567 -0.14 -0.0284 -0.03 -0.0068
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA -0.23 -0.046 0.03 0.00577 -0.09 -0.0176 -0.02 -0.003
6280 Pittsburgh, PA -0.42 -0.083 0.03 0.00606 -0.19 -0.0379 -0.01 -0.003
2240 Duluth, MN-WI -0.36 -0.073 0.03 0.00618 -0.10 -0.0209 -0.03 -0.0051
3720 Kalamazoo, MI -0.13 -0.027 0.03 0.00622 -0.02 -0.0036 -0.02 -0.0037
Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Export Export
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL -0.07 -0.014 0.03 0.00623 -0.10 -0.0192 -0.01 -0.0028
7520 Savannah, GA 0.15 0.0307 0.03 0.00627 -0.02 -0.0039 -0.01 -0.001
6920 Sacramento, CA 0.38 0.0757 0.03 0.00652 0.08 0.01591 -0.00 -0.001
7120 Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA -0.08 -0.016 0.03 0.00662 -0.07 -0.0137 -0.01 -0.0025
7880 Springfield, IL -0.51 -0.103 0.03 0.00676 -0.21 -0.0414 -0.05 -0.0106
840 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX -0.28 -0.055 0.04 0.00703 -0.15 -0.0305 0.00 0.00099
5160 Mobile, AL -0.17 -0.033 0.04 0.00705 -0.06 -0.0113 -0.01 -0.0015
8440 Topeka, KS -0.09 -0.017 0.04 0.00706 -0.00 -0.0007 -0.02 -0.0032
3120 Greensboro-Winston-Salem- 0.01 0.0019 0.04 0.00713 -0.04 -0.0085 -0.02 -0.0035
HighPoint, NC
6120 Peoria, IL -0.42 -0.083 0.04 0.00714 -0.29 -0.0585 -0.07 -0.0146
3740 Kankakee, IL -0.50 -0.1 0.04 0.00721 -0.02 -0.0038 -0.01 -0.0029
3960 Lake Charles, LA -0.30 -0.06 0.04 0.00721 -0.16 -0.0318 0.02 0.00373
2920 Galveston-Texas City, TX -0.20 -0.04 0.04 0.00725 -0.19 -0.0389 0.01 0.00229
8200 Tacoma, WA -0.13 -0.027 0.04 0.00728 -0.09 -0.0183 -0.01 -0.0024
5560 New Orleans, LA -0.21 -0.042 0.04 0.00733 -0.05 -0.0106 -0.01 -0.0021
8120 Stockton, CA 0.21 0.042 0.04 0.00733 -0.04 -0.0079 -0.01 -0.0029
1480 Charlseton, WV -0.41 -0.083 0.04 0.00735 -0.21 -0.0416 0.01 0.00182
2840 Fresno, CA -0.02 -0.004 0.04 0.00743 -0.07 -0.0138 -0.02 -0.0047
4890 Medford, OR -0.02 -0.003 0.04 0.00747 0.05 0.01028 0.00 0.00007
4120 Las Vegas, NV 0.22 0.0441 0.04 0.00762 -0.04 -0.0089 -0.02 -0.0034
7720 Sioux City, IA-NE -0.05 -0.011 0.04 0.00766 -0.04 -0.008 -0.01 -0.0017
2120 Des Moines, IA -0.21 -0.042 0.04 0.00773 -0.07 -0.0147 -0.02 -0.0048
3980 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL -0.07 -0.014 0.04 0.00779 -0.05 -0.0099 -0.02 -0.0035
680 Bakersfield, CA 0.00 0.0006 0.04 0.00787 -0.06 -0.0127 -0.02 -0.0041
8240 Tallhassee, FL 0.48 0.0956 0.04 0.00791 -0.01 -0.0015 -0.02 -0.0049
3600 Jacksonville, FL 0.07 0.015 0.04 0.00792 -0.06 -0.0113 -0.01 -0.0018
5520 New London-Norwich, CT -0.02 -0.005 0.04 0.00797 -0.13 -0.0253 -0.02 -0.0048
5200 Monroe, LA 0.10 0.0198 0.04 0.00828 -0.00 -0.0007 -0.01 -0.0026
600 Augusta, GA 0.03 0.0062 0.04 0.00839 -0.08 -0.0154 -0.02 -0.0033
7080 Salem, OR -0.14 -0.029 0.04 0.00862 -0.04 -0.0088 -0.02 -0.004
7760 Sioux Falls, SD -0.00 -6E-04 0.04 0.00873 -0.00 -0.0008 -0.02 -0.0032
1000 Birmingham, AL -0.24 -0.047 0.04 0.00883 -0.20 -0.0397 -0.02 -0.0044
7610 Sharon, PA -0.44 -0.088 0.04 0.00883 -0.39 -0.0792 -0.03 -0.0061
760 Baton Rouge, LA -0.26 -0.051 0.04 0.00895 -0.16 -0.032 0.00 0.00085
Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change %Change Imports Imports Domes Domes Export Export
3290 Hickory, NC 0.05 0.0106 0.04 0.00898 -0.08 -0.0167 -0.02 -0.0033
6080 Pensacola, FL -0.18 -0.036 0.05 0.00905 -0.03 -0.0064 0.00 0.00057
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH -0.06 -0.013 0.05 0.00911 -0.16 -0.0327 -0.03 -0.0054
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -0.46 -0.093 0.05 0.00922 -0.29 -0.0582 -0.08 -0.0161
1320 Canton, OH -0.22 -0.045 0.05 0.00937 -0.23 -0.0454 -0.03 -0.0067
1960 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-Il -0.36 -0.072 0.05 0.00968 -0.32 -0.0646 -0.07 -0.0133
5170 Modesto, CA 0.18 0.0352 0.05 0.00977 -0.02 -0.0044 -0.01 -0.003
3880 Lafayette, LA -0.05 -0.009 0.05 0.01027 -0.15 -0.0295 -0.05 -0.0092
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR -0.14 -0.028 0.06 0.01114 -0.02 -0.0046 -0.01 -0.0014
8720 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 0.05 0.0093 0.06 0.01128 -0.10 -0.021 -0.02 -0.0034
1400 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 0.20 0.0392 0.06 0.01154 -0.02 -0.004 -0.01 -0.0016
5910 Olympia, WA 0.03 0.0054 0.06 0.01164 -0.03 -0.0063 -0.01 -0.0027
380 Anchorage, AK 0.41 0.0824 0.06 0.01205 -0.02 -0.004 -0.02 -0.004
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN -0.44 -0.089 0.07 0.01442 -0.51 -0.1019 -0.03 -0.0065
6560 Pueblo, CO -0.55 -0.11 0.07 0.01479 -0.44 -0.0875 -0.03 -0.0058
AVERAGE EFFECT 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0001 -3E-05 0.0320 0.00642 -0.0003 -5E-05
ACROSS ALL SMSAs
Results are derived from data taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan Trade
Sensitivity." Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic Development,
Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, July 1990.
Table 4.33
EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT CHANGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO IMPORT, DOMESTIC, AND EXPORT FACTORS
ON LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE FOR ALL MEN BY SMSA
SMSA NAME Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
CODE Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change % Change Imports % Imports Domes % Domes Exports % Exports
6460 Poughkeepsie, NY 0.27 0.0298361 -0.20 -0.022494 0.98 0.1078845 0.25 0.0274593
6400 Portland, ME 0.00 0.0003503 -0.14 -0.015418 0.23 0.025783 0.02 0.0021128
7400 San Jose, CA 0.36 0.0402706 -0.12 -0.013422 0.73 0.0809291 0.16 0.0174115
640 Austin, TX 0.93 0.1024004 -0.11 -0.012135 0.61 0.067889 0.14 0.015965
2640 Flint, MI -0.21 -0.023145 -0.10 -0.011479 -0.03 -0.003494 -0.03 -0.003282
4600 Lubbock, TX -0.19 -0.021173 -0.10 -0.011025 0.56 0.0616778 0.14 0.0153429
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.00 0.0001315 -0.09 -0.010115 0.05 0.0058852 -0.02 -0.002559
2655 Florence, SC -0.12 -0.013777 -0.09 -0.009844 0.18 0.020364 0.01 0.0008442
7920 Springfield, MO 0.08 0.0092124 -0.08 -0.009334 0.13 0.0146545 -0.02 -0.001772
1080 Boise City, ID 0.33 0.036928 -0.08 -0.009006 0.45 0.0495648 0.15 0.0164988
440 Ann Arbor, MI -0.09 -0.009607 -0.07 -0.007947 0.07 0.0075317 0.01 0.0007912
960 Binghamton, NY -0.01 -0.000965 -0.07 -0.007825 0.41 0.045168 0.05 0.0051327
8520 Tucson, AZ 1.13 0.1247755 -0.07 -0.007618 0.56 0.062385 0.10 0.0109052
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX -0.07 -0.008167 -0.07 -0.007615 0.04 0.0045747 -0.01 -0.001443
7240 San Antonio, TX 0.01 0.0010895 -0.07 -0.007224 0.22 0.0243829 0.04 0.0041758
2320 El Paso, TX 0.07 0.0078466 -0.06 -0.006774 0.00 0.0000387 -0.01 -0.000986
4280 Lexington-Fayette, KY -0.11 -0.012637 -0.06 -0.006705 0.38 0.0421856 0.11 0.0118213
8960 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton- 0.60 0.0666006 -0.06 -0.006704 0.42 0.0466907 0.10 0.0114754
Delray Beach, FL
6520 Provo-Orem, UT -0.03 -0.003781 -0.06 -0.006475 -0.08 -0.008335 0.01 0.0008685
8680 Utica-Rome, NY -0.24 -0.026076 -0.06 -0.006459 0.23 0.0254515 0.04 0.0045183
6200 Phoenix, AZ 0.29 0.0321997 -0.05 -0.005613 0.36 0.0394817 0.07 0.0071902
6480 Providence-Pawtucket- -0.17 -0.018575 -0.05 -0.005606 0.01 0.0006287 -0.03 -0.00278
Woonsocket, RI
1120 Boston 0.05 0.0051139 -0.05 -0.005174 0.26 0.0287996 0.04 0.0049007
4160 Lawrence 0.05 0.0051139 -0.05 -0.005174 0.26 0.0287996 0.04 0.0049007
4560 Lowell 0.05 0.0051139 -0.05 -0.005174 0.26 0.0287996 0.04 0.0049007
6640 Raleigh-Durham, NC 0.36 0.0401413 -0.05 -0.005075 0.32 0.0358782 0.07 0.0072322
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 0.62 0.0680183 -0.05 -0.004993 0.58 0.0640403 0.07 0.0077184
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.30 0.0329467 -0.04 -0.004893 0.33 0.0360672 0.08 0.0088146
Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change % Change Imports % Imports Domes % Domes Exports % Exports
3640 Jersey City, NJ -0.33 -0.036204 -0.04 -0.00477 0.09 0.0096069 -0.01 -0.001306
7480 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria- 0.21 0.0233531 -0.04 -0.004319 0.42 0.046294 0.07 0.0076985
Lompoc, CA
2880 Gadsden, AL -0.19 -0.021434 -0.04 -0.004178 -0.20 -0.022245 -0.03 -0.003192
5600 New York, NY -0.22 -0.024324 -0.04 -0.004128 0.07 0.0081251 -0.01 -0.001488
1720 Colorado Springs, CO 0.86 0.0954444 -0.04 -0.004052 0.29 0.0316804 0.05 0.0059449
7160 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 0.21 0.0231288 -0.03 -0.003823 0.27 0.0296991 0.04 0.0042034
7840 Spokane, WA -0.05 -0.00556 -0.03 -0.003733 0.15 0.0163043 0.05 0.0055416
7320 San Diego, CA 0.30 0.0330041 -0.03 -0.003687 0.26 0.0288814 0.04 0.004094
360 Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 0.29 0.0320572 -0.03 -0.003388 0.32 0.0352915 0.04 0.0045526
2560 Fayetteville, NC 0.16 0.0171883 -0.03 -0.003319 -0.00 -3.98E-05 -0.02 -0.002003
2680 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood- 0.15 0.0163463 -0.03 -0.003311 0.31 0.0339964 0.04 0.0044078
Pompano Beach, FL
5120 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -0.07 -0.007727 -0.03 -0.003303 0.29 0.0315555 0.05 0.0059504
6840 Rochester, NY -0.07 -0.007539 -0.03 -0.003002 0.13 0.013902 -0.01 -0.001021
8320 Terre Haute, IN -0.31 -0.033707 -0.03 -0.002997 0.06 0.0061792 -0.01 -0.001328
4000 Lancaster, PA -0.01 -0.001406 -0.03 -0.002787 0.02 0.0023194 -0.01 -0.001254
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI -0.27 -0.029946 -0.02 -0.002748 -0.22 -0.024584 -0.02 -0.002202
7485 Santa Cruz, CA 0.17 0.0187485 -0.02 -0.002747 0.21 0.0229243 0.05 0.0050731
280 Altoona, PA -0.18 -0.020018 -0.02 -0.002746 0.03 0.0037305 -0.02 -0.00177
5880 Oklahoma City, OK 0.03 0.0037791 -0.02 -0.002727 0.16 0.0181087 0.00 0.0005326
5000 Miami-Hialeah, FL -0.03 -0.003578 -0.02 -0.002723 0.05 0.0054035 -0.01 -0.001041
6000 Oxnard-Ventura, CA 0.70 0.0778915 -0.02 -0.002712 0.23 0.0257366 0.02 0.0026376
240 Allentown-Bethlehem, PA-NJ -0.31 -0.034602 -0.02 -0.002693 -0.03 -0.00358 -0.01 -0.001028
3440 Huntsville, AL 0.27 0.0299223 -0.02 -0.002506 0.32 0.035286 0.01 0.0015724
3240 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA -0.17 -0.018779 -0.02 -0.002446 -0.02 -0.002359 -0.01 -0.00097
3160 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC -0.10 -0.011111 -0.02 -0.002332 0.01 0.0010111 -0.02 -0.001863
1160 Bridgeport -0.09 -0.00977 -0.02 -0.002318 0.23 0.0253995 0.04 0.0048565
8040 Stamford -0.09 -0.00977 -0.02 -0.002318 0.23 0.0253995 0.04 0.0048565
5760 Norwalk -0.09 -0.00977 -0.02 -0.002318 0.23 0.0253995 0.04 0.0048565
1930 Danbury -0.09 -0.00977 -0.02 -0.002318 0.23 0.0253995 0.04 0.0048565
3480 Indianapolis, IN -0.25 -0.027499 -0.02 -0.002214 0.07 0.0082654 -0.01 -0.000869
9240 Worcester -0.19 -0.020908 -0.02 -0.002166 0.09 0.0104533 0.02 0.0024476
2160 Detroit, MI -0.24 -0.026045 -0.02 -0.002046 -0.09 -0.009469 -0.02 -0.002651
400 Anderson, IN -0.28 -0.031453 -0.02 -0.001791 0.02 0.0022111 0.02 0.0023393
Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change % Change Imports % Imports Domes % Domes Exports % Exports
5380 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 0.15 0.0169385 -0.02 -0.001738 0.21 0.0232636 0.02 0.0018321
1920 Dallas, TX 0.04 0.0045161 -0.02 -0.00168 0.18 0.0203861 0.01 0.0007912
2000 Dayton-Springfield, OH -0.19 -0.02106 -0.01 -0.001527 0.04 0.0046974 -0.01 -0.001575
9320 Youngstown-Warren, OH -0.39 -0.042651 -0.01 -0.001506 -0.19 -0.020808 -0.03 -0.002909
8400 Toledo, OH -0.18 -0.019738 -0.01 -0.001456 -0.05 -0.005084 -0.02 -0.001737
9160 Wilmington, DE-NJ-MD -0.22 -0.024208 -0.01 -0.00132 -0.02 -0.001755 -0.00 -0.00039
3710 Joplin, MO 0.13 0.0140335 -0.01 -0.001314 0.02 0.0019282 0.00 0.0002961
3810 Killeen-Temple, TX 0.16 0.0180911 -0.01 -0.00123 0.31 0.0347125 0.05 0.0057825
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 0.33 0.0361169 -0.01 -0.001144 0.09 0.0097229 -0.01 -0.00069
8000 Springfield, MA -0.17 -0.018493 -0.01 -0.001039 0.11 0.0116379 0.01 0.0011757
9140 Williamsport, PA -0.20 -0.022056 -0.01 -0.001039 0.04 0.004673 -0.01 -0.001091
5360 Nashville, TN 0.07 0.0073902 -0.01 -0.000991 0.01 0.0012398 -0.02 -0.001962
4440 Lorain-Elyria, OH -0.25 -0.027478 -0.01 -0.000979 -0.15 -0.017024 -0.03 -0.002767
200 Albuquerque, NM -0.00 -0.000267 -0.01 -0.000977 0.21 0.0226912 0.02 0.0025316
4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.03 0.0033051 -0.01 -0.000946 0.15 0.0165065 0.00 0.0000884
7800 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN -0.31 -0.034604 -0.01 -0.000916 0.02 0.0021978 -0.01 -0.00117
4720 Madison, WI 0.04 0.0042399 -0.01 -0.000894 0.06 0.0061758 -0.01 -0.000785
6880 ROckford, IL -0.08 -0.008647 -0.01 -0.000825 -0.02 -0.002715 -0.01 -0.001505
1760 Columbia, SC 0.09 0.0103163 -0.01 -0.000801 0.10 0.0105528 0.01 0.0009183
3320 Honolulu, HI -0.19 -0.020721 -0.01 -0.000716 0.01 0.0013017 -0.02 -0.001737
5640 Newark, NJ -0.19 -0.020624 -0.01 -0.000576 0.06 0.0071018 -0.01 -0.00077
6440 Portland, OR -0.02 -0.002516 -0.01 -0.000553 0.05 0.0052985 0.01 0.0014089
7680 Shreveport, LA -0.19 -0.02068 -0.00 -0.00053 0.12 0.0129705 -0.01 -0.001316
6680 Reading, PA -0.16 -0.017669 -0.00 -0.000147 -0.07 -0.00749 -0.01 -0.001114
1280 Buffalo, NY -0.30 -0.033175 -0.00 -9.83E-05 -0.07 -0.00769 -0.02 -0.002454
1640 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN -0.13 -0.013999 -0.00 -5.75E-05 0.03 0.0030266 -0.02 -0.001785
3760 Kansas City, MO-KS -0.05 -0.005525 0.00 0 0.09 0.009945 -0.01 -0.001105
8560 Tulsa, OK -0.05 -0.00569 0.00 0.0000354 -0.00 -0.00043 -0.02 -0.002235
2760 Fort Wayne, IN -0.11 -0.011807 0.00 0.0001182 -0.04 -0.004487 -0.03 -0.002964
1840 Columbus, OH -0.11 -0.011933 0.00 0.0001591 0.03 0.0034796 -0.01 -0.000923
6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ -0.18 -0.020193 0.00 0.0003039 0.06 0.0064013 0.00 0.0000851
7500 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 0.30 0.0331224 0.00 0.000305 0.18 0.0196801 0.03 0.0029691
2900 Gainesville, FL 0.26 0.029025 0.00 0.0003182 0.02 0.0023316 0.01 0.0007127
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Total Total Employ LFPR Employ LFPR Employ LFPR
Employ LFPR Change Change Change Change Change Change
Change % Change Imports % Imports Domes % Domes Exports % Exports
3290 Hickory, NC 0.05 0.0058377 0.04 0.0049382 -0.08 -0.009186 -0.02 -0.001831
6080 Pensacola, FL -0.18 -0.019792 0.05 0.004978 -0.03 -0.003535 0.00 0.000316
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH -0.06 -0.00712 0.05 0.0050101 -0.16 -0.017996 -0.03 -0.002992
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -0.46 -0.050894 0.05 0.0050697 -0.29 -0.031997 -0.08 -0.008837
1320 Canton, OH -0.22 -0.024577 0.05 0.0051559 -0.23 -0.024979 -0.03 -0.003677
1960 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-I -0.36 -0.039528 0.05 0.0053217 -0.32 -0.035512 -0.07 -0.007337
5170 Modesto, CA 0.18 0.0193651 0.05 0.0053725 -0.02 -0.002402 -0.01 -0.001638
3880 Lafayette, LA -0.05 -0.005208 0.05 0.0056488 -0.15 -0.016225 -0.05 -0.005045
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR -0.14 -0.015183 0.06 0.0061261 -0.02 -0.002549 -0.01 -0.000791
8720 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 0.05 0.0050996 0.06 0.0062024 -0.10 -0.011552 -0.02 -0.001845
1400 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 0.20 0.0215597 0.06 0.0063482 -0.02 -0.002189 -0.01 -0.000901
5910 Olympia, WA 0.03 0.0029879 0.06 0.0064013 -0.03 -0.003455 -0.01 -0.001482
380 Anchorage, AK 0.41 0.045305 0.06 0.00663 -0.02 -0.00221 -0.02 -0.00221
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN -0.44 -0.048715 0.07 0.0079339 -0.51 -0.056028 -0.03 -0.00355
6560 Pueblo, CO -0.55 -0.060494 0.07 0.0081372 -0.44 -0.048121 -0.03 -0.00318
co
Cq
AVERAGE EFFECT 0.0005 0.0000576 -0.0001 -1.43E-05 0.0320 0.0035335 -0.0003 -2.80E-05
ACROSS ALL SMSAs
Results are derived from data taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan Trade
Sensitivity." Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic Development,
Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, July 1990.
in which they reside. This is particularly true for workers who
are women, for those who are less-educated, and for those who are
either African-American or Hispanic. However, I did not find
support for my related hypotheses that workers' hours of work and
probability of being employed are also influenced by the import-
sensitivity of the SMSA in which they reside. My results also
show that a metropolitan area's mean level of earnings and its
labor force participation rate are affected by the vulnerability
of its industry structure to imports. Here again, the results
are strongest for women's earnings and rate of labor force
participation. However, the model showed negligible real effects
for men.
The fact that the strongest effects in both models are found
for workers who are women, less-educated, African-American or
Hispanic is consistent with the notion that these labor force
groups are the least geographically mobile and hence are most
affected by the vicissitudes of local labor markets. Following a
labor demand shock, these labor force groups are in the weakest
position to maintain their earnings levels by virtue of being the
most confined to locally-available employment opportunities, as
compared with men and the better-educated who are in a better
position to change their geographic residence in order to
maintain wage levels. This may account for my findings that the
earnings of these more vulnerable groups are more elastic in
response to a drop in labor demand brought about by an increase
in imports, or any other factor.
In addition to having comparatively less geographic
mobility, another possible reason that women may feel the effects
of import penetration on their earnings more strongly than men is
that a higher proportion of jobs in import-sensitive industries
are held by women. Between 1982 and 1987, women held an average
of 41.8 percent of jobs in import-sensitive manufacturing,
compared with 32.4 percent of jobs in manufacturing as a whole.
However, over the same time period 2.8 percent of all jobs were
lost in import-sensitive manufacturing compared with only 2
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percent of jobs held by women in the same trade-sensitive
industries (U.S. Department of Labor, 1991). Hence, it does not
appear that women lost jobs in trade-sensitive manufacturing at a
disproportionate rate when compared with men.
Given the fact that women's labor supply is documented to be
more elastic than men's in response to wages, it is surprising
that stronger results don't emerge in the microdata employment
probability equations whereas they do show up in the SMSA-level
equation predicting women's labor force participation rates. A
possible explanation for the difference between the microdata and
SMSA-level employment results is that the microdata model is less
well-specified because of its failure to account for the
influence of in-migration. If the effects of in-migration are
stronger on the probability of being employed than they are on
wages, this could explain the fact that the microdata results
support my assertion of the influence of imports on wages but not
my assertion of their influence on employment.
On an issue related to in-migration, I was curious to see
whether I could discern the influence of immigration on any of my
results for earnings and employment. Given Topel's and Brauer's
findings of regional effects related to immigration in the west,
I reexamined my results to see whether the dummy variable for the
Pacific region might be picking up an immigration effect. In the
microdata regression equations, the only labor force groups with
a statistically significant coefficient for the Pacific region
variable were women with a high school education or less and
Blacks and Hispanics. Because immigration is thought by some to
negatively affect the earnings of less-educated native-born U.S.
workers, particularly Blacks, and also other resident immigrant
workers, it makes sense that these three labor force groups might
be most sensitive to immigration effects. However, in the case
of both regression equations, the coefficient for the Pacific
region is positive. In the case of Blacks and Hispanics, the
inclusion of all education groups may make discerning any
immigration effects impossible. For less-educated women, the
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majority of whom are White, the literature on the
substitutability of their labor with that of immigrants is less
clear.
In order to perform a more complete comparison of my
microdata and SMSA-level results on the influence of import-
sensitivity on earnings, I performed an additional microdata
regression analysis on All Workers (Table 4.34). My interest is
in seeing whether the results of the earnings analysis on all
workers, women, and men are each roughly comparable in terms of
the magnitude and direction of the predicted change in earnings
precipitated by a change in employment demand.
Table 4.35 presents data on the same counterfactual analysis
for All Workers that I performed for men and women separately
(Tables 4.4 and 4.9), indicating the change in earnings from
living in an SMSA with a 7 percent positive or negative shift in
employment demand. From the counterfactual analysis, it is
possible to calculate the estimated dollar decline in annual
earnings (calculated on the basis of 2000 hours of work per year)
from a one percent shift in employment. For All Workers, the
microdata model predicts that a one percent decline in employment
demand will result in a $73 drop in annual earnings. For the
same labor force group, the SMSA model estimates a drop in
earnings which is very similar -- $60 for each one percent
decline in employment.
The estimates for the change in earnings for men and women
from a one percent change in employment demand are also very
similar between the two models. The microdata model shows a
change of $74 annually for each one percent change in employment
compared with $90 from the SMSA model. The comparable figures
for men are a change of $71 from the microdata model and $45 from
the SMSA model. In each case, the estimates are in the same
direction and, especially in the case of all workers and women,
are of a similar magnitude.
Where the microdata and SMSA regression models differ most
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each of the labor force groups. In the microdata model, the
estimate for the elasticity of each group's earnings with respect
to labor demand is nearly identical. In the SMSA model, however,
the earnings change for women is estimated to be twice that of
men. A possible explanation for this is that the SMSA model
estimates the change in annual earnings from a one percent change
in employment, whereas the microdata model estimates the change
in hourly earnings. Since the annual earnings data incorporate
information on both wages and hours of employment, one might
expect more variance among labor market groups in their annual
earnings than in their hourly wages.
Having ascertained that import competition does appear to
play a role in the wage and employment prospects of different
groups of workers in local labor markets, in the next chapter I
address the question of what dynamics underlie this result. In
particular, I attempt to place my findings in the context of the
complex relationship between the changing nature of how
production is organized across space; the shifting distribution
of risk and uncertainty across geography and across labor market




In this final chapter, I begin by briefly reviewing my major
findings and presenting a critique of my research methodology. I
then attempt to place my findings in the broader context of the
current wave of global restructuring which has resulted in new
forms of labor market segmentation and increasing economic
inequality across space and between demographic groups.
A. Summary of Findings
In this study, I examined the role of increasing import
competition in the dramatic decline in the economic position of
less-educated U.S. workers between 1979 and 1989. I began by
documenting that for high school dropouts and high school
graduates, earnings over this decade either were stagnant or
declined. I also found that, in contrast to the previous decade
of the 1970s, most age cohorts of less-educated workers did not
see their earnings improve over the 1980s as their level of work
experience increased.
As a first step in ascertaining whether the large growth in
imports over the 1980s played a role in these earnings trends for
less-educated workers, I confirmed that less-educated workers
lost employment in import-competing industries at a
disproporationate rate when compared with workers in other
industry categories. However, when less-educated workers were
divided into high school dropouts and high school graduates, I
found that the distinction based on industry import-sensitivity
was valid only for high school graduates because high school
dropouts experienced devastating employment losses across all
industries.
To examine the role of import competition in local labor
markets, I ran two regression models. The first estimated the
effects of living in a metropolitan area with an import-sensitive
industry structure on workers' earnings, probability of
employment, and annual hours of work. This model found strong
local labor market effects on earnings, particularly for less-
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educated, women, Black, and Hispanic workers, but not on the
probability of employment or annual hours of work. The second
regression model estimated the effects of import-sensitivity on a
metropolitan area's mean level of annual earnings and its labor
force participation rate and found that metropolitan import-
sensitivity had significant effects. The results were strongest
for women's earnings and labor force participation rates, with
negligible real effects for men.
B. Critique of Research Methodology
Overall, my research provides support for the notion that
import penetration has played a role in the declining economic
position of less-skilled workers, particularly those who are
women, African-American, or Hispanic. However, my research does
suffer from several limitations which it is important to keep in
mind when evaluating my findings.
I have argued for the importance of examining employment and
earnings trends at the level of local labor markets because of
the variety of local experience that national or regional data
can mask. In his review of The Wage Curve by Blanchflower and
Oswald, Card writes:
1... One can also imagine a growing body of work that
follows The Wage Curve's lead in using the diverse
experiences of local labor markets as an 'intermediate
level' laboratory for economic research -- part way
between the individualistic focus of traditional
microeconomic research, and the aggregate focus of
traditional microeconometrics. More than any other
lesson, this may be the long-run contribution of The
Wage Curve."i
However, the very richness of information found in local
labor market data also presents its own difficulties when
attempting to model wage and employment trends, as I have done.
One difficulty arises when choosing the appropriate timeframe to
examine. When analyzing national labor market trends, accepted
Card, David. 1994, p. 798.
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practice is to choose a timeframe with beginning and end years
that fall at the same point
ideally from peak to peak.
necessarily follow national
tremendous variance in the
Some metropolitan economies
earlier than others, largel
the variety of factors that
Cities with an industry mix
in the national business cycle,
But local economies do not
economic trends, exhibiting
volatility of their economic cycles.
tend to go into an economic downtown
y dependent on their industry mix and
are causing the economic slowdown.
that is heavily weighted with durable
goods industries tend to be more recession-prone than those with
a mix that is more heavily weighted with education or public
sector activities.
Perhaps even more important in regard to my model, local
labor markets vary tremendously in their sensitivity to import
and export cycles. As an example, the automobile manufacturing
industry virtually collapsed between 1979 and 1982, but then
underwent a strong recovery over the remainder of the decade. By
choosing a 'peak to peak' timeframe of 1979 to 1989, as I have
done, the full impact of this local variation washes out. This
is not an easy problem to solve if one wishes to go beyond a
purely case study approach of examining one local labor market or
even one local industry at a time. However, it is important to
consider the timing of the economic phenomena one is trying to
model and, if it doesn't fall within the usual peak to peak
timeframe, ascertaining whether the model can be adjusted to
reflect this.
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In terms of my attempt to model the effect of imports on
local labor markets, the timing question is very germane,
although at the outset of my research I could not have foreseen
how germane it would become. Apart from the issue of the
business cycle previously discussed, I chose the 1979 to 1989
timeframe because this was a period during which the quantity of
imports soared. Moreover, unlike the level of exports which were
depressed by the high value of the dollar in the early years of
the decade but had recovered by the close of the 1980s, the level
of imports was devoid of large fluctuations, instead showing a
steady increase.
From the vantage point of 1997, however, the examination of
the 1980s emerges as a less-than-ideal choice because of how the
composition of imported goods has changed over the 1990s. Over
the 1980s, the lion's share of imports consisted of goods from
other advanced industrialized countries, primarily Europe and
Japan, whereas over the 1990s, the level of U.S. imports
originating from less-developed countries increased
significantly. Clearly the wage differentials between workers in
the United States and those in other advanced industrial
countries is far smaller than that between the U.S. and less-
developed countries. One would expect, then, that the 1990s
would be the ideal timeframe in which to assess the role of
increasing imports on wages.
While the 1990s is perhaps a preferred time period for
examining the effects of trade on wages and employment when
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compared with the 1980s, Rodrik (1997) points out that even trade
between advanced industrialized countries (North-North trade) can
affect labor market outcomes. Rodrik argues that trade affects
the position of labor through two distinct but reinforcing
mechanisms: an inward shift in the demand curve for less-skilled
labor; and an increase in the elasticity of demand for less-
skilled labor. An inward shift in the demand curve for labor
results from trade between two countries where one is
significantly more abundant in low-skilled labor, for example
between the U.S. and China. An increase in the elasticity of
demand for labor does not require large differentials in either
wages or the supply of unskilled labor between the two trading
countries, according to Rodrik. Instead, the presence of trade
increases the substitutability of labor in one country with that
in another, regardless of each country's relative positions in
regard to factor endowments. This increase in elasticity then
results in the decreased ability of workers to bargain in the
workplace and to force employers to assume nonwage costs such as
health insurance. It also reduces workers' power to minimize the
volatility of their earnings and working hours. According to
Rodrik,
"There are reasons, then, to think that the main
impact of globalization on labor markets may well be
the increase in the (actual or perceived) elasticity of
demand for unskilled workers and not the reduction in
this demand per se. That is, workers now find
themselves in an environment in which they can be more
easily 'exchanged' for workers in other countries. For
those who lack the skills to make themselves hard to
replace, the result is greater insecurity and a more
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precarious existence." 2
Rodrik admits that the evidence for an increase in the
elasticity of demand for labor is scant, citing preliminary
econometric studies by Slaughter (1996) and Richardson and
Khripounova (1996) which suggest that the elasticity of demand
for labor in the United States has increased since the 1960s. He
also makes the point that an increase in the elasticity of demand
for labor is consistent with "the sentiments expressed by those
on the front line of labor markets." 3 It is certainly consistent
with several simultaneous developments in U.S. labor markets such
as the steep decline in the share of the workforce under
collective bargaining agreements, the increase in the share of
the workforce which has no access to employer-provided health
care, and the growing share of the workforce which can be
described as contingent workers. I will return to a discussion
of this increase in the "precariousness" of work further on. But
if Rodrik is correct that international trade may have profound
effects on the labor market regardless of the trading partners
involved, then trade during the 1980s may still have been
responsbile for some share of the decline in earnings among less-
skilled workers and the growth of wage inequality overall.
Ideally, one would like to be able to compare the effects of
trade on wages and employment in 1980s to that in the 1990s,
rather than being confined to only one time period.
2 Rodrik, 1997, pp. 26-27.
Ibid, p. 27.
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A second limitation of my econometric models is that I did
not incorporate information about immigration. This limitation
is not caused by investigating local labor market effects per se
but is exacerbated by the diversity of local labor markets with
respect to immigration. Of the two hundred and eleven SMSA's I
included in my econometric models, some had levels of immigration
over the 1980s which were negligible while others, such as New
York, Miami, or El Paso, were major destination points for
immigrant workers. Not only are there wide differences among
cities in terms of the number of immigrants, but also in terms of
the mix of immigrant groups with respect to country of origin,
educational attainment, and occupation. A city which is
attracting immigrant healthcare professionals, for example, will
experience the impact of immigration in a very different way than
one attracting a large population of immigrants engaged in
unskilled, low-wage labor. In the former case, the immigrant
population will not compete directly with native less-educated
workers, whereas in the latter case they could very well be.
Even in the more limited case of less-skilled immigrants
competing with less-skilled natives, however, the evidence on the
impact on wages and employment remains controversial. According
to a recent report from the National Research Council (1997), a
review of immigration studies reveals few consequences for
native-born workers regardless of their race, gender, or skill
level. According to the report, this is largely because
immigrants tend to settle in different places than the native
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groups they primarily compete with. Instead, it is the waves of
immigrants who have immediately preceded the current influx who
feel the most negative effects on their labor market position.
However, other recent studies by Topel (1994), Borjas, Freeman,
and Katz (1991), and Card and Freeman (1993) discussed in my
literature review each argue that immigration plays a central
role in the widening earning disparities between more and less-
skilled U.S. workers.
Whether or not one wants to argue for a nation-wide effect
of immigration on wage levels or wage inequality by educational
attainment, there appears to be less controversy over the
likelihood of local labor market effects, particularly in cities
that are destination points for less-skilled new immigrants.
Modelling these effects requires having not only detailed SMSA-
specific information on gross immigration levels, but ideally on
immigration levels by age, education, country of origin, gender,
race, and occupation as well. This is a significant undertaking,
especially given that new immigrants are under-represented in
survey data such as the Current Population Survey and the
decennial census. As an initial step, it might be possible to
classify cities as more or less sensitive to the effects of an
influx of less-skilled immigrants, much the same way I did for
import-sensitivity. When I began my research, the available
literature on immigration was clearly on the side of immigration
being a minor consideration when considering its effects on wages
and employment. Now that more recent research is reevaluating
298
those early conclusions, it would certainly be valuable to be
able to incorporate immigration effects into local labor market
models.
B. Placing My Findings in a Broader Context
Given these limitations, what does my research show on a
broader level and what is the larger context in which it must be
understood? The clearest conclusion that can be drawn from my
analysis is that local labor markets do matter. In spite of all
the emphasis on global economic integration of late, we are far
from a world or even a national labor market where local
variation counts for little. In my review of the literature, I
cited Topel's findings that "distinctly local factors affect
relative wages" and that "the extent of labor markets is limited
by geography, at least in the intermediate run." 4 My findings of
significant local labor market effects on both earnings and labor
force participation rates are consistent with this view of
Topel's, as well as others such as Borjas and Ramey (1995), also
discussed earlier. My results also show that women, African-
American, Hispanic, and less-educated workers have been the most
vulnerable to the local labor market effects of import
penetration.
At the heart of the assertion of Topel and others that local
labor market differentials are an important focus for examination
is an acknowledgement of the fact that local labor markets don't
4 Topel, 1994, p. 17.
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clear, at least in the short to intermediate term. This
acknowledgement of the existence of local labor market
imperfections and the relative immobility of labor compared with
capital also underlies the approach taken by Burtless, and
myself, which I examined in chapter three. Burtless examined
whether trade-sensitive industries shed less-skilled workers at a
faster rate than non-trade-sensitive industries over the 1980s.
He concluded that they did not, a conclusion which I challenged
and which Burtless took to be evidence that trade was not
responsible for growing wage inequality. In spite of our
different conclusions, we both worked from the premise that the
theorized link between trade and wage declines for less-skilled
workers lies through the mechanism of worker displacement and the
imperfect labor market adjustment processes which follow. This
displacement is significant precisely because workers leaving one
job or sector don't necessarily get reemployed somewhere else in
the short or even intermediate run, and certainly not always at
their previous wages. The centrality of the assumption that
local labor markets don't clear, and that the consequences of
this are greater for some labor force groups than others, is one
factor which distinguishes Burtless' approach, and the approach
of this thesis, from a strict general equilibrium framework.
In fact, there are several reasons why a continued
examination of local labor markets may be of increasing
importance to our understanding of the recent rise in economic
inequality. These reasons concern the relationship between the
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changing nature of how production is organized across space; the
shifting distribution of risk and uncertainty across geography
and across labor market groups; and the growing importance of
geographic, industrial, and occupational mobility for securing
income and employment for different labor force groups.
My argument is that changes in technology and trade have led
employers to reorganize the geography of production. Employers
have moved away from internal labor markets and toward external
employment arrangements to an increasing degree with the result
that the growing uncertainly of economic life has shifted onto
peripheral groups. As a result, for some labor market groups
employment and earnings have become increasingly precarious over
the past two decades. To an increasing degree, successful
negotiation of this new economic landscape requires either
securing employment in the shrinking internal core sector of
production or being adept at changing one's position along
geographic, industrial, educational, or occupational dimensions.
At the same time that mobility has taken on a new importance for
economic advancement, the ability to effect mobility remains
unevenly distributed across labor market groups, placing some of
them at a further disadvantage.
To elaborate, the changing nature of production in the
United States is an outgrowth of the economy's increased exposure
to the global economy and to the heightened pace of technological
change, two factors which are intricately linked to one another.
At the close of World War II, the U.S. was the envy of the world
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because its economy had survived the war intact and it possessed
a huge domestic market, as well as a world market which was in
desperate need of its output. In this environment of stability
and demand growth, large mass-market production firms developed
an organizational structure which relied heavily on the use of
internal labor markets. Workers employed by these core firms
typically were given jobs with good wages and benefits, as well
as access to internal ladders of upward mobility which provided
opportunities for advancement without leaving the firm. Large to
mid-sized firms of this period also typically performed most of
their corporate functions in-house, for example maintaining
advertising, legal, and accounting departments staffed by their
own professional employees.
Two aspects of economic life during this era made the
evolution of large, multinational enterprises with well-developed
internal labor markets advantageous. This first is that these
large firms generally operated as monopolies or oligopolies which
enabled them to respond to shifts in demand through the mechanism
of product prices rather than through shifting employment levels.
Thus, employers were able to offer job stability as a recruiting
mechanism and as a reward for corporate loyalty. The second is
that internal labor markets provided the means by which employers
could impart specialized knowledge and training to employees,
thus ensuring an orderly way in which firm-specific information
could be passed onto succeeding generations of employees.
Over the last two decades, however, the structure of large
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firms has begun to change dramatically. The rise of global
competition from newly industrializing countries combined with
technological advances has confronted firms with a new set of
challenges with which to contend. The product life cycle -- the
cycle by which products are research, developed, and eventually
reach mass production -- has become compressed, placing pressure
on firms to continually innovate. Firms must also find means to
manage the greater uncertainty of a more globally-integrated
business environment.
One strategy that firms have employed in an attempt to
control this increasing level of uncertainty is to increase their
flexibility along several dimensions. In his book Lean and Mean,
Harrison offers a typology which details three aspects of
flexibility:
functional flexibility involves restructuring the production
process in ways that "redefine work tasks, redeploy resources,
and reconfigure relationships with suppliers, as in the just-in-
time system of minimal-inventory delivery of parts and goods-in-
process to manufacturing assembly plants."5
wage flexibility is accomplished through mechanisms such as
two-tier wage contracts, wage pay-backs, bonus schemes, and union
avoidance. The goal of wage flexibility is to heighten wage
competition among individual workers, thus helping to minimize
the firm's wage bill.
numerical flexibility involves restructuring jobs through
s Harrison, 1994, p. 129.
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increasing reliance on part-time, contract, and other contingent
workers who typically receive few, if any, fringe benefits.
One form of numerical flexibility involves outsourcing
functions once performed in-house. Whereas previously it was
common practice to maintain in-house capacity for most of a
firm's activities, increasingly firms are moving to contract for
these services on the external market. In the process, the firm
externalizes part of its internal training functions onto the
education system, a development made possible in part by the
educational upgrading of the labor force over the past two
decades, particularly among women. Reorganizing production so
that firms no longer invest significant time and money in
training their employees also reduces the incentive to recoup
that investment by means of a long-term employment relationship.
An organizational structure predicated on the ability of
employers to hire job-ready personnel with limited needs for
training also reinforces the importance of education
credentialling. This shift in the approach to training may have
contributed to the strong demand for college graduates, as well
as to my finding that the demand for high school dropouts appears
to have fallen off across the board.
Services for which firms contract out include everything
from cleaning to advertising to routine secretarial work through
the use of temporary employment services. By paring down their
workforce to an essential core of primary workers, firms are able
to separate stable from unstable portions of demand. During the
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earlier phases of this corporate downsizing, the first workers to
lose employment in the sheltered primary sector were typically
the less-skilled whose services could be most easily replaced
through technology or contracting out. Over time, however,
corporate downsizing has reached higher into the ranks of
managers and other professionals. In the process, access to
internal ladders of upward mobility and to employment stability
has become restricted to a shrinking share of workers.
Firms have also reorganized their functions along geographic
lines. This may involve, for example, moving production
facilities to more remote international or domestic locations or
simply outsourcing routinized data entry functions to firms in
the suburbs. This strategy accomplishes several goals
simultaneously. It affords the firm another means of separating
primary from secondary workers and it allows the firm to take
advantage of new sources of labor supply. According to Clark,
Gertler, and Whiteman,
"... The sheer fact of spatial separation significantly
alters the ability of different strata of labor within
companies to bargain with reference to each other --
either to preserve time-honored status differentials,
to peg relative wages, or indeed to argue for narrower
differentials... .The fact of spatial separation
prevents wage referencing and forces labor to operate
within a set of local expectations. These localized
expectations may be further manipulated by corporations
using their new-found spatial freedom to secure
'marginal' workforces."6
Clark, Gertler and Whiteman argue that spatial inequalities
shouldn't be considered to be the outgrowth of factor immobility
' Clark, Gertler, and Whiteman, 1986, p. 33.
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or local specialization, as they would be in a neoclassical
framework. Instead, they view spatial differences as integral to
the workings of the production system, neither "inevitable nor
simply a sign of economic malfunctioning." Rather than spatial
inequalities being an accident of the new spatial division of
labor, what is emerging is an "economic geography premised on
spatial inequalities."
They write that, over time,
...the geographical distribution of economic activity
which results from the evolution of a new form of
division of labor will be overlaid on, and combined
with, the pattern produced in previous periods by
different forms of division of labor....
Local economies can then be differentiated along
the basic dimensions of economic uncertainty. Taken as
a structured set, local economies form a means for
absorbing within the workforce the fluctuations and
uncertainties which industrial economies generate for
the productive process. Taken individually, each
place, by virtue of its location within a spatial
division of labor, represents a structured relation
between capital and labor, which effectively sets a
customary contract governing not only the level of
local wages but also the pattern of how economic
fluctuations are absorbed.""
My placing metropolitan economies along a continuum in terms
of the sensitivity of their industry structures to import
penetration constitutes one means to differentiate local
economies "along the basic dimensions of economic uncertainty."
Not only has import penetration contributed to the new labor-
market and spatial dualism just discussed, it has also resulted
in growing shares of local economies being placed within the
? Ibid, p.34.
' Ibid, p. 35.
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realm of outside control as the importance of local ownership
declines. Thus trade is an important factor in the growing
precariousness of income and employment which has been felt not
only in the United States, but across most western advanced
industrialized countries.
Going back to the work of Rodrik, in Has Globalization Gone
Too Far? he identifies three primary consequences of the
"increased substitutability of low-skilled workers across
borders" for the employment relationship in industrial economies:
a shift in who is responsible for paying nonwage benefits; an
increase in the volatility of employment and earned income; and a
decline in the power of workers to bargain effectively with
employers.' Concerning the incidence of nonwage costs, Rodrik
uses a standard demand/supply framework to demonstrate that the
increased elasticity of demand for labor results in workers
paying more in loss of wages and employment for any increase in
labor standards. He goes on to point out, as he notes Freeman
(1994) has argued, that it is possible for countries to purchase
higher labor standards by any combination of currency
devaluation, direct wage cuts, or government assuming
responsibility for the added costs by increased taxation.
However, he also argues that, ultimately, it is workers who must
bear most of the costs of such interventions since the ability of
firms to move abroad or import gives them the power to maintain
their real after-tax earnings. Consequently, "globalization
9 Rodrik, 1997, p. 17.
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makes it difficult to sustain the postwar bargain under which
workers' pay and benefits steadily improved in return for labor
peace and loyalty."'
Employing the same labor demand and supply framework, Rodrik
demonstrates that an open economy "magnifies the effects of
shocks on the labor market."", resulting in the increased
volatility of earnings and employment. As one piece of evidence
of this increased volatility, he cites the work of Gottschalk and
Moffitt (1994) who argue that in the United States, one third of
the increase in wage inequality between the 1970s and the 1980s
is a result of an increase in the instability of earned income.
He also presents evidence by Farber (1996) that suggests that job
security has declined in the 1990s compared with the 1980s.
Lastly, the decline in unionization, which has been most
extreme in the United States, has intensified the effects of the
first two consequences of a more open economy as well as being in
part a result of them. Rodrik cites a particularly insightful
piece by Howell (1994) which I excerpt here because it provides
an apt summary of many of the labor market shifts I have been
discussing:
"The undermining of traditional wage-setting
institutions has lowered wages for those with the least
bargaining power in the labor market, thus increasing
inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers... .While the conventional view is that
technological change has increased the demand for
skill, ... it may be that deinstitutionalization of the
Ibid, p. 19.
" Ibid, p. 20.
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labor market has had a greater effect. Wage norms
appear to have broken down within firms (as internal
labor markets are opened up to external competition),
within industries (as increasing competition causes
differences among firms to become a more critical
factor in wage outcomes), and among communities (as
transportation and telecommunications facilitate the
relocation of some, but not all, firms to lower wage
areas." 12
As previously argued, the negative consequences of these
developments in the structure of global production are unevenly
distributed across space within countries and even within
metropolitan areas, let alone across national boundaries. Cities
with a concentration of corporate headquarters offices will offer
a certain array of employment opportunities while those with a
concentration of the routinized functions of services or
manufacturing firms will offer another. But not only are the
negative consequences of global restructuring unevenly
distributed across space, they are also unequally distributed
across different demographic groups within the labor market. My
results reinforce the view that not only have less-skilled,
women, and minority workers fared the worst but that they have
done so in part because of their position in the spatial division
of labor.
The key to understanding the repercussions of this shifting
array of employment opportunities for these three subgroups of
the labor force rests on an understanding of mobility --
geographic, industrial, occupational, and educational. First, as
employers search for flexibility through non-traditional work
12 Howell, 1994, as cited in Rodrik, 1997, p. 24.
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arrangements such as outsourcing and employment becomes more
tenuous, workers must increasingly face the prospect of economic
dislocation as a persistent feature of their working lives. In
this context, the ability to secure new employment following job
displacement becomes of paramount importance in maintaining
income. Moreover, as employment and upward mobility are
increasingly delinked within the confines of the firm, being able
to secure better employment increasingly depends on one's ability
to move, whether that move is between firms, between cities,
between occupations, or between levels of education.
If we consider the profile of the contingent workforce, we
find that it is largely comprised of women and-minority workers.
According to Christopherson (1988), "at least two-thirds of the
contingent workforce in the United States" are women (many of
whom will also be minority).'3 Christopherson argues that within
the contingent workforce, women and men tend to be segregated to
different types of production activities:
"...In general, women are concentrated in the most
competitive sectors of subcontracting activity and in
those with the most tangential relationship to the
central mission of firms... .In contrast, men are more
highly represented among subcontractors who provide
essential and regularly required inputs and among the
most skilled and highest paid specialty subcontractors
(such as computer programmers and research
engineers." 14
Even within occupations, many of them skilled, women must
contend with disparities in the amount of working time they are
13 Christopherson, 1988, p. 2.
" Ibid, p. 17.
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allocated, even if they are paid the same hourly wage rate.
Christopherson maintains that these new forms of working
arrangements create a complex structure of labor market
segmentation that goes beyond a simple formulation of jobs as
inside versus outside or primary versus secondary. While these
new forms of segmentation are still evolving,
"I... the trend toward subcontracting will potentially
increase the wage and occupational mobility disparities
that existed between men and women under conditions of
segregated employment in large firms."'5
In addition to limiting their wage and occupational mobility
in the manner just described, the growth of contingent work has
other ramifications for the mobility of women and minority
workers. First, the decreased reliance on internal labor markets
makes it increasingly difficult for women and minorities to
benefit from the implementation of affirmative action policies
within firms, policies which were largely tailored to influence
internal hiring and promotion practices. Second, the
externaliztion of training functions onto the education system
increases the relationship between employment opportunties and
educational opportunities. According to Noyelle (1987):
"... to the extent that discrimination occurs in the
process by which workers acquire additional increments
of training and education, such discrimination becomes
an increasingly important determinant of overall labor
market discrimination." 16
Given the retrenchment from affirmative action within educational
is Ibid, p. 18.
16 Noyelle, 1987, p. 119.
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institutions which has had serious effects, most particularly for
African-American students, and which we can only expect to
intensify, this is an ominous development.
For the least-educated of any race or gender, several
additional factors combine to limit mobility. Less-educated
workers generally possess more job-specific skills than do those
with a post-high school education. Job-specific skills are less
transferable across firms or industries, thus circumscribing the
opportunities for job changes. To the extent that less education
also means lower wages (true to an increasing degree), mobility
is also constrained by the financial costs of job switching.
Most workers just surviving on current wages can't afford the
luxury of voluntarily leaving a job, no matter how inadequate, in
search of something better if a spell of unemployment would be a
possibility. The financial costs of a geographic move may also
be prohibitive, perhaps even more so now when the decreasing
likelihood of am employment relationship of long duration won't
allow workers to amortize the costs of a move over an extended
time horizon. In areas of rapid economic growth where entry-
level jobs may be more plentiful, the shortage of low-cost
housing presents an additional difficulty for low-wage workers
which may be insurmountable. For minority workers and for
families with children, housing options may be further limited by
discrimination.
Women's opportunties for mobility are further limited by the
self-reinforcing nature of their dual roles in the domestic and
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labor market spheres, particularly if they have limited
education. Because women generally earn less than men and assume
more of the responsibility for child care, married couples often
grant priority to the husband's job when it comes time to make
decisions about geographic moves. According to a survey of
Chicago women aged 25 to 54, only 6 percent answered yes to the
question of whether they had ever moved to accept a job, compared
with 26 percent who reported that they had given up a job because
their families moved. Similarly, only 15 percent said that they
would take a "really desirable" job if it required moving to
another town and over half would not be interested in a job
requiring out of town travel." To the extent that married women
with children have unequal labor market opportunities, it will
continue to make economic sense for them to assume a larger role
in the domestic sphere, particularly if their wages cannot
justify the additional expenses incurred by their labor market
participation.
For single mothers, the problems are multiplied. In
addition to severe financial constraints on their ability to
cover the expenses of relocation, single mothers must often rely
on a complex network of family and community support to make it
possible for their families to survive. As employment becomes
more unstable, these informal social and financial support
networks are increasingly essential. Moving requires disrupting
these ties not only for themselves, but also for their children.
17 Lopata, 1981, pp. 162-63.
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For women whose economic circumstances limit them to
neighborhoods with some level of violent crime, remaining in a
neighborhood where the social and physical landscape is known can
be preferable to moving to a new location where the terrain is
unfamiliar.
Thus, in an economic environment which increasingly requires
workers to be mobile along a number of dimensions, less-educated
workers, particularly if they are women or minorities, find
themselves at a growing disadvantage. Within local labor
markets, the decreased mobility of these groups makes them more
vulnerable to job loss and unemployment which, in turn, weakens
their bargaining position with employers.
In their book The Wage Curve, Blanchflower and Oswald
provide insight into the relationship between unemployment and
wages, and indirectly about the consequences of limited mobility.
The book documents the relationship between contemporaneous
unemployment levels and wages in local labor markets, a
relationship which manifests itself virtually identically across
roughly a dozen countries and exhibits stability over time. In
his review of the book, Card (1995) discusses the authors' three
alternative models which might explain the wage curve. While
critical of a contractual model based on different locations'
amenity values and a second conventional union bargaining model,
Card is more enthusiastic about a third efficiency wage model.
As described by Card,
"In the efficiency wage model.. .firms must offer a net
wage that exceeds the value of unemployment; otherwise
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employees will shirk. Because the penalty for shirking
is greater if it takes a longer time to find a new job,
firms can offer a lower wage premium if unemployment
rates are higher." 8
In other words, workers with the least ability to threaten
to take their labor power elsewhere will be forced to accept jobs
at lower wages, most likely with fewer benefits and more
precarious conditions of employment as well. Based on the
previous discussion of mobility, we would expect that less-
skilled workers, but in particular women and minorities, will
continue to be crowded into jobs with the lowest earnings and
least stability. My findings that it is just these labor force
groups that appear to be most vulnerable to import competition in
local labor markets is entirely consistent with this view.
Sawhill and McMurre point out that in a society where
economic rewards are unequally distributed, the importance of
mobility increases:
"If the distribution of income or other resources in a
society is equal then mobility matters very little.
There's almost no place to move to and the prizes or
rewards for success are small. But if the distribution
is very unequal, then the stakes are much larger and
mobility matters more. The bigger the prizes, the more
important it is that the competition be a fair one."'
At present, the rewards accruing to mobility are greater than at
any time since the early 1970s when wage inequality began to
increase. Given that so many factors are driving the trend
toward economic inequality simultaneously, it is unlikely to
" Card, 1995, p. 797.
19 Sawhill and McMurrer, 1996, p.3.
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abate any time soon. Moreover, government seems increasingly
unwilling and/or unable to offset its negative consequences
through such means as labor law reform, further raising the
minimum wage, or better-targetted and managed training
initiatives. If anything, the punitive nature of recent welfare
reform initiatives will only exacerbate the difficulties of the
low-wage workforce. While state governments welcomed the power
to manage their own welfare programs, once they begin to cope
with the difficulties of integrating a largely unskilled
population into an unstable labor market, they may find that they
have made an unhappy bargain.
To date, business has been particularly successful in
arguing that it must be allowed to operate in as unfettered a
manner as possible in order to survive in a fiercely competitive
world market. It has been only too happy to endorse anti-
government sentiment in an effort to cut back the regulatory
framework it must operate in to its own advantage. But as the
effects of growing inequality are felt for a longer period of
time and by a broadening array of groups and localities, business
may find itself facing a public backlash. If the last
presidential election is any indication, the focus of this
backlash may be calls for new restrictions on trade. As a
society, we would be well advised to find ways to better
distribute the benefits of global economic integration and to
assist workers in coping with the increased uncertainty it
generates. Otherwise, the social cohesion which grew out of the
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postwar compact between business and labor may begin to unravel.
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International Trade and Productivity Shift Share Results, Metropolitan Statisical Areas, 1978-86
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760 Baton Rouge, LA
780 Battle Creek, MI
840 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX
845 Beaver County, PA
860 Bellingham, WA
870 Benton Harbor, MI
875 Bergen-Passaic, NJ
410007 59785 -282552 -515969
846 90 -451 -761
4732 1002 -3866 -6869
1217 107 -750 -1612
2001 599 -2614 -6514
2023 239 -1273 -2404
343 64 -253 -438
7929 1256 -5818 -11077
1579 358 -1433 -2625
1151 182 -813 -1475
1012 128 -663 -1253
25541 2764 -16229 -33780
300 25 -154 -295
1487 361 -1288 -1979
2219 315 -1562 -2813
2169 598 -2292 -3829
1197 158 -756 -1352
4766 613 -3043 -5644
2234 308 -1429 -2478
1583 225 -1048 -1878
18146 2175 -11305 -20854
857 129 -614 -1110
3991 516 -2627 -4910
3522 612 -2686 -5039
4706 432 -2694 -5401
1019 101 -595 -1241
15093 2138 -10484 -19537
1726 196 -1066 -2014
2299 310 -1635 -3247
1199 299 -1008 -1644
3245 425 -2346 -5008
861 348 -1384 -3176
775 101 -493 -892
1550 341 -1287 -2215



















































































































































































































MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
880 Billings, MT 395 53 -272 -525 -354 -51 199 228 -925 -1252
920 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS 977 80 -527 -1081 -677 -280 142 591 2962 2186
960 Binghamton, NY 3876 515 -2671 -5520 15755 1790 -2729 -5475 -5879 -338
1000 Birmingham, AL 4478 813 -3674 -7003 -11527 -1271 2561 4099 -4695 -16219
1010 Bismarck, ND 199 31 -142 -250 -320 -62 112 100 181 -152
1020 Bloomington, IN 970 141 -576 -932 4296 -221 -2906 -3246 -884 -3358
1040 Bloomington-Normal, IL 556 89 -424 -806 -139 -238 98 -492 1 -1355
1080 Boise City, ID 759 142 -541 -806 3467 1154 -630 -3777 2830 2599
1123 Bstn-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell-Brockton, l 36950 4889 -25749 -52068 96013 16338 -17248 -60950 18158 16333
1125 Boulder-Longmont, CO 4537 423 -2459 -4473 22566 5445 -4122 -19127 4461 7251
1140 Bradenton, FL 677 60 -412 -880 -196 -76 137 205 1589 1104
1145 Brazoria, TX 2277 190 -1292 -2723 -2995 267 270 1337 3866 1199
1150 Bremerton, WA 149 14 -91 -193 90 -4 17 -64 246 163
1163 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk-Danbury, C 11954 1457 -7624 -14399 24545 4693 -2240 -12142 -15956 -9711
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 1189 134 -771 -1564 446 -141 -742 -104 791 -762
1260 Bryan-College Station, TX 385 41 -230 -481 167 20 98 -88 143 56
1280 Buffalo, NY 7151 1344 -5809 -10657 -6310 -2014 -81 3393 -19759 -32742
1300 Burlington, NC 2161 290 -1501 -2842 -1351 -401 567 -1093 6612 2442
1303 Burlington, VT 1781 173 -1000 -1897 6001 863 -1151 -2705 3413 5479
1320 Canton, OH 3764 663 -3094 -5865 -10756 -1584 2220 2994 159 -11498
1350 Casper, WY 147 15 -118 -317 -309 -101 72 300 -42 -353
1360 Cedar Rapids, IA 2393 355 -1766 -3410 4722 -206 181 -1384 -6552 -5668
1400 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL 792 103 -523 -974 -147 -60 425 -274 2007 1349
1440 Charleston, SC 2110 251 -1369 -2658 -1454 -410 113 90 4129 804
1480 Charlseton, WV 931 193 -785 -1448 -2510 110 443 1031 -4109 -6144
1520 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 16277 2020 -10560 -19849 -7786 -2783 1489 -8810 32180 2179
1540 Charlottesville, VA 1047 121 -670 -1265 1382 -92 172 -810 1278 1162
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA 4256 737 -3120 -5518 -4091 -707 1343 -804 -4799 -12703
1600 Chicago, IL 54146 9133 -40545 -74488 22036 -4037 2869 -5648 -123566 -160099
1620 Chico, CA 470 59 -306 -546 -102 -68 116 -40 1260 843
1640 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 13263 2122 -9562 -17364 3857 -2274 -73 2798 -12321 -19554
1660 Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 859 126 -623 -1182 -254 -175 -514 137 904 -721
1680 Cleveland, OH 16857 3288 -13736 -24573 -21042 -5156 4334 13559 -40858 -67327
1720 Colorado Springs, CO 2612 206 -1430 -2809 5098 957 -652 -3064 9163 10080
1740 Columbia, MO 368 53 -245 -427 26 -42 15 73 -190 -369
1760 Columbia, SC 2856 360 -1886 -3600 2544 221 -193 -2945 5025 2383
1800 Columbus, GA-AL 3262 4 -1498 -3683 -2826 -433 473 -756 22380 16922
1840 Columbus, OH 8843 1432 -6482 -11535 3010 -798 138 -291 -5470 -11152
MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
1880 Corpus Christi, TX 1467 145 -954 -2014 -1340 -61 335 562 554 -1306
1900 Cumberland, MD-WV 571 100 -461 -894 371 -63 -158 -1043 -1722 -3300
1920 Dallas, TX 23439 2603 -14543 -27607 36477 1415 -3005 -10374 -874 7531
1950 Danville, VA 2061 227 -1286 -2435 -654 -387 -695 -1856 5298 273
1960 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, IA-IL 2420 485 -2347 -4692 -12192 -2519 1827 5822 -3980 -15176
2000 Dayton-Springfield, OH 8308 1571 -6414 -11010 4104 -1376 -1335 427 -15732 -21457
2020 Daytona Beach, FL 1335 139 -780 -1416 1728 -63 271 -394 4723 5543
2040 Decatur, IL 1073 250 -964 -1682 -3318 -1074 321 1742 -3870 -7522
2080 Denver, CO 10488 1271 -6595 -12664 11764 -930 1255 -3359 2887 4117
2120 Des Moines, IA 2221 400 -1702 -3102 -1877 -615 987 784 -3226 -6129
2160 Detroit, MI 28757 7275 -25580 -41000 -34631 -9694 -7485 21979 -59423 -119802
2180 Dothan, AL 1212 123 -743 -1500 617 -31 -311 -669 620 -680
2200 Dubuque, IA 848 194 -818 -1594 -1720 -828 123 1345 -2413 -4862
2240 Duluth, MN-WI 554 138 -514 -1027 -891 -219 263 754 -3296 -4237
2285 East St. Louis-Belleville, IL 723 145 -591 -1088 -1083 -120 88 336 -962 -2553
2290 Eau Claire, WI 963 136 -625 -1118 1288 251 -598 -1829 1314 -218
2320 El Paso, TX 4342 400 -2546 -5299 12 -302 -2078 -364 7928 2094
2330 Elkhart-Goshen, IN 4350 766 -2873 -4309 -1933 -821 -199 3253 4163 2397
2335 Elmira, NY 676 133 -590 -1144 -77 -72 -80 421 -3282 -4014
2340 Enid, OK 192 27 -140 -295 -457 -131 152 254 -510 -908
2360 Erie, PA 3494 546 -2568 -4990 -5528 -388 497 1711 -3311 -10538
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR 1634 281 -1223 -2081 -421 -131 1011 -1089 -789 -2807
2440 Evansville, IN-KY 3115 490 -2274 -4452 -851 -780 509 -648 -1075 -5965
2520 Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 451 68 -319 -599 -558 -132 258 141 -5 -695
2560 Fayetteville, NC 1156 161 -805 -1448 -4 -204 -338 -549 3584 1553
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 921 112 -574 -1045 -586 -185 188 481 1791 1103
2640 Flint, MI 5026 1135 -4418 -7120 -2184 -2051 -7174 3193 -3159 -16752
2650 Florence, AL 1136 176 -854 -1567 -1878 -313 266 482 101 -2452
2655 Florence, SC 1548 186 -912 -1668 2289 95 -1107 -867 -1268 -1705
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 1453 126 -885 -1861 3905 954 -530 -3203 2873 2834
2680 Fort Laud-Hollywd-Pompano Bch, FL 4429 527 -2882 -5510 12318 1597 -1200 -6265 2362 5376
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 515 54 -309 -614 366 -26 -43 -47 1296 1193
2710 Fort Pierce, FL 668 56 -381 -782 339 -11 159 119 1586 1753
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK 2119 348 -1471 -2509 -848 -549 539 47 848 -1478
2750 Fort Walton Beach, FL 436 39 -238 -454 583 44 -6 -164 1738 1979
2760 Fort Wayne, IN 3960 710 -2901 -5115 -1729 -1142 46 2087 -993 -5076
2800 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 12788 1420 -7841 -15139 5556 -1487 143 2352 13673 11465
2840 Fresno, CA 2013 299 -1431 -2591 -1418 -483 762 121 2360 -368
MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
2880 Gadsden, AL 1043 174 -792 -1455 -2358 -338 -443 -79 1783 -2465
2900 Gainesville, FL 620 67 -365 -685 104 32 14 296 1135 1218
2920 Galveston-Texas City, TX 1052 134 -739 -1453 -2074 122 387 1120 -732 -2181
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN 5864 1163 -5053 -9519 -40698 -2579 5763 5505 -4208 -43762
2975 Glens Falls, NY 182 95 -489 -1534 584 -146 128 -5 283 -902
2985 Grand Forks, ND 129 24 -84 -140 -53 -25 69 43 -26 -63
3000 Grand Rapids, MI 8844 1297 -6097 -10987 68 -1630 1689 2281 15572 11037
3040 Great Falls, MT 87 26 -80 -113 73 55 -40 -195 -654 -842
3060 Greeley, CO 916 115 -522 -850 613 -12 -89 -672 985 485
3080 Green Bay, WI 2192 296 -1426 -2665 379 -371 796 -91 1597 707
3120 Greensboro-Winston-Salem-HighPoint, l 14850 1924 -9825 -18451 -5750 -2389 4833 1687 14331 1210
3160 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC 10690 1353 -6949 -13141 898 -1655 -2071 -7483 8118 -10241
3180 Hagerstown, MD 1292 165 -872 -1698 -1982 -567 330 568 1656 -1109
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH 2423 336 -1621 -2976 -3794 -631 1056 1040 2584 -1583
3240 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 4917 711 -3385 -6333 -1038 -427 -1077 -1155 -1047 -8834
3283 Hartford-N Britain-Middletown-Bristol, CT 13587 1755 -9483 -18326 11580 -484 776 4327 -8984 -5251
3290 Hickory, NC 6670 826 -4168 -7639 -4742 -945 2549 -347 10743 2947
3320 Honolulu, HI 1752 257 -1192 -2058 203 -271 -111 -110 -2039 -3570 C
3350 Houma-Thibodaux, LA 553 59 -384 -912 -1009 -194 309 240 -1905 -3243 my)
3360 Houston, TX 19785 1890 -13193 -31204 -22817 -7683 5234 15104 -591 -33474
3400 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH 1396 331 -1342 -2456 -6968 -602 477 1612 -2902 -10453
3440 Huntsville, AL 3245 364 -1888 -3384 7985 356 -567 -4158 4326 6279
3480 Indianapolis, IN 10256 1787 -7547 -13419 8307 -873 -2225 2042 -30094 -31765
3500 lowa City, IA 450 53 -261 -463 163 -62 167 140 683 869
3520 Jackson, MI 845 212 -809 -1437 -729 -318 97 369 -1999 -3769
3560 Jackson, MS 1912 261 -1353 -2604 -861 -374 123 449 1767 -681
3580 Jackson, TN 876 118 -604 -1113 -948 -194 208 -116 1346 -427
3600 Jacksonville, FL 3518 471 -2336 -4301 -1849 -293 1295 -103 5973 2375
3605 Jacksonville, NC 322 33 -199 -388 -309 -61 60 174 1351 983
3620 Janesville-Beloit, WI 1746 349 -1230 -1840 -2124 -617 -965 1675 -1294 -4299
3640 Jersey City, NJ 5399 836 -3819 -7039 4904 -667 -2435 -710 -18105 -21635
3660 Johnson Cty-Kingsprt-Bristol (TN), TN-V/ 5582 779 -3780 -7004 3646 902 155 -5354 -17 -5089
3680 Johnstown, PA 782 236 -898 -1681 -4615 -371 269 873 -1416 -6822
3690 Joliet, IL 1419 376 -1480 -2813 -3488 -948 591 2087 -4359 -8614
3710 Joplin, MO 1685 198 -973 -1805 225 35 -154 -331 2813 1692
3720 Kalamazoo, MI 2635 432 -1789 -2993 -457 -479 799 1083 -3279 -4048
3740 Kankakee, IL 516 121 -479 -986 -153 -117 289 -478 -4306 -5592
3755 Kansas City, KS 4167 611 -2814 -4981 2614 -486 -31 617 -1118 -1421
MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
3760 Kansas City, MO-KS 7851 1173 -5228 -9925 6515 -790 18 -4068 239 -4216
3800 Kenosha, WI 1272 225 -966 -1655 -774 -354 -757 488 -1122 -3644
3810 Killeen-Temple, TX 883 99 -543 -1032 2300 383 -81 -1810 866 1065
3840 Knoxville, TN 5193 715 -3375 -6060 -3834 -712 202 832 4878 -2161
3850 Kokomo, IN 1940 337 -1423 -2436 9847 -203 -7978 -7318 2600 -4634
3870 La Crosse, WI 1048 134 -695 -1317 -357 -261 730 -642 951 -410
3880 Lafayette, LA 708 75 -467 -1040 -984 -306 343 443 927 -301
3920 Lafayette-West Lafayette, IN 1073 168 -757 -1399 -263 -112 -52 223 740 -379
3960 Lake Charles, LA 962 126 -709 -1425 -1684 198 382 417 -1670 -3403
3965 Lake County, IL 3578 631 -2761 -4678 2836 26 405 -1328 1514 223
3980 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 2271 269 -1496 -2913 -1040 -373 820 230 869 -1423
4000 Lancaster, PA 6369 807 -4067 -7518 1183 -640 -1421 868 3706 -713
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 4019 592 -2722 -4794 2025 -880 -3481 633 4653 45
4080 Laredo, TX 136 24 -109 -193 279 -9 -184 -68 -440 -564
4100 Las Cruces, NM 268 36 -155 -254 -88 -43 161 40 -297 -332
4120 Las Vegas, NV 828 93 -508 -983 -304 -118 261 402 1676 1347
4150 Lawrence, KS 450 51 -318 -627 523 -40 219 311 -435 133
4200 Lawton, OK 403 24 -213 -446 -7 -72 12 -294 2142 1549
4243 Lewiston-Auburn, ME 1412 189 -899 -1640 -49 -173 -1491 -635 562 -2725
4280 Lexington-Fayette, KY 2641 425 -1931 -3472 10855 3042 -1726 -10475 -2876 -3515
4320 Lima, OH 1835 370 -1443 -2244 -3466 -572 179 3197 890 -1253
4360 Lincoln, ME 1338 199 -916 -1672 819 -11 309 -420 -1192 -1547
4400 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 3517 552 -2465 -4409 -988 -845 694 670 -3328 -6600
4420 Longview-Marshall, TX 1509 207 -1082 -2255 -2537 -390 363 1394 233 -2559
4440 Lorain-Elyria, OH 2633 532 -2133 -3707 -5021 -816 -289 1887 -2591 -9505
4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 93110 11824 -61626 -117023 129764 691 -7439 -29634 5356 25022
4520 Louisville, KY 7983 1351 -6069 -11076 -963 -2206 1244 3286 -17799 -24248
4600 Lubbock, TX 1277 132 -807 -1649 6393 1590 -1143 -5680 -2289 -2175
4640 Lynchburg, VA 2327 327 -1598 -3003 -501 -385 -278 382 -1825 -4555
4680 Macon-Warner Robins, GA 2142 228 -1283 -2399 -1590 -404 321 -349 5352 2019
4720 Madison, WI 1718 232 -1160 -2151 935 -119 -135 439 896 655
4763 Manchester-Nashua, NH 5535 672 -3384 -5984 13837 3012 -2168 -12066 4188 3641
4800 Mansfield, OH 2082 312 -1346 -2229 -2202 -428 469 346 -2530 -5526
4880 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 1090 94 -621 -1197 -588 -135 89 197 5116 4045
4890 Medford, OR 705 115 -489 -731 357 2 259 -542 200 -123
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 2581 236 -1495 -2844 11426 1377 -891 -4825 3375 8939
4920 Memphis, TN-AR-MS 5910 896 -4254 -7826 -919 -1084 625 -741 -160 -7552
4940 Merced, CA 534 80 -349 -598 -207 -90 230 91 3850 3541
MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
5000 Miami-Hialeah, FL 9603 1337 -6601 -12293 4606 -888 -2321 -2044 5587 -3013
5015 Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ 11254 1470 -7269 -13658 5678 45 1055 -2309 -6064 -9799
5040 Midland, TX 492 29 -256 -686 9 -87 -51 130 1067 647
5080 Milwaukee, WI 14276 2625 -11586 -21948 -15190 -5311 1901 8256 -28465 -55442
5120 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 22273 3150 -15058 -27571 61058 11513 -6390 -47600 -16932 -15557
5160 Mobile, AL 2611 355 -1787 -3663 -1484 -200 930 -344 -1276 -4858
5170 Modesto, CA 1434 203 -1139 -2701 -383 -261 856 -471 5435 2974
5190 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 3459 425 -2252 -4341 7717 1420 -1081 -4824 1080 1602
5200 Monroe, LA 692 90 -493 -963 -25 -91 289 -247 1351 604
5240 Montgomery, AL 1645 235 -1131 -2021 -1155 -317 369 323 3143 1091
5280 Muncie, IN 896 177 -764 -1343 -872 -282 -419 696 -1123 -3033
5320 Muskegon, MI 1430 271 -1180 -2130 -2894 -512 301 1996 -154 -2872
5345 Naples, FL 190 14 -93 -184 41 -19 41 117 757 864
5360 Nashville, TN 8617 1180 -5762 -10505 912 -1443 -729 142 12965 5378
5380 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 16561 2202 -11603 -23824 35318 2781 -2639 -6709 12159 24246
5403 New Bedford-Fall River-Attleboro, MA 7834 1072 -5239 -9621 3477 -1134 -4395 -3611 3219 -8398
5483 New Haven-Waterbury-Meriden, CT 8602 1242 -5832 -10537 -394 -1029 113 1452 -5178 -11561
5523 New London-Norwich, CT 4247 478 -2561 -4705 -4360 -820 1374 1196 4355 -797
5560 New Orleans, LA 5294 648 -3600 -7336 -2748 -549 1897 -275 -4441 -11111
5600 New York, NY 43131 7241 -33279 -64778 37241 -6822 -18922 -2455 -87342 -125985
5640 Newark, NJ 18608 2673 -12964 -24305 11955 -1297 -970 -426 -29919 -36646
5660 Newburgh-Middleton, NY 756 192 -837 -1877 -739 -144 236 415 97 -1902
5700 Niagara Falls, NY 497 321 -1281 -3229 -1961 -686 710 1461 -5887 -10054
5720 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, V, 7599 923 -4699 -8489 -5398 -1563 737 -912 16139 4339
5775 Oakland, CA 10410 1476 -7174 -13602 2428 1115 751 -5936 2506 -8026
5790 Ocala, FL 754 65 -425 -850 14 -95 116 198 2531 2309
5800 Odessa, TX 725 41 -459 -1364 -1163 -398 186 838 903 -691
5880 Oklahoma City, OK 5580 626 -3630 -7147 8269 243 -1245 -4560 3462 1598
5910 Olympia, WA 377 50 -226 -367 -96 -41 178 -38 251 87
59200maha, NE-IA 3731 530 -2474 -4535 3437 319 406 -2397 -7348 -8331
5960 Orlando, FL 5411 501 -3060 -5789 10530 206 490 -2607 14727 20409
5990 Owensboro, KY 591 87 -450 -862 983 199 62 -568 -992 -948
6000 Oxnard-Ventura, CA 2778 313 -1843 -4187 5915 606 -623 -2598 13172 13534
6015 Panama City, FL 448 41 -248 -531 -224 82 103 -103 403 -28
6020 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 1324 207 -973 -1832 -1656 -101 598 -96 -593 -3122
6025 Pascagoula, MS 1788 315 -1205 -2308 -2765 -235 747 -1016 -5960 -10638
6080 Pawtucket-Woonsocket-Attleboro, RI-MA 1164 163 -767 -1415 -348 31 491 -48 -1419 -2149
6120 Peoria, IL 1357 440 -1781 -3816 -9369 -2331 1144 4996 -8344 -17705
MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
6160 Philadelphia, PA-NJ 37583 5781 -26479 -48527 22410 299 1062 -13174 -57663 -78708
6200 Phoenix, AZ 13251 1449 -8156 -15376 39111 7122 -5561 -19467 14812 27186
6240 Pine Bluff, AR 608 84 -408 -798 -485 -91 237 -67 -74 -995
6280 Pittsburgh, PA 10154 2049 -9094 -18073 -28084 -2190 4495 4447 -41547 -77844
6323 Pittsfield, MA 1809 242 -1228 -2244 3647 26 -82 -917 -3902 -2649
6403 Portland, ME 1838 229 -1239 -2324 4116 337 -2461 -1952 1511 54
6440 Portland, OR 8731 1293 -6295 -11803 4409 1172 -460 -3260 4109 -2103
6453 Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester, NH 2597 324 -1820 -3535 8469 1752 -2999 -6155 2362 996
6460 Poughkeepsie, NY 4038 443 -2405 -4408 30628 7796 -6386 -23923 1298 7080
6483 Providence, RI 11051 1750 -7900 -14112 662 -2926 -5899 2136 -6605 -21844
6560 Pueblo, CO 275 80 -339 -727 -2650 -175 448 407 -1851 -4533
6600 Racine, WI 1687 358 -1483 -2717 -3259 -776 650 1775 -1985 -5749
6640 Raleigh-Durham, NC 6135 656 -3631 -6835 15583 3141 -2204 -11782 13839 14902
6660 Rapid City, SD 313 44 -212 -392 2511 696 -527 -2216 318 534
6680 Reading, PA 5301 757 -3558 -6399 -3414 -508 -67 424 -1210 -8675
6690 Redding, CA 262 60 -257 -566 252 0 183 -381 340 -107
6720 Reno, NV 857 127 -567 -1087 663 14 134 -166 -609 -635
6740 Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 1499 154 -888 -1690 -1532 -44 677 1033 5155 4363
6760 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 6925 844 -4498 -8494 -2011 -1005 2174 3652 2591 178
6780 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 4054 817 -3882 -8821 -871 -275 1014 720 20534 13290
6800 Roanoke, VA 2109 279 -1415 -2648 -1337 -623 509 160 2152 -813
6820 Rochester, MN 1193 161 -721 -1343 12773 3617 -2103 -11624 -3730 -1775
6840 Rochester, NY 10096 1616 -8369 -18670 16361 -1202 -3534 -9760 4240 -9220
6880 Rockford, IL 4006 726 -3176 -5845 -1169 -648 -356 2479 89 -3894
6920 Sacramento, CA 1609 323 -1795 -4720 2386 -147 978 -1169 12851 10316
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 3475 750 -2922 -4834 -10029 -898 -1121 5074 -4163 -14668
6980 St. Cloud, MN 1049 147 -713 -1281 510 -202 -306 400 1633 1236
7000 St. Joseph, MO 1004 137 -651 -1151 204 -100 2 -298 -246 -1099
7040 St. Louis, MO-IL 17883 2834 -11974 -20691 4863 -2084 86 6781 -23389 -25691
7080 Salem, OR 971 172 -723 -1248 -469 -216 460 140 -810 -1723
7120 Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA 777 127 -547 -980 -543 -97 262 160 144 -696
7160 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 6966 776 -4238 -8107 15426 2183 -1986 -10119 10064 10966
7200 San Angelo, TX 578 70 -357 -681 664 -11 21 -501 255 39
7240 San Antonio, TX 5867 595 -3522 -7116 10508 1799 -3113 -8531 3954 439
7320 San Diego, CA 11305 1226 -7361 -16402 27399 3883 -3498 -14890 26625 28288
7360 San Francisco, CA 6484 918 -4896 -10109 11069 412 -583 -3284 554 565
7400 San Jose, CA 29423 2590 -18033 -39613 175276 37710 -29070 -121519 28110 64874
7480 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 1608 209 -1169 -2496 7077 1177 -660 -4051 1412 3106
MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
7485 Santa Cruz, CA 1108 144 -737 -1539 2175 481 -261 -1824 2157 1704
7490 Sante Fe, NM 158 18 -91 -171 10 -2 14 62 -264 -266
7500 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 1068 167 -901 -2148 2469 373 38 -1677 4398 3787
7510 Sarasota, FL 1025 109 -612 -1163 517 -93 131 332 3187 3433
7520 Savannah,GA 1531 216 -1024 -1791 -288 -75 466 -93 3415 2357
7560 Scranton-Wilkes-Barre, PA 7782 1146 -5374 -10013 2329 -939 -2910 -2150 -3889 -14019
7600 Seattle, WA 15211 1789 -10475 -20994 21271 190 1544 -2384 -1124 5029
7610 Sharon, PA 723 176 -783 -1618 -5310 -409 593 1291 -2138 -7476
7620 Sheboygan,WI 1594 240 -1121 -1994 -1517 -440 459 561 714 -1505
7640 Sherman-Denison, TX 1125 157 -808 -1516 2308 29 -306 -781 -1066 -857
7680 Shreveport, LA 2373 359 -1689 -3349 2805 -284 -115 -587 -4135 -4623
7720 Sioux City, IA-NE 883 127 -606 -1086 -343 -72 329 296 9 -463
7760 Sioux Falls, SD 968 124 -609 -1118 -34 -132 362 32 383 -24
7800 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 2171 451 -1724 -2978 525 -279 -219 1395 -9673 -10331
7840 Spokane, WA 1668 276 -1216 -2052 2596 882 -594 -3349 861 -927
7880 Springfield, IL 355 93 -361 -755 -1282 -328 209 891 -3395 -4573
7920 Springfield, MO 2007 285 -1373 -2570 2579 -312 -1642 -1241 3821 1555
8003 Springfield, MA 5205 860 -3981 -7581 6335 640 -566 -5384 -6651 -11123 C
8050 State College, PA 830 110 -562 -1077 174 30 -99 67 1100 570
8080 Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 1335 281 -1252 -2212 -9048 -593 1106 1180 2697 -6505
8120 Stockton, CA 1526 229 -1234 -2698 -748 -272 694 -183 6429 3742
8160 Syracuse, NY 1279 640 -2760 -7311 145 -749 449 551 908 -6847
8200 Tacoma, WA 1994 260 -1387 -2656 -1813 -241 722 327 101 -2693
8240 Tallhassee, FL 527 40 -277 -570 -26 -85 137 191 1367 1304
8280 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 10022 1043 -5910 -11103 5996 80 845 -1621 20066 19418
8320 Terre Haute, IN 844 168 -734 -1438 668 -144 -324 -1369 -2148 -4478
8360 Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 720 96 -471 -864 58 -88 189 -594 2233 1280
8400 Toledo, OH 4864 1034 -3919 -6361 -2788 -953 -799 1052 -5268 -13138
8440 Topeka, KS 892 152 -655 -1169 -35 -156 344 -37 -271 -934
8480 Trenton, NJ 2368 388 -1713 -2977 -768 -520 346 652 -1454 -3678
8520 Tucson, AZ 4660 281 -2267 -4625 14757 2580 -1802 -9571 12865 16878
8560 Tulsa, OK 5616 574 -3801 -8507 -214 -1110 17 1849 2940 -2635
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL 773 124 -535 -900 -739 -106 240 -358 917 -584
8640 Tyler, TX 1281 183 -872 -1642 -2234 -388 389 470 1419 -1394
8680 Utica-Rome, NY 1627 362 -1704 -4062 6498 1154 -1649 -5188 -4491 -7453
8720 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 598 111 -567 -1456 -980 -157 526 37 2352 464
8725 Vancouver, WA 1547 180 -964 -1726 186 62 57 -607 3304 2038
8750 Victoria, TX 453 36 -250 -532 -973 -130 129 545 201 -520
MSA National National National National Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Indust Mix Competi- Net Job
Demand Exports Imports Productivity Demand Exports Imports Productivity tive Shift Change
8760 Vineland-Milville-Bridgeton, NJ 1769 249 -1180 -2177 -1976 -366 181 -4 -3047 -6550
8780 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 527 123 -615 -1518 237 -86 141 107 917 -168
8800 Waco,TX 1763 220 -1134 -2110 -555 -302 377 -23 2024 259
8840 Washington, DC-MD-VA 7844 841 -4545 -8397 13189 846 266 -4269 14994 20770
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 1392 231 -1188 -2366 -5429 -1500 860 1568 -3448 -9880
8940 Wausau, WI 1052 188 -751 -1301 -577 -327 371 333 -2609 -3620
8960 W Palm Bch-Boca Raton-Delray Bch, FL 4103 398 -2301 -4357 12382 3043 -1778 -8241 10336 13586
9000 Wheeling, WV-OH 486 126 -504 -1023 -1154 -156 233 112 -3832 -5712
9040 Wichita, KS 5187 801 -4133 -8213 10282 1008 468 1423 -2519 4304
9080 Wichita Falls, TX 1007 106 -634 -1430 -1317 -424 126 461 249 -1856
9140 Williamsport, PA 1503 242 -1065 -1973 664 -155 -148 228 -2865 -3570
9160 Wilmington, DE-NJ-MD 4538 538 -2813 -5430 -622 -138 -468 683 -5756 -9470
9200 Wilmington, NC 1203 165 -810 -1464 -616 -1 410 -98 275 -937
9243 Worcester-Fitchburg-Leominster, MA 6064 1088 -5178 -10765 7712 1806 -1598 -8740 -7559 -17170
9260 Yakima, WA 727 102 -479 -845 -367 -114 251 16 307 -402
9280 York, PA 6260 800 -4249 -8298 -1931 -1799 -416 1255 11265 2888
9320 Youngstown-Warren, OH 4426 1084 -3925 -6327 -11811 -1651 -855 4154 -17086 -31990
9340 Yuba City, CA 18 31 -123 -348 -217 -46 116 2 252 -315
Data are taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan Trade Sensitivity."
Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic Development,
Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, July 1990.
This table represents a complete listing of MSAs included in the Noponen and Shao analysis.
For a listing of MSAs included in the dissertation regression analyses, see Appendix C.
APPENDIX B: Correlation Matrix of All Age and Education
Variables. Agez and Age2 are included in the Microdata Regression
Models.
Variable Definitions:
Age: age of respondent at time of survey.
Agesq: age squared.
Agez: age minus the mean level of age in the population.
Age2: agez squared.
Educ: years of school completed.
Educsq: educ squared.
Educz: education minus the mean level of education in the
population.
Educ2: educz squared.
CORR AGE AGESQ AGEZ AGE2
AGE 1.0000 0.9949 1.0000 0.3735
AGESQ 0.9949 1.0000 0.9949 0.4653
AGEZ 1.0000 0.9949 1.0000 0.3735
AGE2 0.3735 0.4653 0.3735 1.0000
EDUC -0.0185 -0.0252 -0.0185 -0.0687
EDUCSQ -0.0085 -0.0156 - -0.0085 -0.0681
EDUCZ -0.0185 -0.0252 -0.0185 -0.0687
EDUC2 0.0469 0.0474 0.0469 0.0236
CORR EDUC EDUCSQ EDUCZ EDUC2
AGE -0.0185 -0.0085 -0.0185 0.0469
AGESQ -0.0252 -0.0156 -0.0252 0.0474
AGEZ -0.0185 -0.0085 -0.0185 0.0469
AGE2 -0.0687 -0.0681 -0.0687 0.0236
EDUC 1.0000 0.9752 1.0000 -0.4128
EDUCSQ 0.9752 1.0000 0.9752 -0.2009
EDUCZ 1.0000 0.9752 1.0000 -0.4128
EDUC2 -0.4128 -0.2009 -0.4128 1.0000
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APPENDIX C
STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS (SMSAs) INCLUDED IN THE MICRODATA
AND SMSA REGRESSIONS WITH VALUES OF EACH SHIFT-SHARE TRADE VARIABLE













































































































































































































































































































































































































SMSA NAME EMPCH DOM
EMPCH DOM EXPORT IMPORT PROD
3480 Indianapolis, IN 0.07 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.02
9240 Worcester -0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.11
2160 Detroit, MI -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.05
400 Anderson, IN 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.05
5380 Nassau-Suffolk, NY 0.17 0.21 0.02 -0.02 -0.04
1920 Dallas, TX 0.12 0.18 0.01 -0.02 -0.05
2000 Dayton-Springfield, OH 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
9320 Youngstown-Warren, OH -0.16 -0.19 -0.03 -0.01 0.07
8400 Toledo, OH -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.02
9160 Wilmington, DE-NJ-MD -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.02
3710 Joplin, MO -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
3810 Killeen-Temple, TX 0.11 0.31 0.05 -0.01 -0.25
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
8000 Springfield, MA 0.02 0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.09
9140 Williamsport, PA 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
5360 Nashville, TN -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
4440 Lorain-Elyria, OH -0.13 -0.15 -0.03 -0.01 0.06
200 Albuquerque, NM 0.14 0.21 0.02 -0.01 -0.08
4480 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 0.11 0.15 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
7800 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
4720 Madison, WI 0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
6880 Rockford, IL 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
1760 Columbia, SC -0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.11
3320 Honolulu, HI -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
5640 Newark, NJ 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
6440 Portland, OR 0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.04
7680 Shreveport, LA 0.08 0.12 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02
6680 Reading, PA -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
1280 Buffalo, NY -0.06 -0.07 -0.02 -0.00 0.04
1640 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.02




























































































































































































































EMPCH DOM EXPORT IMPORT PROD
2360 Erie, PA -0.10 -0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.04
8780 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01
4520 Louisville, KY 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04
8480 Trenton, NJ -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.03
2440 Evansville, IN-KY -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
1040 Bloomington-Normal, IL -0.12 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.08
6780 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.01
7510 Sarasota, FL 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.04
5320 Muskegon, MI -0.06 -0.16 -0.03 0.02 0.11
6720 Reno, NV 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.02
3680 Johnstown, PA -0.25 -0.30 -0.02 0.02 0.06
860 Bellingham, WA -0.11 -0.13 0.00 0.02 -0.00
160 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.01
4680 Macon-Warner Robins, GA -0.12 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.02
3000 Grand Rapids, MI 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.03
4400 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02
1680 Cleveland, OH -0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.06
2650 Florence, AL -0.11 -0.15 -0.02 0.02 0.04
920 Biloxi-Gulfport, MS -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.09
5790 Ocala, FL 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.04
3400 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH -0.25 -0.32 -0.03 0.02 0.07
5240 Montgomery, AL -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.02
460 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03
8800 Waco, TX -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.00
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.06
4800 Mansfield, OH -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 0.02
1140 Bradenton, FL 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.04
1880 Corpus Christi, TX -0.04 -0.10 -0.00 0.02 0.04
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.00
720 Baltimore, MD -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.02
6800 Roanoke, VA -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.01
SMSA NAME
EMPCH DOM EXPORT IMPORT PROD
780 -Battle Creek, MI -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 0.03 -0.02
1620 Chico, CA -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01
2020 Daytona Beach, FL 0.15 0.17 -0.01 0.03 -0.04
3360 Houston, TX -0.05 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 0.08
9000 Wheeling, WV-OH -0.11 -0.14 -0.02 0.03 0.01
80 Akron, OH -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.02
1800 Columbus, GA-AL -0.21 -0.17 -0.03 0.03 -0.04
6600 Racine, WI -0.07 -0.14 -0.03 0.03 0.08
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.02
6280 Pittsburgh, PA -0.14 -0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.03
2240 Duluth, MN-WI -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.09
3720 Kalamazoo, MI 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.04
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL -0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.03 -0.05
7520 Savannah, GA 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01
6920 Sacramento, CA 0.07 0.08 -0.00 0.03 -0.04
7120 Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.02
7880 Springfield, IL -0.08 -0.21 -0.05 0.03 0.14
840 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX -0.06 -0.15 0.00 0.04 0.05
5160 Mobile, AL -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.01
8440 Topeka, KS 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.00
3120 Grnsboro-Wnstn-Salm-HighPnt, NC -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.01
6120 Peoria, IL -0.17 -0.29 -0.07 0.04 0.16
3740 Kankakee, IL -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.06
3960 Lake Charles, LA -0.06 -0.16 0.02 0.04 0.04
2920 Galveston-Texas City, TX -0.04 -0.19 0.01 0.04 0.10
8200 Tacoma, WA -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.02
5560 New Orleans, LA -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.01
8120 Stockton, CA -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01
1480 Charlseton, WV -0.08 -0.21 0.01 0.04 0.09
2840 Fresno, CA -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.01
4890 Medford, OR 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.08
SMSA NAME
EMPCH DOM EXPORT IMPORT PROD
4120 Las Vegas, NV 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.06
7720 Sioux City, IA-NE 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.03
2120 Des Moines, IA -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.03
3980 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.01
680 Bakersfield, CA 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.05
8240 Tallhassee, FL 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.05
3600 Jacksonville, FL -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.00
5520 New London-Norwich, CT -0.08 -0.13 -0.02 0.04 0.03
5200 Monroe, LA -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.04
600 Augusta, GA -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.05
7080 Salem, OR -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.01
7760 Sioux Falls, SD 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00
1000 Birmingham, AL -0.11 -0.20 -0.02 0.04 0.07
7610 Sharon, PA -0.28 -0.39 -0.03 0.04 0.10
760 Baton Rouge, LA -0.04 -0.16 0.00 0.04 0.07
3290 Hickory, NC -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 -0.01
6080 Pensacola, FL 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.00
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH -0.10 -0.16 -0.03 0.05 0.04
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -0.24 -0.29 -0.08 0.05 0.08
1320 Canton, OH -0.15 -0.23 -0.03 0.05 0.06
1960 Davnprt-Rck IsId-Moline, IA-IL -0.19 -0.32 -0.07 0.05 0.15
5170 Modesto, CA -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.03
3880 Lafayette, LA -0.08 -0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.07
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.06
8720 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 0.06 0.00
1400 Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.04
5910 Olympia, WA 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.01
380 Anchorage, AK 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.07
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN -0.40 -0.51 -0.03 0.07 0.07
6560 Pueblo, CO -0.32 -0.44 -0.03 0.07 0.07
SMSA NAME
The data values represent the percentage change in SMSA employment due to domestic (DOM),
import, export, and productivity factors. EMPCH is the net total employment change from the other
four factors.
Data are taken from Helzi Noponen and Yang Shao, "Estimating Metropolitan Trade Sensitivity."
Technical Note Number 1, Mott Project on International Trade and State and Local Economic
Development, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers Univ., July 1990.
APPENDIX D: Sample of Earnings Regression Results Run With and
Without Sample Weights.
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Appendix D Table 1
Regression Results from Microdata Model Predicting Hourly




































































































































































































Appendix D Table 2
Regression Results
Earnings for All Men.




































































































































































Appendix D Table 2
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Prob>F
Model 30 2017.26688 67.24223 204.315 0.0001
Error 16417 5403.00481 0.32911
C Total 16447 7420.27169
Root MSE 0.57368 R-square 0.2719




Appendix D Table 3
Regression Results from Microdata Model Predicting the
Probability of Employment for All Men.
































































































































































































































































Appendix D Table 3 continued:










APPENDIX E: TABLE 1
Results of Regression Analysis Explaining the Variance in Hourly Earnings in 1989, Using Microdata from the
Current Population Survey, Workers with Earnings, Age 25-54
Table of Coefficients Notated for Statistical Significance























































































































































































































































































APPENDIX E: TABLE 2
Results of Regression Analysis Explaining the Variance in Annual Hours of Work in 1989, Using Microdata from the
Current Population Survey, Workers with Earnings Age 25-54
Table of Coefficients Notated for Statistical Significance
*** = significant at the .01 percent level, ** = significant at the .05 percent level, *
Variables

















































































































































































































































































APPENDIX E: TABLE 3
Results of Regression Analysis Explaining the Probability of Employment in 1989, Using Microdata from the
Current Population Survey, Persons with or without earnings, Age 25-54
Table of Coefficients Notated for Statistical Significance















































































































































































































































THE MEAN LEVEL OF ANNUAL EARNINGS BY SMSA IN 1989 DOLLARS




























































































































































































































































































































2020 Daytona Beach, FL 15518.85 2236.77 36 6.94
2120 Des Moines, IA 29462.28 2804.65 58 10.50
2160 Detroit, MI 33598.31 805.38 810 41.72
2240 Duluth, MN-WI 28859.52 2140.33 42 13.48
2320 El Paso, TX 21773.21 2599.28 61 8.38
2360 Erie, PA 23942.02 2899.76 47 8.26
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR 27004.86 2506.76 56 10.77
2440 Evansville, IN-KY 24564.23 1863.18 57 13.18
2560 Fayetteville, NC 19248.18 2573.86 22 7.48
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale, AR 27563.82 5117.55 32 5.39
2640 Flint, MI 36104.37 2643.12 82 13.66
2650 Florence, AL 26727.52 2843.69 17 9.40
2655 Florence, SC 25928.46 3845.45 16 6.74
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 22145.82 3056.6 38 7.25
2680 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood-Pompano Beac 24720.64 1662.5 161 14.87
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 20907.35 2594.22 28 8.06
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK 20732.5 2470.89 42 8.39
2760 Fort Wayne, IN 25938.83 1610.08 80 16.11
2840 Fresno, CA 24869.85 2016.15 86 12.34
2880 Gadsden, AL 25972.97 4470.95 19 5.81
2900 Gainesville, FL 19092.87 2887.48 23 6.61
2920 Galveston-Texas City, TX 24752.65 2775.65 43 8.92
2960 Gary-Hammond, IN 35908.38 1647.48 118 21.80
3000 Grand Rapids, MI 29501.77 1840.1 112 16.03
3120 Greensboro-Winston-Salem-HighPoint, NC 24978.5 1637.88 131 15.25
3160 Greenville-Spartanburg, SC 22830.47 2022.45 110 11.29
3200 Hamilton-Middletown, OH 32905.38 2521.69 48 13.05
3240 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 32892.88 2234.43 79 14.72
3283 Hartford-New Britain-Middletown-Bristol, Cl 33609.31 2330.42 129 14.42























































Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR
Lorain-Elyria, OH

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR
Lorain-Elyria, OH


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Data are calculated from the Current Population Survey of the United States, 1979 and 1989.
9243
9320
APPENDIX G Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables Used in
both the Microdata and SMSA Regression Models.
CORR EMPCH MARRIED NHBLACK HISP
EMPCH 1.0000 -0.0546 -0.0157 0.1116
MARRIED -0.0546 1.0000 -0.1331 0.0138
NHBLACK -0.0157 -0.1331 1.0000 -0.1416
HISP 0.1116 0.0138 -0.1416 1.0000
AGEZ -0.0318 0.1685 -0.0024 -0.0561
AGE2 0.0064 -0.0163 -0.0042 -0.0050
EDUCZ 0.0179 -0.0014 -0.0433 -0.3311
EDUC2 0.0664 0.0144 -0.0522 0.3074
SMSAHR79 0.0921 -0.0479 0.0743 -0.0066
FEMALE 0.0028 -0.0759 0.0600 -0.0227
NEW 0.0648 -0.0255 -0.0675 -0.0755
MAT 
-0.0594 0.0036 0.0210 -0.0196
ENC -0.3069 0.0147 
-0.0004 
-0.1121
WNC 0.0385 0.0083 
-0.0432 -0.0688
SAT 0.0443 -0.0206 0.1320 -0.0561





PAC 0.2557 -0.0111 -0.0758 0.2046
NATRES 0.0145 
-0.0002 -0.0263 0.0843
MINING -0.0176 0.0142 0.0002 -0.0153





DUR -0.0207 0.0324 
-0.0340 0.0091
TUC -0.0130 0.0120 0.0411 -0.0140
WSALE -0.0071 0.0146 -0.0309 -0.0080
FIRE 0.0223 -0.0032 -0.0134 
-0.0340
BUS 0.0376 -0.0232 0.0005 0.0053
PERS 0.0247 -0.0470 0.0239 0.0721
ENTMENT 0.0239 -0.0359 -0.0002 -0.0023
PROF -0.0039 0.0110 0.0413 -0.0652






































































































































































































































































































































CORR ENC WNC SAT ESC
EMPCH -0.3069 0.0385 0.0443 -0.1393
















SMSAER79 0.2183 -0.0982 
-0.1843 -0.0973








-0.1024 1.0000 -0.1108 
-0.0431




-0.1408 -0.0702 -0.1523 -0.0593
PAC 
-0.1943 -0.0969 -0.2103 -0.0819
RATRES 
-0.0218 -0.0067 0.0083 -0.0095
MINING 
-0.0221 -0.0073 -0.0119 0.0017
CONS -0.0281 
-0.0021 0.0098 -0.0060
NONDUR 0.0036 0.0070 0.0082 0.0106
DUR 0.0892 -0.0059 -0.0596 0.0028
TUC 
-0.0021 -0.0063 0.0106 0.0005
WSALE 0.0063 0.0073 0.0002 
-0.0022
FIRE -0.0171 0.0152 0.0007 -0.0017
BUS 
-0.0140 -0.0128 0.0072 -0.0166
PERS 
-0.0204 -0.0130 0.0072 -0.0116
ENTMENT -0.0127 -0.0063 -0.0088 -0.0150
PROF -0.0075 0.0116 -0.0067 0.0012
PUB 
-0.0246 -0.0100 0.0453 0.0063
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Appendix G continued
CORR WSC PAC NATRES MINING
EMPCH -0.0649 0.2557 0.0145 -0.0176
MARRIED 0.0174 -0.0111 -0.0002 0.0142
NHBLACK -0.0064 -0.0758 -0.0263 0.0002
HISP 0.1244 0.2046 0.0843 -0.0153
AGEZ -0.0146 -0.0184 -0.0335 -0.0145
AGE2 -0.0014 -0.0165 0.0006 -0.0212
EDUCZ -0.0327 -0.0838 -0.1139 0.0095
EDUC2 0.0225 0.1306 0.1369 -0.0008
SMSAHR79 -0.1953 0.2042 -0.0521 0.0208
FEMALE 0.0055 -0.0162 -0.0424 -0.0310
NEW -0.0850 -0.1174 -0.0100 -0.0175
MAT -0.1451 -0.2002 -0.0286 -0.0178
ENC -0.1408 -0.1943' -0.0218 -0.0221
WNC -0.0702 -0.0969 -0.0067 -0.0073
SAT -0.1523 -0.2103 0.0083 -0.0119
ESC -0.0593 -0.0819 -0.0095 0.0017
WSC 1.0000 -0.1331 0.0009 0.0739
PAC -0.1331 1.0000 0.0556 0.0107
NATRES 0.0009 0.0556 1.0000 -0.0070
MINING 0.0739 0.0107 -0.0070 1.0000
CONS 0.0109 0.0186 
-0.0284 -0.0166
NONDUR 0.0031 -0.0118 -0.0310 -0.0180
DUR -0.0266 0.0176 -0.0401 -0.0233
TUC 0.0122 -0.0115 -0.0324 -0.0189
WSALE 0.0128 0.0021 -0.0232 -0.0135
FIRE -0.0231 -0.0183 -0.0323 -0.0188
BUS 0.0007 0.0031 -0.0294 -0.0171
PERS 0.0164 0.0021 -0.0203 -0.0118
ENTMENT 0.0016 0.0154 -0.0115 -0.0067
PROF -0.0059 -0.0182 -0.0597 -0.0348
PUB -0.0032 -0.0067 -0.0271 -0.0158
371
Appendix G continued
CORR CONS NONDUR DUR TUC
EMPCH 0.0103 -0.0495 -0.0207 -0.0130
MARRIED 0.0161 -0.0015 0.0324 0.0120
NHBLACK -0.0346 -0.0040 -0.0340 0.0411
HISP 0.0169 0.0608 0.0091 -0.0140
AGEZ -0.0286 -0.0022 0.0404 0.0258
AGE2 -0.0009 -0.0000 0.0223 -0.0160
EDUCZ -0.1117 -0.0908 -0.0716 -0.0247
EDUC2 0.0086 0.0500 0.0078 -0.0603
SMSAHR79 -0.0118 -0.0280 -0.0008 0.0115
FIALE -0.1919 -0.0170 -0.1396 -0.0938
NEW -0.0155 -0.0054 0.0255 -0.0116
MAT -0.0024 0.0139 -0.0265 0.0040
ENC -0.0281 0.0036 0.0892 -0.0021
WNC -0.0021 0.0070 -0.0059 -0.0063
SAT 0.0098 0.0082 -0.0596 0.0106
ESC -0.0060 0.0106 0.0028 0.0005
WSC 0.0109 0.0031 -0.0266 0.0122
PAC 0.0186 -0.0118 0.0176 -0.0115
NATRES -0.0284 -0.0310 -0.0401 -0.0324
MINING -0.0166 -0.0180 -0.0233 -0.0189
CONS 1.0000 -0.0734 -0.0949 -0.0767
NONDUR -0.0734 1.0000 -0.1034 -0.0836
DUR -0.0949 -0.1034 1.0000 -0.1082
TUC -0.0767 -0.0836 -0.1082 1.0000
WSALE -0.0549 -0.0599 -0.0774 -0.0626
FIRE -0.0764 -0.0834 -0.1078 -0.0872
BUS -0.0695 -0.0758 -0.0980 -0.0792
PERS -0.0479 -0.0522 -0.0676 -0.0546
ENTMENT -0.0272 -0.0297 -0.0384 -0.0310
PROF -0.1413 -0.1541 -0.1993 -0.1611
PUB -0.0642 -0.0700 -0.0905 -0.0732
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Appendix G continued
CORR WSALE FIRE BUS PERS
EMPCH -0.0071 0.0223 0.0376 0.0247
MARRIED 0.0146 -0.0032 -0.0232 -0.0470
NHBLACK -0.0309 -0.0134 0.0005 0.0239
HISP -0.0080 -0.0340 0.0053 0.0721
AGEZ -0.0054 -0.0143 -0.0387 -0.0148
AGE2 -0.0041 0.0007 -0.0034 0.0155
EDUCZ 0.0024 0.0687 -0.0010 -0.0947
EDUC2 -0.0195 -0.0442 -0.0083 0.0362
SMSAER79 -0.0124 0.0218 0.0329 -0.0048
FEMALE -0.0692 0.0721 -0.0188 0.0680
NEW -0.0121 0.0203 0.0042 -0.0163
MAT -0.0091 0.0352 0.0117 -0.0148
ENC 0.0063 -0.01.71 -0.0140 -0.0204
WNC 0.0073 0.0152 -0.0128 -0.0130
SAT 0.0002 0.0007 0.0072 0.0072
ESC -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0166 -0.0116
WSC 0.0128 -0.0231 0.0007 0.0164
PAC 0.0021 -0.0183 0.0031 0.0021
NATRES -0.0232 -0.0323 -0.0294 -0.0203
MINING -0.0135 -0.0188 -0.0171 -0.0118
CONS -0.0549 -0.0764 -0.0695 -0.0479
NONDUR -0.0599 -0.0834 -0.0758 -0.0522
DUR -0.0774 -0.1078 -0.0980 -0.0676
TUC -0.0626 -0.0872 -0.0792 -0.0546
WSALE 1.0000 -0.0624 -0.0567 -0.0391
FIRE -0.0624 1.0000 -0.0789 -0.0544
BUS -0.0567 -0.0789 1.0000 -0.0495
PERS -0.0391 -0.0544 -0.0495 1.0000
ENTMENT -0.0222 -0.0309 -0.0281 -0.0194
PROF -0.1153 -0.1606 -0.1459 -0.1006
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